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ABSTRACT
ECONOMICS OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
Gaurav S. Kasbekar
Supervisor: Saswati Sarkar
Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are emerging as a promising technology for the ef-
ficient use of radio spectrum. In these networks, there are two levels of networks on
each channel, primary and secondary, and secondary users can use the channel when-
ever the primary is not using it. Spectrum allocation in CRNs poses several challenges
not present in traditional wireless networks; the goal of this dissertation is to address
some of the economic aspects thereof. Broadly, spectrum allocation in CRNs can be
done in two ways– (i) one-step allocation in which the spectrum regulator simultane-
ously allocates spectrum to primary and secondary users in a single allocation and (ii)
two-step allocation in which the spectrum regulator first allocates spectrum to primary
users, who in turn, allocate unused portions on their channels to secondary users.
For the two-step allocation scheme, we consider a spectrum market in which trading
of bandwidth among primaries and secondaries is done. When the number of primaries
and secondaries is small, we analyze price competition among the primaries using the
framework of game theory and seek to find Nash equilibria. We analyze the cases both
when all the players are located in a single small location and when they are spread over
a large region and spatial reuse of spectrum is done. When the number of primaries and
vii
secondaries is large, we consider different types of spectrum contracts derived from
raw spectrum and analyze the problem of optimal dynamic selection of a portfolio of
long-term and short-term contracts to sell or buy from the points of view of primary
and secondary users.
For the one-step allocation scheme, we design an auction framework using which
the spectrum regulator can simultaneously allocate spectrum to primary and secondary
users with the objective of either maximizing its own revenue or maximizing the social
welfare. We design different bidding languages, which the users can use to compactly
express their bids in the auction, and polynomial-time algorithms for choosing the al-
location of channels to the bidders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The last decade has seen a tremendous proliferation in the use of different wireless net-
work technologies such as cellular networks, Wireless Local Area Networks, Wireless
Meteropolitan Area networks etc, resulting in a proportionate increase in demand for
radio spectrum. As a result, there is a widespread belief that radio spectrum is becom-
ing increasingly crowded. However, spectrum measurements indicate that the allocated
spectrum is under-utilized, i.e., at any given time and location, much of the spectrum is
unused [21]. This is because, in the traditional spectrum licensing model, a spectrum
regulator (e.g. the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States),
allocates spectrum by assigning exclusive licenses to service providers to operate their
networks on different bands. So a band lies idle when not in use by the license holder
1
on the band.
Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) [2] are emerging as a promising solution to this
dilemma. In these networks, there are two levels of networks on a channel– primary
networks and secondary networks. A primary network has priortized access to the
band, whereas a secondary network can access the band when the primary is not using
it. CRNs allow a more efficient use of spectrum than traditional networks in which
each band is used by a single network– spectrum that would have been idle in the latter
case can be used by secondary networks in the former. CRNs have been enabled by
the cognitive radio technology [28], [29] that allows secondary nodes to detect which
channel is not being used by primary nodes, share this channel with other nodes and
vacate the channel when a primary node is detected. Surveys on CRNs can be found
in [2] and [75].
Spectrum allocation in CRNs poses several challenges not present in traditional
wireless networks; the goal of this dissertation is to address some of the economic as-
pects thereof. Broadly, there are two possibilities for spectrum allocation in CRNs [51].
In the first possibility, which we refer to as one-step allocation, the regulator simulta-
neously allocates the rights to be the primary and secondary networks on the channels
in a single allocation, e.g. by an auction. This is a natural extension of spectrum al-
location in traditional wireless networks– e.g. the FCC has been conducting spectrum
auctions [1] since 1994 to allocate (exclusive) licenses to service providers. In the
other possibility, which we refer to as two-step allocation, the regulator allocates chan-
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nels to primary networks, which then independently allocate unused portions on their
channels to secondary networks. The transition from the spectrum allocation process
in traditional wireless networks to the two step allocation process in CRNs is perhaps
more imminent owing to the decomposition of the allocation process into two steps,
as opposed to the one-step allocation process which will require the involvement of a
larger set of players in auctions involving the regulator. Hence, we first study the two-
step allocation scenario in Chapters 2 to 6 and then the one-step allocation scenario in
Chapter 7.
We now describe some challenges that arise in each of the above two possibilities.
In the two-step allocation scenario, trading of bandwidth between primaries and sec-
ondaries can be done through a market mechanism, in which primaries quote prices
at which they are willing to sell bandwidth, and then sell it to interested secondaries.
There are two possible cases, depending on whether the number of players (primaries
and secondaries) is large or small. When the number of players is small in the two-
step allocation scenario, each player exerts a considerable amount of influence on the
market. In this case, the price is not necessarily set at a competitive level by the mar-
ket. Instead, there may be price competition in which each primary must decide how to
price its bandwidth, the tradeoff being that a low price will attract more buyers for its
bandwidth and a high price will fetch a high profit if the bandwidth is sold. A CRN has
several distinguishing features, which makes the price competition in CRNs different
from that in traditional commodity markets, e.g. (i) there is uncertainty about whether
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a primary has unused bandwidth in a given time slot and (ii) spectrum is a commodity
that allows spatial reuse, i.e. the same band can be used at far-off locations without
interference. A problem of interest is to study the behavior of players in this price
competition setup. This problem constitutes the bulk of this dissertation, we address it
using the framework of game theory [43], and it is the subject of Chapters 2 to 5.
When there are a large number of primaries and secondaries, the amount of influ-
ence that an individual player exerts on the market is typically small, and the price of
bandwidth is set at a competitive level, which is determined by the market. In this case,
a problem facing a primary that owns multiple channels 1 is to dynamically select the
durations for which to lease each of these to secondaries and whether to provide service
guarantees on these “bandwidth contracts”. The corresponding problem facing the sec-
ondaries is to buy an appropriate mix or portfolio of different types of contracts. Since a
primary’s demand for bandwidth evolves stochastically over time, if it sells a long-term
contract on a band and guarantees availability of the bandwidth over this duration, then
it may need to pay a hefty penalty as compensation to the buyer if the primary is later
forced to use the band to satisfy its own demand for bandwidth. On the other hand, it
may wish to sell a lot of long-term contracts if their market price is much higher than
that of short-term contracts. Similar tradeoffs are faced by the secondaries. We address
this problem of selection of a portfolio of spectrum contracts for both the primary and
the secondary using the stochastic dynamic programming framework, as discussed in
1When there are a small number of players, we assume for tractability that each primary owns only
one channel. When there are a large number of players, we allow a primary to own multiple channels.
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Chapter 6.
Now, in the one-step allocation scenario mentioned above, the regulator needs to
select the networks that will be the primary and secondary networks on each band, with
the goal of either maximizing the social welfare or its own revenue. Different networks
may have different traffic demands and utilities, and hence may assign different valua-
tions to a given allocation of primary and secondary rights on the bands. A problem is
to design a mechanism that allows networks to compactly express their valuations for
different channel allocations, and efficient algorithms that allocate the channels based
on the submitted valuations. We have designed an auction mechanism for this problem,
which we discuss in Chapter 7.
1.2 Our Contributions and Related Work
As explained above, this dissertation consists of three parts– (i) spectrum pricing games,
(ii) dynamic contract trading in spectrum markets and (iii) spectrum auction framework
for access allocation. Now we outline our contributions and overview related work in
each of these parts.
1.2.1 Spectrum Pricing Games
We study price competition in a CRN when there are a small number of primaries and
secondaries. Each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for its
bandwidth than other primaries. A CRN has several distinctive features, which makes
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the price competition very different from that in traditional commodity markets. First,
in every time slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. Sec-
ond, the number of secondaries will be random and not known apriori as each secondary
may be a local spectrum provider or even a user shopping for spectrum in a futuristic
scenario, e.g., users at airports, hotspots, etc. Thus, each primary who has unused band-
width is uncertain about the number of primaries from whom it will face competition
as well as the demand for bandwidth; it may only have access to imperfect information
such as statistical distributions about either. A low price will result in unnecessarily low
revenues in the event that very few other primaries have unused bandwidth or several
secondaries are shopping for bandwidth, because even with a higher price the primary’s
bandwidth would have been bought, and vice versa. Third, spectrum is a commodity
that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simultaneously used at far-off locations
without interference; on the other hand, simultaneous transmissions at neighboring lo-
cations on the same band interfere with each other. As a result, a primary cannot offer
bandwidth at all locations, but must select an independent set of locations at which to
offer it. Also, the choice of the independent set and the prices at those locations must be
made jointly. We formulate price competition in a CRN as a game, taking into account
bandwidth uncertainty, a random number of secondaries and spatial reuse. We analyze
the game in a single slot, as well as its repeated version.
In the one-shot game at a single location, we explicitly compute the Nash Equi-
librium [43] (NE) and show its uniqueness (Chapter 3). The proof is complicated by
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the fact that the strategies of the primaries being prices, the strategy sets are contin-
uous; also the utility functions are not continuous. Also, we allow the probabilities
with which different primaries have unused bandwidth to be arbitrary and unequal; this
asymmetry further complicates the analysis. The NE turns out to be of a mixed-strategy
type, i.e. each primary randomly chooses his price from a range. The structure of the
NE provides several insights into the price competition among primaries (discussed in
Section 3.3.5).
Next, we analyze the repeated game version of the one-shot game (Section 3.4), and
show that there exists an efficient NE in which each primary sets the highest possible
price and as a result, the sum of expected revenues of the primaries is maximized. This
is achieved through a threat mechanism: if any primary lowers its price in a slot, all
others retaliate in future slots by playing the one-shot game NE strategy and hence the
primary suffers in the long run.
We then analyze a generalization of the basic model in which the valuations of sec-
ondary users for unit bandwidth are not constant, but random variables whose distri-
butions are known (Chapter 4). We explicitly compute the symmetric NE in this game
and show its uniqueness in the class of symmetric NE.
Finally, we consider the game with spatial reuse (Chapter 5), in which each primary
owns bandwidth over a large region containing several smaller locations, which we
model as an undirected graph. Each primary must simultaneously choose a set of mu-
tually non-interfering (an independent set of) locations at which to offer bandwidth and
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the price of bandwidth at each of those locations. We focus on a special class of graphs,
which we refer to as mean valid graphs, such that the conflict graphs corresponding to
a large number of topologies that arise in practice are mean valid graphs. We explicitly
compute a NE in mean valid graphs and show its uniqueness in the class of NE with
symmetric independent set selection probability mass functions of the primaries.
Fig. 1.1 summarizes the main results.
Figure 1.1: The figure summarizes the main results obtained in the “spectrum pricing games” part of the
dissertation (Chapters 2 to 5).
Related Work: Pricing related issues have been extensively studied in the context
of wired networks and the Internet; see [12] for an overview. Price competition among
spectrum providers in wireless networks has been studied in [30], [40], [41], [74], [46], [47].
Specifically, Niyato et. al. analyze price competition among multiple primaries in
CRNs [46], [47]. However, neither uncertain bandwidth availability, nor spatial reuse
is modeled in any of the above papers. Also, most of these papers do not explicitly find
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a NE (exceptions are [40], [46]). Our model incorporates both uncertain bandwidth
availability and spatial reuse, which makes the problem challenging; despite this, we
are able to explicitly compute a NE. Zhou et. al. [77] have designed double auction
based spectrum trades in which an auctioneer chooses an allocation taking into account
spatial reuse and bids. However, in the price competition model we consider, each pri-
mary independently sells bandwidth, and hence a central entity such as an auctioneer is
not required.
In the economics literature, the Cournot game and the Bertand game are two basic
models that have been widely used to study competition among sellers in oligopolies [42].
In a Cournot game, sellers choose the quantity of a good to produce as opposed to prices
in a Bertrand game, and hence the latter is more relevant to our model. In a Bertrand
game, each seller quotes a price for a good, and the buyers buy from the seller that
quotes the lowest price 2 [42]. Several variants of the Bertrand game have been stud-
ied, e.g., [48], [36], [31], [34], [9]. Osborne et al [48] consider price competition in
a duopoly, when the capacity of each firm is constrained. Chawla et al. [9] consider
price competition in networks where each seller owns a capacity-constrained link, and
decides the price for using it; the consumers choose paths they would use in the net-
works based on the prices declared and pay the sellers accordingly. The capacities in
both cases are deterministic, whereas the availability of bandwidth is random in our
model. The closest to our work are [31], [34], which analyze price competition where
each seller may be inactive with some probability and find a Nash equilibrium [42]
2If two or more sellers quote the lowest price, the demand is equally shared between them.
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(NE), which they show to be unique. However, the results in [31], [34] are restricted
to the case of one buyer; but, a CRN is likely to have multiple secondaries, which we
consider. Also, [31], [34] analyze only the symmetric model where the probability of
owning the good is the same for each seller. Also, in [31], it is only shown that the
NE is unique in the class of symmetric NE. In [34], uniqueness in the class of all NE is
shown only for the case of a single buyer (and symmetric good availability probabili-
ties). Moreover, unlike [31], [34], we consider repeated interactions among primaries,
unequal probabilities of availability of unused bandwidth and random valuations for
secondaries (Chapters 3 and 4).
Finally, none of the above papers [48], [36], [31], [34], [9] consider the spectrum-
specific issue of spatial reuse, which introduces a new dimension, that each player
not only needs to determine the price of the commodity he owns (as in [48], [36],
[31], [34], [9]), but also select an independent set to compete in. The joint decision
problem significantly complicates the analysis.
1.2.2 Dynamic Contract Trading in Spectrum Markets
We consider a spectrum market with a large number of primary and secondary providers 3.
Providers in both categories have their subscriber (e.g., TV or mobile communication
subscriber) bases whom they need to serve using the spectrum they respectively license
from the FCC or buy in the spectrum market.
3We use the terms primary network (respectively, secondary network), primary provider (respectively,
secondary provider) and primary (respectively, secondary) interchangeably.
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A question that is key to the efficient operation of the spectrum market is how the
primary and the secondary providers should trade bandwidth contracts dynamically,
based on time-varying demand patterns arising from their subscribers, to maximize
their returns while satisfying their subscriber base. We consider two basic forms of
contracts that are used for selling/buying spectral resources: i) Guaranteed-bandwidth
(Type-G) contracts, and (ii) Opportunistic-access (Type-O) contracts. Under the Type-
G contracts, a secondary provider purchases a guaranteed amount of bandwidth (in
units of frequency bands or sub-bands) for a specified duration of time (typically a
“long term”) from a primary provider, and pays a fixed fee (either as a lump-sum or
as a periodic payment through the duration of the contract) irrespective of how much
it uses this bandwidth. If after selling the contract, the primary is unable to provide
the promised bandwidth (this may for example happen when the primary is forced to
use a band it has sold due to an unexpected rise in its subscriber demand), the primary
financially compensates the secondary for contractual violation. On the other hand,
Type-O contracts are short-term (one time unit in our model), and a secondary which
buys a Type-O contract pays only for the amount of bandwidth it actually uses on the
corresponding band. The primary does not provide any guarantee on a Type-O contract
and may use the channel sold as a Type-O contract without incurring any penalty. Thus,
a Type-O contract provides the secondary the right to use the channel if the primary is
not using it.
The spectrum contract trading problem that we formulate and solve allows the pri-
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mary (respectively, secondary) provider to dynamically adjust its spectrum contract
portfolio, i.e, choose how much of each type of contract to sell (respectively, buy) at
any time, so as to maximize (respectively, minimize) its profit (respectively, cost) sub-
ject to satisfying its own subscriber demand that varies with time, and given the current
market prices of Type-G and Type-O contracts which also vary with time.
We separately address the Primary’s Spectrum Contract Trading (Primary-SCT)
problem and the Secondary’s Spectrum Contract Trading (Secondary-SCT) problem.
We formulate each problem as a finite horizon stochastic dynamic program whose
computation time is polynomial in the input size. We prove several structural prop-
erties of the optimum solutions. For example, we show that the optimal number of
Type-G contracts, for both primary and secondary providers, are monotone (increasing
or decreasing) functions of the subscribers’ demands and the contract prices. These
structural results provide more insight into the problems, and allow us to develop faster
algorithms for solving the dynamic programs. Also, using numerical evaluations, we
investigate properties of the optimal solutions and demonstrate that the revenues they
earn substantially outperform static spectrum portfolio optimization strategies that de-
termine the portfolio based on the steady-state statistics of the contract price and sub-
scriber demand processes.
Note that the spectrum contract trading problem differs in several key aspects from
the problem of trading traditional goods such as stocks, bonds, foodgrains etc. First,
both the primary and the secondary must decide their trading strategies considering
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their subscriber demand which changes with time. For example, a primary (respec-
tively, secondary) cannot simply decide to sell (respectively, buy) a large number of
Type-G contracts at any given time at which their market prices are high (respectively,
low). This is because a primary will need to pay a hefty penalty if it can not deliver the
promised bandwidth owing to an increase in its subscriber demand, and the secondary
will need to pay for the contract even if it does not use the corresponding bands ow-
ing to a decrease in its subscriber demand. Next, spectrum usage must satisfy certain
spatial constraints that are perhaps unique. Specifically, a frequency band cannot be
simultaneously successfully used at neighboring locations (without causing significant
interference), but can be simultaneously successfully used at geographically disparate
locations. Thus, the spectrum trading solution for the primary provider must also take
into account spatial constraints for spectrum reuse, and therefore the computation of
the optimal trading strategy requires a joint optimization across all locations. We prove
a surprising separation theorem in this context: when the same signal is broadcast at all
locations, the Primary-SCT problem can be solved separately for each location and the
individual optimal solutions can subsequently be combined so as to optimally satisfy
the global reuse constraints, and obtain the same revenue as the solution of a computa-
tionally prohibitive joint optimization across locations.
Related Work: The need for bringing market-based reform in spectrum trading, with
the goal of ensuring efficient use of spectrum and fairness in allocation and pricing
of bandwidth, is being increasingly recognized by both economists and engineers [8,
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20, 49, 50, 52, 68]. The literature on the economics of spectrum allocation has so far
mostly focused on the debate of spectrum commons [38, 49, 50] and spectrum auction
mechanism design [33, 53, 65, 64]. Spectrum sharing games and/or pricing issues have
been considered in [14, 18, 44, 24, 59]. A clear design of the spectrum market structure,
precise definition of spectrum contracts, or how the different contracts can be optimally
traded in a dynamic market environment is yet to emerge. This is the space in which
we contribute in this dissertation (Chapter 6).
The question we address in Chapter 6 also differs significantly from existing re-
lated work in the Economics and Operations Research literature. In the inventory prob-
lem [60], [63], a firm maintains an inventory of some good to meet customer demand,
which is uncertain. The firm needs to decide the amount to purchase in every slot of a
finite or infinite horizon. There is a tradeoff between purchasing and storing costs of
the inventory and the cost of not satisfying customers. This is somewhat related to our
model, in which a secondary provider needs to decide the number of Type-G and Type-
O contracts to buy in every time slot to meet its subscriber demand. However, contracts
in our model have a different nature from goods in the inventory model: e.g., Type-G
contracts, once bought, can be used in every subsequent time slot to satisfy subscriber
demand, whereas goods in an inventory can be used only once to satisfy customer de-
mand. This aspect of Type-G contracts is loosely related to production capacity: once
a firm installs capacity, it can be used to manufacture goods in all subsequent time pe-
riods. In capacity expansion problems [16], [39], a firm needs to optimally decide the
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volumes, times, and locations of production plants; the tradeoff is that if capacity falls
short of demand, the demand cannot be met; on the other hand, if capacity exceeds
demand, the excess capacity is wasted. However, our model differs in several aspects
from the capacity expansion problem: e.g., (i) there is no counterpart of Type-O con-
tracts in the capacity expansion model, (ii) Type-G contracts can be bought on the spot,
whereas capacity installation typically needs to be planned in advance. Finally, spa-
tial reuse constraints being spectrum-specific, are not considered in either inventory or
capacity expansion models.
1.2.3 Spectrum Auction Design
We consider a scenario in which the regulator conducts an auction to sell the rights to
be the primary and secondary networks on a set of channels. Networks can bid for
these rights based on their utilities and traffic demands. The regulator uses these bids
to solve the access allocation problem, i.e., the problem of deciding which networks
will be the primary and secondary networks on each channel. The goal of the regu-
lator may be either to maximize its revenue or to maximize the social welfare of the
bidding networks. Now, networks can have utilities or valuations that are functions of
the number of channels on which they get primary and secondary rights, how many and
which other networks they share these channels with etc. The number of valuations of
a network may be large and an exponential amount of space may be required to express
a bid for each valuation. So we design bidding languages, that is, compact formats
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for networks to express bids for their valuations. For different bidding languages, we
design algorithms for the access allocation problem.
We first consider the case when the bids of a network depend on which other net-
works it will share channels with. When there is only one secondary network on
each channel, we design an optimal polynomial-time algorithm for the access alloca-
tion problem based on reduction to a maximum matching problem in weighted graphs.
When there can be two or more secondary networks on a channel, we show that the op-
timal access allocation problem is NP-Complete. Next, we consider the case when the
bids of a network are independent of which other networks it will share channels with.
We design a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm to optimally solve the
access allocation problem when the number of possible cardinalities of the set of sec-
ondary networks on a channel is upper-bounded. Finally, we design a polynomial-time
algorithm that approximates the access allocation problem within a factor of 2 when
the above upper bound does not exist.
Related Work: Spectrum auctions have been studied in [22], [76], [61], [27], [32], [62].
In [22], [76] a framework is developed to distribute spectrum in real-time to a set of
wireless users. Channel allocation is done under interference constraints, in which the
same channel cannot be allocated to two or more users whose transmissions interfere
with each other. The mechanism in [76] is strategy-proof, that is, under the mechanism
buyers find it in their best interest to bid according to their true valuations. In [61], there
is a set of bidders and multiple chunks of spectrum. The paper investigates sequential
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and concurrent auction mechanisms to allocate the chunks of spectrum to the bidders
such that each bidder is allocated at most one chunk. In [27], a set of spread spectrum
users is considered, who share the spectrum with the owner of the spectrum. The goal
is to design auctions to allocate the transmit power to each user subject to a limit on
the interference at a measurement location. In [32], there are multiple primary users
who own the licenses to channels in a region and multiple secondary users who are
interested in leasing the unused portions of the channels of the primaries. The paper
proposes a double auction mechanism with multiple sellers (the primaries) and multi-
ple buyers (the secondaries). In [62], a knapsack based auction model is proposed to
allocate spectrum to providers while maximizing revenue and spectrum usage.
We now explain how our work differs from previous work. In some of the existing
work on spectrum auctions [22], [76], [61], [62] each channel is assigned to a single
network, i.e., there is no notion of primary and secondary networks on a single channel.
We consider the case when there is a primary network and one or more secondary
networks on each channel. As explained above, there are two possibilities, one-step
and two-step allocation, for allocating secondary rights on channels [51]. Auctions
have been designed for the two-step allocation scenario in [27] and [32]. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first to design an auction for the one-step allocation
scenario.
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1.3 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, to gain insight, we
analyze a simplified symmetric model for the two-step allocation scenario in which
there are a small number of primaries and secondaries in a region. We also analyze a
simplified symmetric model, which provides insight. Chapter 3 analyzes the general
asymmetric model– both the game in a single slot and its infinitely repeated version.
Chapter 4 considers a generalization in which the valuations of the secondaries are
random and Chapter 5 considers the model with spatial reuse of spectrum. Chapter 6 is
on dynamic contract trading in spectrum markets and Chapter 7 describes our auction
framework for the one-step allocation scenario. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Spectrum Pricing Games: A
Symmetric Analysis
In this chapter and the next three chapters, we consider Cognitive Radio Networks
(CRNs) with a small number of primaries and secondaries; in this scenario, each player
exerts a significant influence on the market price of bandwidth.
2.1 Introduction
Consider a CRN with multiple primaries and multiple secondaries. Price competition
in a CRN has the distinguishing feature that in every slot, each primary may or may not
have bandwidth available. We model this price competition as a game [43] and seek a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) in it. Since prices can take real values, the strategy sets of play-
ers are continuous. In addition, the utilities of the primaries are not continuous func-
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tions of their actions. Thus, classical results, including those for concave and potential
games, do not establish the existence and uniqueness of NE in the resulting game, and
there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE unlike when each player’s strategy set is
finite [43]. Nevertheless, as described in Chapter 3, we are able to explicitly compute a
NE and show that it is unique in the class of all NE, allowing for player strategies that
are arbitrary mixtures of continuous and discrete probability distributions.
Our results also apply to any price competition setting where the sellers’ supply
is uncertain. In particular, microgrids [37] are a newly emerging technology for dis-
tributed electricity generation, which consist of a connected network of generators (e.g.,
solar panels, wind turbines) and loads (e.g., households, factories). There is uncertainty
in the power generated by a generator at a given time, e.g., the power produced by a so-
lar panel on a given day depends on the availability of sunlight. Our results characterize
NE in pricing games in such electricity markets.
In this chapter, we intuitively analyze a simplified symmetric model, which provides
insight. In the next chapter, we provide a formal analysis of the general model.
2.2 Model
Suppose there are n≥ 2 primaries and k ≥ 1 secondaries in a region. Each primary owns
1 channel, which corresponds to 1 unit of bandwidth. Each secondary may constitute a
customer who requires 1 unit of bandwidth, or may simply be a demand for 1 unit of
bandwidth. For simplicity, in this chapter, we assume that the number of secondaries k
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is a constant that is known to the primaries, and in the next chapter generalize our results
to the case where the number of secondaries is random and unknown. Time is divided
into slots of equal duration. In every slot, the channel of each primary is independently
free (unused) with probability (w.p.) q ∈ (0,1); i.e., each primary independently has
1 unit of unused bandwidth w.p. q. For simplicity, in this chapter, we assume that
this probability is the same for all the primaries. In the next chapter, we generalize
our results to the case in which the primaries have unused bandwidth with arbitrary
and possibly different probabilities. A primary i who has unused bandwidth in a slot
can lease it out to a secondary for the duration of the slot, in return for an access fee
of pi. Leasing in a slot incurs a cost of c ≥ 0. This cost may arise, for example, if
the secondary uses the primary’s infrastructure to access the Internet. We assume that
pi ≤ v for each primary, for some constant v > c. This upper bound v may arise as
follows:
1. The spectrum regulator may impose this upper bound to ensure that primaries
do not excessively overprice bandwidth even when competition is limited owing
to bandwidth scarcity or high demands from secondaries, or when the primaries
collude.
2. Alternatively, the valuation of each secondary for 1 unit of bandwidth may be v,
and no secondary will buy bandwidth at a price that exceeds his valuation.
We initially assume that the primaries know this upper limit v, which is likely to be the
case for the first interpretation. For the second interpretation, the primaries need not
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know the secondaries’ valuations– we consider this generalization in Chapter 4.
Secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer the lowest price. More
precisely, in a given slot, let Z be the number of primaries who offer unused bandwidth.
Then the bandwidth of the min(Z,k) primaries that offer the lowest prices is bought
(ties are resolved at random).
2.3 Game Formulation
We formulate the above price competition among primaries as a game, which is any
situation in which multiple individuals called players interact with each other, such that
each player’s welfare depends on the actions of others [42]. In our model, the primaries
are the players, and the action of primary i is the price pi that he chooses
4. For the
most part of this dissertation, we study the interaction of the primaries in a single slot,
which is referred to as the one-shot game. In Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, we consider a
setting where the one-shot game is repeated an infinite number of times, referred to as
the repeated game.
The utility or payoff of a player in a game is a numerical measure of his satisfaction
level [42], which in our context is the corresponding primary’s net revenue. In (the one-
shot version of) our game, the utility of primary i is 0 if he has no unused bandwidth.
4If primary i has no unused bandwidth, it does not matter what price pi he sets. Yet, for convenience,
we speak of pi as being his action.
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Let ui(p1, . . . , pn) denote his utility
5 if he has unused bandwidth 6 and primary j sets a
price of p j, j = 1, . . . ,n. Thus,
ui(p1, . . . , pn) =



pi − c if primary i sells his bandwidth
0 otherwise
Recall that the distribution function (d.f.) [19] of a random variable (r.v.) X is the
function:
G(x) = P(X ≤ x), x ∈ R
where R is the set of real numbers. Now, a strategy [42] for primary i is a plan for
choosing his price pi. We allow each primary i to choose his price randomly from a set
of prices using an arbitrary d.f. ψi(.), which is referred to as the strategy of primary i.
A d.f. that concentrates its entire mass on a single value allows a primary to determin-
istically choose this value as his price– such a ψ(.) is referred to as a pure strategy. The
5The utility of any primary i who has unused bandwidth depends on whether he sells his bandwidth,
which depends on other primaries’ bandwidth availabilities that are random and not included in the action
space. The expected utility (if the expectation is taken over the availabilities) however depends only on
the primaries’ actions. For example, if n = 2,k = 1, if primary 1 has unused bandwidth, his expected
utility is
E[u1(p1, p2)] =



p1 − c if p1 < p2
(p1 − c)/2 if p1 = p2
(1− q2)(p1 − c) if p1 > p2.
So, in game theoretic terminology, the above expected utility ought to be considered as the utility of
a primary. We will consider the expectation in defining the Nash equilibrium and also in our proofs.
Finally, note that the expected utility is not a continuous function of the actions (prices).
6If instead, ui(p1, . . . , pn) were defined to be primary i’s net revenue, unconditional on whether he
has unused bandwidth or not, then his expected utility in the one-shot game analysis would be scaled
everywhere by q.
23
vector (ψ1(.), . . . ,ψn(.)) of strategies of the primaries is called a strategy profile [42].
Let ψ−i = (ψ1(.), . . . ,ψi−1(.),ψi+1(.), . . . ,ψn(.)) denote the vector of strategies of pri-
maries other than i. Let E{ui(ψi(.),ψ−i)} denote the expected utility of player i when
he adopts strategy ψi(.) and the other players adopt ψ−i.
We use the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept, which has been extensively
used in game theory in general and wireless network applications in particular to predict
the outcome of a game. Several arguments have been proposed in the literature for using
NE as a solution concept, e.g. it is a necessary condition if there is a unique predicted
outcome to a game, a strategy profile can be a “focal point” only if it is a NE etc. (see
Section 8.D in [42] for a detailed discussion). A NE is a strategy profile such that no
player can improve his expected utility by unilaterally deviating from his strategy [42].
Thus, (ψ∗1(.), . . . ,ψ
∗
n(.)) is a NE if for each primary i:
E{ui(ψ
∗
i (.),ψ
∗
−i)} ≥ E{ui(ψ̃i(.),ψ
∗
−i)}, ∀ ψ̃i(.) (1)
When players other than i play ψ−i, ψ
∗
i (.) maximizes i’s expected utility and is thus his
best-response [42] to ψ−i.
2.4 Symmetric NE
Since the bandwidth availability probability of each primary is the same (equal to q),
the game in Section 2.2 is a symmetric game, which is one in which all players have the
same action sets and utility functions.
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We focus on a specific class of Nash equilibria, known as symmetric Nash equilib-
ria. A NE (ψ∗1(.), . . . ,ψ
∗
n(.)) is a symmetric NE if all players play identical strategies
under it, i.e., ψ∗1(.) = ψ
∗
2(.) = . . . = ψ
∗
n(.). In practice it is challenging to implement
any other NE– the simple example of two primaries and a NE of (ψ∗1(.),ψ
∗
2(.)) elu-
cidates the inherent complications in the current context. If ψ∗1(.) 6= ψ
∗
2(.), then since
players have the same action sets, utility functions and probability of having unused
bandwidth (i.e., the game is a symmetric game), (ψ∗2(.),ψ
∗
1(.)) also constitutes a NE.
If player 1 knows that player 2 is playing ψ∗2(.) (ψ
∗
1(.) respectively), he would choose
the best response ψ∗1(.) (ψ
∗
2(.) respectively), but he cannot know player 2’s choice be-
tween the two options without explicitly coordinating with him, which is again ruled
out due to the competition between the two. Under symmetric NE, all players play
the same strategy, and thus this quandary is somewhat limited– symmetric NE has in-
deed been advocated for symmetric games by several game theorists [10]. The natural
question now is whether there exists at least one symmetric NE, and also whether there
is a unique symmetric NE (only uniqueness will eliminate the above quandary). Note
that some symmetric games are known to have multiple symmetric NE. For example,
consider the simple “Meeting in New York game” [42] with two players, where each
player can either be at Grand Central or at Empire State Building, and both receive
unit utility if they meet and zero utility otherwise. The strategies where each player is
at Grand Central, and where each player is at Empire State Building, both constitute
symmetric NE. We prove existence of a symmetric NE, by explicitly computing one,
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and subsequently prove that it is the unique symmetric NE in our context.
2.5 Nash Equilibria
If k ≥ n, then the number of buyers is always greater than or equal to the number of
sellers. So a primary i will sell his unused bandwidth even when he chooses the maxi-
mum possible price v. So the strategy profile under which all primaries deterministically
choose the price v is the unique NE. So henceforth, we assume that k ≤ n−1.
Theorem 1. There is no pure strategy NE (i.e., one where every primary selects his
price deterministically) in the above game.
Before proving Theorem 1, we state a definition. A strategy pi of player i is said to
strictly dominate [42] another strategy p′i if:
E{ui(pi, p−i)}> E{ui(p
′
i, p−i)}, ∀p−i
Proof of Theorem 1. For every primary i, and any p−i, ui(c, p−i)= 0. Also, E{ui(pi, p−i)}>
0 for all pi ∈ (c,v] because primary i gets a positive payoff in the event that no other
primary has unused bandwidth, which happens with positive probability. Thus, the
strategy pi = c is strictly dominated by each pi ∈ (c,v], and hence no primary sets
pi = c in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Suppose (p1, . . . , pn) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where c < pi ≤ v for i =
1, . . . ,n. Let pmin = min(p1, . . . , pn), Smin = {i : pi = pmin}, and nmin = |Smin|. Note that
Smin is the set of primaries who set the lowest price pmin, and nmin is its cardinality. One
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of the following two cases must hold:
Case (i): nmin ≤ k
Since k ≤ n− 1, nmin ≤ n− 1 and hence at least one primary sets a price above pmin.
Since pi ≤ v, i = 1, . . . ,n, it follows that pmin < v.
Let p j = min{pi : i /∈ Smin} be the second lowest price. Now, note that ∀i ∈ Smin,
ui(pmin, p−i) = pmin − c and ui(p
′
i, p−i) = p
′
i − c ∀p
′
i ∈ (pmin, p j). This is because the
bandwidth of primary i always gets sold for any p′i < p j, since it is among the primaries
with the nmin ≤ k lowest prices. So ∀i ∈ Smin:
ui(pmin, p−i)< ui(p
′
i, p−i) ∀p
′
i ∈ (pmin, p j)
Hence pi = pmin is not a best response to p−i, which contradicts the assumption that
(p1, . . . , pn) is a Nash equilibrium.
Case (ii): nmin > k
In this case, for i ∈ Smin:
E{ui(pmin, p−i)}= (pmin − c)P(E1)
where E1 is the event that primary i’s bandwidth is bought by a secondary. Note that
P(E1) < 1 because with a positive probability, k or more primaries, other than i, in
Smin have unused bandwidth. In this case, k randomly selected primaries, out of the
primaries in Smin who have unused bandwidth, sell their bandwidth, and with a positive
probability, primary i is not among them. Also, note that primary i’s bandwidth is
always sold if it sets a price less than pmin and the vector of prices of primaries other
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than i is p−i. Hence, for small enough ε > 0:
E{ui(pmin − ε, p−i)} = (pmin − ε− c)
> (pmin − c)P(E1)
= E{ui(pmin, p−i)}
Thus, pi = pmin is not a best response, which contradicts the assumption that (p1, . . . , pn)
is a Nash equilibrium.
In contrast, in the Bertrand game, which corresponds to q = 1 in our model, the pure
strategy profile under which each primary deterministically selects c as his price is the
unique NE [42]. This strategy profile is not a NE in our context as this provides 0 utility
for each primary, whereas by quoting any price above c (and less than or equal to v)
each primary can attain a positive utility since he will sell his unused bandwidth at least
when he is the only primary that has unused bandwidth which happens with positive
probability (since q < 1).
In the rest of this chapter, we intuitively derive the symmetric NE in the above
game, which turns out to be the unique symmetric NE. We defer the formal proofs until
Section 3.3.4 in the next chapter.
For convenience, we introduce the notion of “pseudo-price” for each primary. The
pseudo-price of primary j, p′j, is the price he selects if he has unused bandwidth; p
′
j =
v+ 1 otherwise 7. Consider primary 1 and let p′(k),1 denote the k’th smallest pseudo-
price among the pseudo-prices of the rest of the primaries, i.e., p′j, j ∈ {2, . . . ,n} (which
7The choice v+ 1 is arbitrary. Any other value greater than v would also work.
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primary 1 will know only after choosing his price or equivalently pseudo-price). Since
the primaries choose their prices randomly and since their bandwidth availabilities are
random, p′(k),1 is a random variable; let F(.) be its d.f. If primary 1 offers a price of x,
he sells his bandwidth only if p′(k),1 > x (since there are k secondaries who opt for the
lowest available prices), which happens with probability (1−F(x)); the sale fetches a
utility of x− c. Hence, primary 1’s expected utility is (x− c)(1−F(x)). Now, under
NE, primary 1’s price distribution being his best response to those of others, he must
attain the same expected utility for the entire range of prices he is randomly choosing
his price from, more technically, in the entire support set 8 of his price distribution; this
is because his best response price distribution will never select from the less profitable
ones which will not therefore be in its support set. Thus, (x − c)(1− F(x)) is the
same (i.e., a constant) for all x in the support set for his NE price distribution. Hence,
F(x) is fully specified once this constant is known, which we determine by considering
F(v). Note that F(v) is the probability that p′(k),1 ≤ v, which happens when k or more
primaries have unused bandwidth (among those in {2, . . . ,n}); this probability therefore
is w(q,n), where:
w(q,n) =
n−1
∑
i=k


n−1
i

q
i(1−q)n−1−i. (2)
Thus, F(v) = w(q,n). Hence, the constant in question is (v − c)(1− F(v)) = (v −
c)(1−w(q,n)) . Thus, in the support set of F(.), F(x) = 1− (v−c)(1−w(q,n))
x−c . The x at
8The support set of a d.f. is the smallest closed set such that its complement has probability zero
under the d.f. [19].
29
which F(x) = 0 provides the lower limit of this support set, which, from the above
expression, is:
p̃ = v−w(q,n)(v− c). (3)
Thus,
F(x) =



0, x ≤ p̃
x− p̃
x−c , p̃ < x ≤ v.
(4)
We now only need to determine a price d.f. ψ(.) for each primary that leads to the
above d.f. F(.) for the kth smallest pseudo-price of n− 1 primaries. Note that the
pseudo-price for any given primary is less than or equal to x (where x ≤ v) whenever he
has unused bandwidth and he quotes a price of x or less: the probability that both these
events occur is qψ(x). Thus, since F(x) is the probability that k or more pseudo-prices
(among those n−1) are less than or equal to x, F(x) equals
n−1
∑
i=k


n−1
i

 [qψ(x)]
i[1−qψ(x)]n−1−i,
for all x ≤ v. Thus, since we know F(.) from (4), we can compute ψ(x) = (1/q)φ(x),
where φ(x) is the solution of the following equation:
n−1
∑
i=k


n−1
i

 [φ(x)]
i[1−φ(x)]n−1−i = F(x). (5)
We can in fact formally prove that:
Lemma 1. Equation (5) has a unique solution φ(x)∈ [0,1]. The function φ(x) is strictly
increasing and continuous on [p̃,v]. Also, φ(p̃) = 0 and φ(v) = q.
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And, the symmetric NE price d.f. ψ(.) is:
ψ(x) =



0, x ≤ p̃
1
q
φ(x), p̃ < x ≤ v
1, x ≥ v
(6)
From the properties of the φ(.) function obtained in Lemma 1, ψ(x) is a continuous
d.f9.
The above intuitive justification however glosses over some technical, nonetheless
important, details: we implicitly assume that F(.) is continuous and that the set of best
responses of a primary is a convex set. In the formal proof, we prove both the above
for any symmetric NE and subsequently establish that:
Theorem 2. The strategy profile in which each primary i chooses his price pi according
to ψ(.), where ψ(.) is defined by (6), (5), (4) is the unique symmetric NE.
This random selection of prices as per ψ(.) can be interpreted as follows: each pri-
mary i sets a base price v and randomly holds “sales” to attract secondaries by lowering
the price to some value pi ∈ [p̃,v]
10.
Example: For n = 2 and k = 1, we have w(q,n) = q, p̃ = v−q(v− c), and
ψ(x) =



0 x ≤ p̃
1
q
(
x− p̃
x−c
)
p̃ < x ≤ v
1 x ≥ v
(7)
9A function f (x) is a d.f. iff it is increasing, right continuous, and has limits 0 and 1 as x tends to −∞
and ∞ respectively [19].
10This interpretation has been suggested in [69] for random selection of prices in a different context.
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Chapter 3
Spectrum Pricing Games with
Asymmetric Bandwidth Availability
Probabilities
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we described a simplified spectrum pricing games model and provided
an intuitive analysis. In this chapter, we analyze the general asymmetric model in
which the bandwidth availability probabilities of the primaries need not be all equal. In
Section 3.3, we analyze the game in a single time slot and in Section 3.4, we study its
repeated version in which the game is repeated an infinite number of times.
For the game in a single slot, we explicitly compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and
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show its uniqueness. Our explicit NE computations provide valuable insights, which
we describe in Section 3.3.5.
3.2 Model
In this chapter, we analyze the model described in Section 2.2, with some differences
that we now describe. In the model described in Section 2.2, we assumed that every
primary has unused bandwidth with the same probability q ∈ (0,1). Now, instead,
suppose primary i∈ {1, . . . ,n} has unused bandwidth with probability qi ∈ (0,1), where
we assume without loss of generality that:
q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . .≥ qn. (8)
Also, in the model described in Section 2.2, we assumed that there are a fixed num-
ber of secondaries k. However, in practice, each secondary may be a local spectrum
provider or even a user seeking to lease spectrum bands to transmit data on an on-
demand basis. So the number of secondaries seeking to buy bandwidth may be random
and and also apriori unknown to the primaries, due to user mobility, varying bandwidth
requirements of the secondaries, etc. Thus, the number of secondaries seeking to buy
bandwidth (henceforth referred to as the number of secondaries for simplicity) is K,
where K is a random variable with probability mass function (p.m.f.) Pr(K = k) = γk.
The primaries apriori know only the γks, but not the values of K. We will make some
technical assumptions on the p.m.f. {γk}: (i) ∑
n−1
k=0 γk > 0 (i.e., the total number of pri-
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maries exceeds the number of secondaries with positive probability, but not necessarily
probability 1) (ii) if γ0 > 0, then γ1 > 0 (if the event that no secondary requires band-
width has positive probability, then the event that only 1 secondary requires bandwidth
also has positive probability). A large class of probability mass functions, including
those generated from the most common scenario, where each local provider or user
from a given pool requires bandwidth with a positive probability independent of others,
satisfy both the above assumptions.
3.3 One-Shot Game Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Recall from Chapter 2 that the pseudo-price of primary i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, denoted as p′i, is
the price he selects if he has unused bandwidth and p′i = v+1 otherwise. As before, let
ψi(.) be the distribution function (d.f.) of the price pi of primary i. Also, let φi(.) be
the d.f. of p′i. For c ≤ x ≤ v, p
′
i ≤ x for a primary i iff he has unused bandwidth and sets
a price pi ≤ x. So φi(x) = qiP(pi ≤ x) = qiψi(x). Thus, ψi(.) and φi(.) differ only by a
constant factor on [c,v] and we use them interchangeably wherever applicable.
For a function f (.), we denote the left and right hand side limits at a point a,
limx↑a f (x) and limx↓a f (x) by f (a−) and f (a+) respectively [58].
The proofs of the results in this section are technical and we relegate them to Sec-
tion 3.5.
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3.3.1 Necessary Conditions for a NE
Consider a NE under which the d.f. of the price (respectively, pseudo-price) of primary
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} is ψi(.) (respectively, φi(.)). In Theorem 3 below, we show that the
NE strategies must have a particular structure. This is the most challenging part of
the analysis; given this structure, the computation of the NE strategies is relatively
straightforward. Before stating Theorem 3, we describe some basic properties of the
NE strategies.
Property 1. φ2(.), . . . ,φn(.) are continuous on [c,v]. φ1(.) is continuous at every x ∈
[c,v), has a jump 11 of size q1 −q2 at v if q1 > q2 and is continuous at v if q1 = q2.
Thus, there does not exist a pure strategy NE (one in which every primary selects a
single price with probability (w.p.) 1).
Now, let ui,max be the expected payoff that primary i gets in the NE and Li be the
lower endpoint of the support set 12 of ψi(.), i.e.:
Li = inf{x : ψi(x)> 0}. (9)
Also, let wi be the probability of the event that at least K primaries among {1, . . . ,n}\i
have unused bandwidth. Let r be the probability that K ≥ 1. Note that r = 1− γ0,
and wi can be easily computed using the p.m.f {γk} and the fact that each primary j
11A d.f. f (x) is said to have a jump (discontinuity) of size b > 0 at x = a if f (a)− f (a−) = b, where
f (a−) = limx↑a f (x).
12The support set of a d.f. is the smallest closed set such that its complement has probability zero
under the d.f.
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independently has unused bandwidth w.p. q j.
Property 2. L1 = . . .Ln = p̃, where p̃ = c+
(v−c)(1−w1)
r
. Also, ui,max = (p̃− c)r, i =
1, . . . ,n.
Thus, the lower endpoints of the support sets of the d.f.s ψ1(.), . . . ,ψn(.) of all the
primaries are the same, and every primary gets the same expected payoff in the NE.
Note that in the symmetric case q1 = . . . = qn, if γk = 1 for some k and γl = 0 ∀l 6= k,
then w1 = . . .= wn = w(q,n), where w(q,n) is given by (2) in Chapter 2 and p̃ reduces
to the expression in (3) in Chapter 2.
Theorem 3. The following are necessary conditions for strategies φ1(.), . . . ,φn(.) to
constitute a NE:
1) φ1(.), . . . ,φn(.) satisfy Property 1 and Property 2.
2) There exist numbers R j, j = 1, . . . ,n+1, and a function {φ(x) : x ∈ [p̃,v)} such that
p̃ = Rn+1 < Rn ≤ Rn−1 ≤ . . .≤ R1 ≤ v, (10)
φ1(x) = . . .= φ j(x) = φ(x), p̃ ≤ x < R j, (11)
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
and φ j(R j) = q j, j = 1, . . . ,n. (12)
Also, every point in [p̃,R j) is a best response for primary j and he plays every sub-
interval in [p̃,R j) with positive probability. Finally, R1 = R2 = v.
Theorem 3 says that all n primaries play prices in the range [p̃,Rn), the d.f. φn(.) of
primary n stops increasing at Rn, the remaining primaries 1, . . . ,n−1 also play prices
36
in the range [Rn,Rn−1), the d.f. φn−1(.) of primary n−1 stops increasing at Rn−1, and
so on. Also, primary 1’s d.f. φ1(.) has a jump of height q1 −q2 at v if q1 > q2. Fig. 3.1
illustrates the structure.
Figure 3.1: The figure shows the structure of a NE described in Theorem 3. The horizontal axis shows
prices in the range x ∈ [p̃,v] and the vertical axis shows the functions φ(.) and φ1(.), . . . ,φn(.).
3.3.2 Explicit Computation, Uniqueness and Sufficiency
By Theorem 3, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}:
φi(x) =



φ(x), p̃ ≤ x < Ri
qi, x ≥ Ri
(13)
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So the candidate NE strategies φ1(.), . . . ,φn(.) are completely determined once p̃,R1, . . . ,Rn
and the function φ(.) are specified. Also, Property 2 provides the value of p̃, and
R1 = R2 = v by Theorem 3. First, we will show that there also exist unique R3, . . . ,Rn
and φ(.) satisfying (10), (11), and (12) and will compute them. Then, we will show that
the resulting strategies given by (13) indeed constitute a NE (sufficiency).
Let p′−i be the K’th smallest pseudo-price out of the pseudo-prices, {p
′
l : l ∈{1, . . . ,n}, l 6=
i}, of the primaries other than i (with p′−i = 0 if K = 0 and p
′
−i = v+ 2 if K > n− 1
). Also, let F−i(x) denote the d.f. of p
′
−i. Since there are K secondaries, if primary 1
has unused bandwidth and sets p1 = x ∈ [p̃,v), its bandwidth is bought iff
13 p′−1 > x,
which happens w.p. 1−F−1(x). Note that primary 1’s payoff is (x− c) if its band-
width is bought and 0 otherwise. So, letting E{ui(x,ψ−i)} denote the expected payoff
of primary i if it sets a price x and the other primaries use the strategy profile ψ−i, we
have:
E{u1(x,ψ−1)}= (x− c)(1−F−1(x)) = (p̃− c)r, x ∈ [p̃,v) (14)
where the second equality follows from the facts that each x ∈ [p̃,v) is a best response
for primary 1 by Theorem 3, and u1,max = (p̃− c)r by Property 2. By (14), we get:
F−1(x) = g(x), x ∈ [p̃,v) (15)
where, g(x) =
x− p̃
x− c
, x ∈ [p̃,v). (16)
Next, we calculate Ri, i = 3, . . . ,n and φ(.) using (15).
13By Property 1, no primary has a jump at any x ∈ [p̃,v). So P(p′−1 = x) = 0.
38
3.3.2.1 Computation of Ri, i = 3, . . . ,n
For 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, let fi(y) be the probability of K or more successes out of n− 1 inde-
pendent Bernoulli events, (i−1) of which have the same success probability y and the
remaining (n− i) have success probabilities qi+1, . . . ,qn. An expression for fi(y) can
be easily computed.
Now, to compute Ri, i ∈ {3, . . . ,n}, we note that by (13) and (10), φ j(Ri) = qi, j =
2, . . . , i, and φ j(Ri) = q j, j = i+ 1, . . . ,n. So from the preceding paragraph, with the
events {p′j ≤ Ri}, j = 2, . . . ,n as the n− 1 Bernoulli events, and by the definition of
F−1(.), we get:
F−1(Ri) = fi(qi). (17)
By (15) and (17):
g(Ri) = fi(qi). (18)
By (16) and (18), Ri is unique and is given by:
Ri = c+
(p̃− c)r
1− fi(qi)
. (19)
3.3.2.2 Computation of φ(.)
Now we compute the function {φ(.) : x ∈ [p̃,v)} by separately computing it for each
interval [Ri+1,Ri), i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}. If Ri+1 = Ri, then note that the interval [Ri+1,Ri) is
empty. Now suppose Ri+1 < Ri. For x ∈ [Ri+1,Ri), by (13) and (10):
φ j(x) = q j, j = i+1, . . . ,n (20)
39
and φ1(x) = . . .= φi(x) = φ(x). (21)
By definition of the function fi(.), with the events {p
′
j ≤ x}, j = 2, . . . ,n as the n− 1
Bernoulli events, by definition of F−1(x) and using P{p
′
j ≤ x}= φ j(x), (20) and (21):
F−1(x) = fi(φ(x)), Ri+1 ≤ x < Ri. (22)
By (15) and (22):
fi(φ(x)) = g(x), Ri+1 ≤ x < Ri. (23)
Lemma 2. For each x, (23) has a unique solution φ(x). The function φ(.) is strictly
increasing and continuous on [p̃,v). For i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, φ(Ri) = qi. Also, φ(p̃) = 0.
Thus, there is a unique function φ(.), and by (13), unique φi(.), i = 1, . . . ,n that
satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3.
3.3.2.3 Sufficiency
Theorem 4. The pseudo-price d.f.s φi(.), i = 1, . . . ,n in (13), with R1 = R2 = v, Ri,
i = 3, . . . ,n given by (19), and φ(.) being the solution of (23), constitute the unique NE.
The corresponding price d.f.s are ψi(x) =
1
qi
φi(x), x ∈ [c,v], i = 1, . . . ,n.
3.3.3 Efficiency of the unique NE
The efficiency, η, of a NE quantifies the loss in total revenue incurred owing to lack of
cooperation among primaries. η may be defined as η = RNE
ROPT
, where RNE is the expected
sum of utilities of the primaries at the NE and ROPT is the maximum possible (optimal)
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expected sum of utilities. Note that ROPT is attained only when all primaries cooperate
and each selects the maximum possible price v so as to ensure that bandwidth is always
sold at this price. Now, ROPT = E[min(Z,K)](v−c), where Z is the number of primaries
who have unused bandwidth. Also, from Property 2, at the unique NE, whenever a
primary has unused bandwidth, he attains an expected utility of (v− c)(1−w1). Thus,
since primary i has unused bandwidth with probability qi, RNE = (1−w1)(v−c)∑
n
i=1 qi.
Hence,
η =
(1−w1)∑
n
i=1 qi
E[min(Z,K)]
. (24)
Now, assume for simplicity that each secondary out of a pool of αn secondaries
independently requires bandwidth with some probability, where α is a constant. The
following lemma characterizes the asymptotic behavior of the efficiency for a large
number of primaries and secondaries.
Lemma 3. Suppose K =Kn, the number of secondaries (who require bandwidth) grows
with the number of primaries n. Let E(Kn) = kn. Assume that kn ≥ β for all large n for
some constant β > 0.
1. If kn ≤ ∑
n
i=2(qi − ε) for all n and some ε > 0, then η → 0 as n → ∞.
2. If kn ≥ ∑
n
i=2(qi + ε) for all n and some ε > 0, then η → 1 as n → ∞.
Note that ∑ni=2 qi is the expected number of primaries out of primaries 2, . . . ,n who
have unused bandwidth. So the above lemma roughly states that when the expected
demand for bandwidth (kn) is lower than the expected supply of bandwidth, the effi-
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ciency of the NE is close to 0 and vice versa. The intuition is that when the demand
is low compared to the supply, there is intense price competition among the primaries
to sell to the few secondaries who are present, driving down the prices and thereby the
efficiency of the NE.
3.3.4 Symmetric q
We now prove the results that were stated but not proved in Section 2.5. We first
show that Theorem 2 in Chapter 2 follows as a corollary of Theorem 4 above. When
q1 = q2 . . . = qn = q, by definition of the function fi(.) defined in Section 3.3.2.1, for
each i= 1, . . . ,n, fi(q) is the probability of k or more successes out of n−1 independent
Bernoulli events, each with success probability q. So:
fi(q) =
n−1
∑
j=k


n−1
i

q
i(1−q)n−i−1 = w(q,n) = w1 (25)
where the second equality follows from (2) and the third equality follows from the
definition of w1, which was defined just before Property 2. So by Property 2,
p̃ = v−w(q,n)(v− c). (26)
Also, by (19), (25) and (26), for each i = 1, . . . ,n:
Ri = c+
(v− c)(1−w(q,n))
(1−w(q,n)
= v
Thus, all primaries play prices in the range [p̃,v].
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Now, we put i = n in (23) to get:
fn(φ(x)) = g(x), p̃ ≤ x < v (27)
By definition of the function fi(.):
fn(φ(x)) =
n−1
∑
i=k


n−1
i

 [φ(x)]
i[1−φ(x)]n−1−i (28)
By (16) and (28), (27) becomes:
n−1
∑
i=k


n−1
i

 [φ(x)]
i[1−φ(x)]n−1−i =
x− p̃
x− c
Note that the above equation is the same as (5), where F(.) in (5) is given by (4). Also,
φ(.) is the pseudo-price d.f. of each primary and the corresponding price d.f. is given
by (6). So we have proven a strengthening of Theorem 2 in Chapter 2, namely that
the strategy profile identified in that Theorem is the unique NE (not only the unique
symmetric NE). Also, Lemma 1 in Chapter 2 follows from Lemma 2.
3.3.5 Discussion
The structure of the unique NE identified in Theorems 3 and 4 provides several inter-
esting insights:
1) First, from (8), (10) and the fact that the support set of ψi(.) is [p̃,Ri], it follows that
only the primaries with a high bandwidth availability probability (q) play high prices
(see Fig. 3.1). Intuitively this is because all the primaries play low prices (near p̃), so
if a primary sets a high price, he is undercut by all the other primaries. But a primary
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with a high q runs a lower risk of being undercut than one with a low q because of the
lower bandwidth availability probabilities of the set of primaries other than itself.
2) Second, by Property 1, ψ1(.) has a jump at v iff q1 > q2 and is continuous everywhere
else, whereas ψ2(.), . . . ,ψn(.) are always continuous on [c,v].
The above insights highlight the differences of the asymmetric case from the sym-
metric case q1 = . . .= qn discussed in Section 3.3.4, in which the support set of every
d.f. ψi(.), i = 1, . . . ,n is the same ([p̃,v]) and they are all continuous everywhere.
3.4 Repeated Game
3.4.1 Model
We now consider the repeated game version of the one-shot game analyzed in Sec-
tion 3.3. Suppose the one-shot game is repeated an infinite number of times, at times
τ = 1,2,3, . . .. We refer to the game in each individual time slot as a stage game. Each
player perfectly recalls the actions of every player in all preceding time slots. The pay-
off of player i for the overall repeated game is defined to be ui = ∑
∞
τ=1 δ
τ−1ui,τ, where
ui,τ is his payoff at time τ and δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, which is used to discount
future payoffs (see [42], [43] for interpretations of the discount factor). The discount
factor is usually close to 1 [42].
A strategy of a player in a repeated game is a complete plan for choosing the action
in each slot as a function of the actions of all players in all preceding slots. As in a
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one-shot game, a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a repeated game is a strategy profile in
which no player can improve his payoff by unilateral deviation from his strategy [42].
However, NE constitutes a rather weak notion of equilibrium in repeated games [42]
and hence we focus on NE with a special property, known as the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibria (SPNE) [42]. A subgame [42] of the repeated game is the part of the game
starting from some slot τ0 ≥ 1, i.e. the stage games in slots τ = τ0,τ0+1, . . .. An SPNE
is an NE of the repeated game that is also an NE of every subgame [42].
3.4.2 Results
It is well-known that for any repeated game, the strategy profile under which every
player uses the one-shot game NE strategy in every time slot is a SPNE [42]. Thus,
the NE we found in Section 3.3 for the one-shot game provides a SPNE in the repeated
game version. Our main contribution, described in the rest of this section, is to present
an SPNE that is also efficient in the sense that the sum of expected utilities of the n
primaries at equilibrium equals the maximum possible sum of utilities, provided the
discount factor δ is sufficiently high.
We consider Nash reversion [42] type of strategy profiles in which each player plays
a specified strategy (called the pre-deviation strategy [42]) at each time until one of the
players deviates from it, and all players play the one-shot game NE strategy thereafter.
Strategy for primary i: Select a price of v at τ = 1, and also for all other τ so long
as all other primaries had chosen v in all previous times. Otherwise, play the one-shot
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game Nash equilibrium strategy ψi(.).
Let uOSi be the expected payoff, conditional on him having unused bandwidth, that
primary i receives in the one-shot game Nash equilibrium, which we have shown to be
unique in Section 3.3. Let uPDi be his expected payoff, (conditional on having unused
bandwidth), in each stage game of the repeated game when all primaries play the pre-
deviation strategy in the above Nash reversion strategy. Also, let u
sup
i be the supremum
over the possible expected payoffs that primary i can get, (conditional on having unused
bandwidth), in a single stage game by using any strategy, when all primaries played the
pre-deviation strategy in all slots until the previous stage game, and primaries other
than i play the pre-deviation strategy in the current stage game.
It can be shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for the above Nash rever-
sion strategy to be a SPNE (the proof is similar to that of (12.AA.1) in [42]) is that for
each primary i = 1, . . . ,n:
u
sup
i +
qiδ
1−δ
uOSi ≤ u
PD
i +
qiδ
1−δ
uPDi (29)
Note that the left-hand side is primary i’s maximum (discounted) payoff starting from
a given slot if he deviates from the pre-deviation strategy, and the right-hand side is the
payoff if he does not deviate. (The factor qi appears in the second term on either side to
account for the fact that primary i would have free bandwidth in each future slot with
probability qi.) So if condition (29) is met, primary i would not deviate from its pre-
deviation strategy. Also, under the pre-deviation strategy, every primary always sets the
maximum price of v. So the sum of utilities of the primaries is the maximum possible.
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Thus, if the condition in (29) is satisfied, the strategy profile in which all primaries play
the above Nash reversion strategy constitutes an efficient SPNE.
In the rest of this section, we simplify the condition in (29). The condition is equiv-
alent to:
1
δ
≤ 1+qi
(
uPDi −u
OS
i
u
sup
i −u
PD
i
)
, i = 1, . . . ,n. (30)
Next, we compute u
sup
i , u
OS
i and u
PD
i . To compute u
sup
i , note that when primaries
other than i set a price of v, primary i’s expected payoff is maximized when he sets a
price just below v. So:
u
sup
i = v− c. (31)
By Property 2, the payoff that each primary gets in the one-shot game NE is the
same, and equals:
uOSi = (v− c)(1−w1) (32)
where w j is the probability that K or more primaries out of {1, . . . ,n}\ j have unused
bandwidth.
Now we compute uPDi . Let Z−i be the number of primaries out of {1, . . . ,n}\i who
have unused bandwidth in a given slot. Let Pi(win) be the probability that primary i’s
bandwidth is sold if he and each of the other primaries set a price of v 14. Note that:
uPDi = (v− c)Pi(win). (33)
14Recall that this computation of uPDi is conditional on primary i having unused bandwidth, but not
conditional on the other primaries having unused bandwidth.
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Also recall that P(K = k) = γk; also, if K = k and if more than k primaries have unused
bandwidth and set the same price of v, then the bandwidth of k of them, randomly
selected, is bought. So:
Pi(win) =



1, if K = k and Z−i ≤ k−1
k
Z−i+1
, if K = k and Z−i ≥ k
(34)
So:
Pi(win) = ∑
k
(
P(Z−i ≤ k−1)+
n−1
∑
j=k
P(Z−i = j)
k
j+1
)
γk. (35)
P(Z−i = j) and P(Z−i ≤ k−1), and using them Pi(win), can be easily computed using
the fact that primary l ∈ {1, . . . ,n}\i has unused bandwidth w.p. ql .
By (32) and (33):
uPDi −u
OS
i = (v− c)(Pi(win)− (1−w1)). (36)
Also, by (31) and (33):
u
sup
i −u
PD
i = (v− c)(1−Pi(win)) (37)
> 0 (38)
since clearly Pi(win)< 1.
We claim that by (8) and the definition of Pi(win):
P1(win)≥ . . .≥ Pn(win). (39)
The reason (39) holds is as follows. Consider primaries i and j, where i < j. When
every primary sets a price of v, a primary’s bandwidth is likelier to be sold the fewer
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the other primaries who have unused bandwidth. Also, the set of primaries other than
i (respectively, j) consists of primaries {1, . . . ,n}\{i, j} and primary j (respectively, i).
Since qi ≥ q j by (8), more primaries out of the set of primaries other than primary i are
likely to have unused bandwidth than out of the set of primaries other than primary j
and hence Pi(win)≥ Pj(win). Equation (39) follows.
By (36) and (39):
(uPD1 −u
OS
1 )≥ . . .≥ (u
PD
n −u
OS
n ). (40)
Also, by (37) and (39):
(u
sup
1 −u
PD
1 )≤ . . .≤ (u
sup
n −u
PD
n ). (41)
By (8), (40) and (41):
q1
(
uPD1 −u
OS
1
u
sup
1 −u
PD
1
)
≥ . . .≥ qn
(
uPDn −u
OS
n
u
sup
n −uPDn
)
. (42)
Now, for i = 1, . . . ,n, let
δi =
1
1+qi
(
uPDi −u
OS
i
u
sup
i −u
PD
i
) (43)
Note that the condition in (30) is equivalent to δ ≥ δi, i = 1, . . . ,n. But by (42):
δ1 ≤ . . .≤ δn. (44)
So a necessary and sufficient condition for (30), or equivalently for (29), is δ ≥ δn.
Thus, δ ≥ δn is a necessary and sufficient condition for the strategy profile corre-
sponding to the above Nash reversion strategy to be a SPNE. Note that u
sup
i −u
PD
i > 0 ∀i
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by (38). So by (43), δn < 1 if and only if
uPDn > u
OS
n . (45)
Thus, if (45) holds, then for δ large enough (δ ≥ δn), the above Nash reversion strategy
constitutes a SPNE. If uPDn < u
OS
n , then it does not constitute a SPNE. This is because,
for primary n, the payoff under the one-shot game NE is higher than the pre-deviation
payoff of the above Nash reversion strategy. So obviously, primary n will deviate in the
first slot itself and set a price just below v.
Remark 1. Note that the pre-deviation strategy profile in which every primary sets
the maximum price of v can be interpreted as tacit collusion: if a primary i sees that
other primaries are setting the maximum price and are not trying to undercut their
competitors, then primary i also participates in the collusion and keeps setting a price
of v in every slot. However, once at least one primary undercuts its competitors, the
tacit collusion breaks down and primaries revert to the one-shot NE strategy.
Remark 2. Note that by (33) and (39), the pre-deviation strategy profile in which all
primaries set a price of v is most beneficial for primary 1 and least beneficial for pri-
mary n. This is intuitively the reason behind the fact that the condition (δ ≥ δn) for the
above Nash reversion strategy profile to constitute a SPNE is in terms of the parameter
δn of primary n.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Proofs of results in Section 3.3.1
We first prove a series of lemmas and then deduce Properties 1 and 2 and Theorem 3
from them.
Lemma 4. For i = 1, . . . ,n, ψi(.) is continuous, except possibly at v. Also, at most one
primary has a jump at v.
Proof. Suppose ψi(.) has a jump at a point x0, c < x0 < v. Then for some ε > 0, no
primary j 6= i chooses a price in [x0,x0+ε] because it can get a strictly higher payoff by
choosing a price just below x0 instead. This in turn implies that primary i gets a strictly
higher payoff at the price x0 + ε than at x0. So x0 is not a best response for primary i,
which contradicts the assumption that ψi(.) has a jump at x0. Thus, ψi(.) is continuous
at all x < v.
Now, suppose primary i has a jump at v. Then a primary j 6= i gets a higher payoff
at a price just below v than at v. So v is not a best response for primary j and he plays
it with 0 probability. Thus, at most one primary has a jump at v.
Lemma 5. For every ε > 0, there exist primaries m and j, m 6= j, such that ψm(v−ε)<
1 and ψ j(v− ε)< 1.
That is, at least two primaries play prices just below v with positive probability.
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Proof. Suppose not. Fix i and let:
y = inf{x : ψl(x) = 1 ∀l 6= i}. (46)
By definition of y, ψl(x)= 1 ∀l 6= i and x> y. Also, since ψl(.) is a distribution function,
it is right continuous [19]. So
ψl(y) = 1 ∀l 6= i. (47)
Suppose y < v. By (47):
P{pl ∈ (y,v]}= 0, ∀l 6= i. (48)
So every price pi ∈ (y,v) is dominated by pi = v. Hence:
P{pi ∈ (y,v)}= 0 (49)
By (48) and (49):
P{p j ∈ (y,v)}= 0, j = 1, . . . ,n. (50)
By (46), ∀ε > 0, ψl(y− ε)< 1 for at least one primary l 6= i; otherwise the infimum
in the RHS of (46) would be less than y. So this primary l plays prices just below y
with positive probability. Now, if primary l sets a price pl < v, he gets a payoff equal to
the revenue, (pl −c), if bandwidth is sold, times the probability that bandwidth is sold.
Also, by Lemma 4, ψ j(.), j = 1, . . . ,n are continuous at all prices below v. So by (50),
a price pl just below v yields a higher payoff than a price just below y. This is because,
pl − c is lower by approximately v− y for pl just below y than for pl just below v, but
by (50) and continuity of ψ j(.), j = 1, . . . ,n, the probability that bandwidth is sold for
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a price pl just below y can be made arbitrarily close to the probability that bandwidth
is sold for a price pl just below v. This contradicts the assumption that primary l plays
prices just below y with positive probability.
Thus, y in (46) equals v and hence at least one primary j 6= i plays prices just below
v with positive probability. The above arguments with j in place of i imply that at least
one primary other than j plays prices just below v with positive probability. Thus, at
least two primaries in {1, . . . ,n} play prices just below v with positive probability.
Let ui,max and Li be as defined in Section 3.3.1.
Lemma 6. For i = 1, . . . ,n, Li is a best response for primary i.
Proof. By (9), either primary i has a jump at Li or plays prices arbitrarily close to Li
and above it with positive probability.
Case (i): If primary i has a jump at Li, then Li is a best response for i because in a NE,
no primary plays a price other than a best response with positive probability.
Case (ii): If primary i does not have a jump at Li, then by (9), ψi(Li) = 0. Since every
primary selects a price in [c,v], ψi(v) = 1. So Li < v. So by Lemma 4, no primary
among {1, . . . ,n}\i has a jump at Li. Hence, primary i’s payoff at a price above Li and
close enough to it is arbitrarily close to its payoff at Li. But since primary i does not
have a jump at Li, by (9), he plays prices just above Li with positive probability and
they are best responses for him. So Li is also a best response for primary i.
Lemma 7. For some c < p̃ < v, L1 = . . .Ln = p̃. Also, ui,max = (p̃− c)r, i = 1, . . . ,n.
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That is, the lower endpoint of the support set of the price distribution of every pri-
mary is the same.
Proof. Let Lmin = min{Lm : m = 1, . . . ,n}, and Smin = {m : Lm = Lmin} be the set of
primaries with the lowest endpoint. Let
kmin = min
k
{k : γk > 0}.
Thus, kmin is the minimum number of secondaries at a location. Note that kmin will be
0 if γ0 > 0, and kmin > 0 otherwise. First, we show by contradiction that:
|Smin| ≥ kmin +1. (51)
Clearly, the above holds if kmin = 0. We therefore show that it holds even otherwise.
Suppose |Smin| ≤ kmin. If Lmin = v, then all primaries play the price v w.p. 1, which
does not constitute a NE by Lemma 4. So Lmin < v and again by Lemma 4, no primary
has a jump at Lmin. Also, by Lemma 6, Lmin is a best response for the primaries in
Smin. Let L̂ = min{Lm : m /∈ Smin} be the second lowest endpoint. Now, a primary
m ∈ Smin who has unused bandwidth can get a higher payoff at a price just below L̂ than
at Lmin because in both cases, since |Smin| ≤ kmin, primary m’s bandwidth is sold w.p. 1;
however, it gets a higher revenue at a price just below L̂ than at Lmin. This contradicts
the fact that Lmin is a best response for primary m. Thus, (51) must hold.
Now, suppose Li < L j for some i, j. By Lemma 6, L j is a best response for primary
j. Now, the expected payoff that primary j gets for p j = L j is strictly less than the
expected payoff that primary i would get if it set pi to be just below L j. This is because,
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if primaries i or j set a price of approximately L j, then they see the same price distri-
bution functions of the primaries other than i and j. But primary j may be undercut by
primary i, since Li < L j, whereas primary i may not be undercut by primary j. Also, by
(51), primary j’s expected payoff is strictly lowered due to this undercutting by primary
i. (Note that if kmin > 0, undercutting by primary i would not lower primary j’s prob-
ability of winning, and thereby the expected payoff, if a total of ≤ kmin − 1 primaries
played prices below L j with positive probability. This possibility is ruled out by (51).
If kmin = 0, γ0 > 0. If in addition γ1 = 0, and Smin = 1, it is possible that only 1 primary
(i.e., i) plays prices below L j with positive probability. In this case, note that whenever
at least 1 secondary is available, at least 2 secondaries are available (as γ1 = 0), and
hence undercutting by primary i does not lower primary j’s probability of winning, and
thereby the expected payoff. This possibility is ruled out by assumption (ii) on {γk} in
Section 5.2.1 since γ1 > 0 if γ0 > 0.) Hence, ui,max > u j,max.
Now, by Lemma 6, Li is a best response for primary i. If primary j were to play
price Li, then it would get a payoff of ui,max. This is because, when primary i plays
price Li, it gets payoff ui,max. Since L j > Li, primary i is, w.p. 1, not undercut by
primary j. If primary j were to set the price Li, then w.p. 1, it would not be undercut
by primary i. Also, the price distributions of the primaries other than i and j are exactly
the same from the viewpoints of primaries i and j. Thus, primary j can strictly increase
its payoff from u j,max to ui,max by playing price Li, which contradicts the fact that L j is
a best response for him.
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Thus, Li < L j is not possible. By symmetry, Li > L j is not possible. So Li = L j. Let
L1 = . . .= Ln = p̃.
If p̃ = v, then every primary plays the price v w.p. 1, which does not constitute a NE.
So p̃ < v. So by Lemma 4, no primary has a jump at p̃. Thus, since the lower endpoint
of the support set of every primary is p̃, by (9), a price of p̃ is a best response for every
primary i. Since no primary sets a price lower than p̃, a price of p̃ fetches a payoff of
p̃− c if K ≥ 1 and a payoff of 0 if K = 0. So ui,max = (p̃− c)P(K ≥ 1) = (p̃− c)r,
i = 1, . . . ,n.
Let wi be as defined in Section 3.3.1. Using (8), it can be easily shown that:
w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . .≤ wn. (52)
Lemma 8. p̃ = c+
(1−w1)(v−c)
r
.
Proof. If primary 1 sets the price p1 = v, then it gets an expected payoff of at least
(v− c)(1−w1) because its bandwidth is sold at least in the event that k − 1 or fewer
primaries out of 2, . . . ,n have unused bandwidth. So u1,max ≥ (v− c)(1−w1). Since
u1,max = (p̃− c)r by Lemma 7, we get:
p̃ ≥ c+
(1−w1)(v− c)
r
. (53)
Now, by Lemma 5, at least two primaries, say m and j, play prices just below v
with positive probability. By Lemma 4, at most one of them has a jump at v. So
assume, WLOG, that no primary other than j has a jump at v. Then a price of p j = v
is a best response for primary j and fetches a payoff of u j,max = (v − c)(1−w j) ≤
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(v− c)(1−w1), where the inequality follows from (52). Since u j,max = (p̃− c)r by
Lemma 7, we get:
p̃ ≤ c+
(1−w1)(v− c)
r
. (54)
The result follows from (53) and (54).
Lemma 9. Let p̃ ≤ a < b ≤ v. Then at least two primaries play prices in (a,b) with
positive probability.
Proof. If b = v, then the claim is true by Lemma 5. If a = p̃, then the claim is true
by Lemma 4 and Lemma 7, since p̃ < v is the lower endpoint of the support set of all
primaries and no primary has a jump at p̃; hence all primaries play prices just above p̃
with positive probability.
Now, fix any a,b such that p̃ < a < b < v. Let:
a = inf{x ≤ a : ψ j(x) = ψ j(a) ∀ j = 1, . . . ,n} (55)
By Lemma 7, a > p̃. Also, by definition of a, P{p j ∈ [a,a]}= 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,n.
By definition of a, at least one primary, say primary i, plays prices just below a
with positive probability. (If not, then the infimum in (55) would be less than a.) This
implies that at least one primary j 6= i plays prices in (a,b) with positive probability.
(If not, then pi = b would yield a strictly higher payoff to primary i than prices just
below a.) Now, if primary j is the only primary among primaries {1, . . . ,n} who play
prices in (a,b) with positive probability, then p j = b yields a strictly higher payoff than
p j ∈ (a,b), which is a contradiction. So at least two primaries play prices in (a,b) with
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positive probability. But P{pl ∈ [a,a]}= 0 ∀l = 1, . . . ,n by definition of a. Hence, at
least two primaries play prices in (a,b) with positive probability.
Let F−i(x) be as defined in Section 3.3.2.
Lemma 10. For a fixed x ∈ (p̃,v], and primaries i and j, (i) F−i(x) = F− j(x) iff φi(x) =
φ j(x), (ii) F−i(x)< F− j(x) iff φi(x)> φ j(x).
Proof. Let p′(l) be the l’th smallest out of the pseudo-prices of the primaries other than i
and j. Let F−i,k(x) be the probability that p
′
−i ≤ x given that K = k. Clearly, F−i,0(x) = 1
since x > p̃ ≥ 0, and F−i,k(x) = 0 if k > n−1. We evaluate F−i,k(x) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1.
Conditioning on the event {p′j ≤ x} and using the fact that {p
′
l : l 6= i} are independent,
we get:
F−i,k(x)
= P{k′th smallest of {p′l : l 6= i} ≤ x}
= P{p′j ≤ x}P{p
′
(k−1) ≤ x}+P{p
′
j > x}P{p
′
(k) ≤ x}
= φ j(x)P{p
′
(k−1) ≤ x}+(1−φ j(x))P{p
′
(k) ≤ x}
= φ j(x)[P{p
′
(k−1) ≤ x}−P{p
′
(k) ≤ x}]
+P{p′(k) ≤ x} (56)
Similarly,
F− j,k(x) = φi(x)[P{p
′
(k−1) ≤ x}−P{p
′
(k) ≤ x}]+P{p
′
(k) ≤ x} (57)
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By (56) and (57):
F−i,k(x)−F− j,k(x)
= (φ j(x)−φi(x))[P{p
′
(k−1) ≤ x}−P{p
′
(k) ≤ x}]
= (φ j(x)−φi(x))αk (58)
where αk = P{p
′
(k−1) ≤ x}−P{p
′
(k) ≤ x}. Thus,
F−i(x)−F− j(x) = (φ j(x)−φi(x))
n−1
∑
k=1
αkγk.
We will next show that αk > 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1. Both parts of the result will then
follow from the above.
Note that αk equals the probability that exactly (k−1) out of the pseudo-prices of
the primaries other than i and j are ≤ x. Since x > p̃, all primaries play prices in (p̃,x)
with positive probability by Lemma 7. So:
φl(x) = P{p
′
l ≤ x}> 0, l = 1, . . . ,n. (59)
Also,
φl(x)≤ φl(v) = ql < 1, l = 1, . . . ,n. (60)
By (59) and (60):
0 < φl(x)< 1, l = 1, . . . ,n. (61)
Also, since 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, we have:
0 ≤ k−1 ≤ n−2. (62)
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Since αk equals the probability of exactly k − 1 successes out of n− 2 independent
Bernoulli events that have success probabilities {φl(x) : l = 1, . . . ,n, l 6= i, j}, αk > 0 by
(61) and (62). This completes the proof.
Lemma 11. (i) φ2(.), . . . ,φn(.) are continuous at v. (ii) φ1(.) is continuous at v if
q1 = q2 and has a jump of size at most q1 −q2 at v if q1 > q2. Also,
φ1(v−)≥ q2. (63)
Proof. If no primary i > 1 has a jump at v, then primary 1 gets a payoff of (v− c)(1−
w1), which equals (p̃− c)r by Lemma 8, for a price p1 just below v in the limit as
p1 → v−. So if a primary i ≥ 2 has a jump at v, primary 1 can get a payoff strictly
greater than (p̃− c)r by playing a price close enough to v. This contradicts the fact
that u1,max = (p̃− c)r (see Lemma 7). Thus, no primary i ≥ 2 has a jump at v and
φ2(.), . . . ,φn(.) are continuous.
First, suppose q1 = q2. If primary 1 has a jump at v, then similar to the preceding
paragraph, primary 2 can get a payoff strictly greater than (p̃− c)r by playing a price
just below v, which contradicts the fact that u2,max = (p̃− c)r. So ψ1(.) is continuous.
Now suppose q1 > q2. First, suppose primary 1 has a jump of size exactly q1 −q2
at v. Then if primary 2 sets a price just below v, then the probability of being undercut
by primary j ∈ {3, . . . ,n} is approximately q j. Also, since primary 1 has a jump of
size q1 −q2 at v, the probability of being undercut by primary 1 is approximately q1 −
(q1 −q2) = q2. So at a price just below v, primary 2 sees the same set of probabilities
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of being undercut by primaries other than itself as primary 1 would see if it set a price
just below v. Hence, by the first paragraph of this proof, primary 2 gets a payoff of
approximately (p̃− c)r at a price just below v.
Hence, if primary 1 has a jump of size, not equal to, but greater than q1 − q2 at v,
primary 2 gets a payoff of strictly greater than (p̃− c)r at a price just below v. This
contradicts the fact that u2,max = (p̃− c)r.
Thus, primary 1 has a jump of at most size q1−q2 at v. So φ1(v)−φ1(v−)≤ q1−q2.
This, along with φ1(v) = q1, gives (63).
Lemma 12. If p̃ ≤ x < y < v and ψi(x) = ψi(y) for some primary i, then ψi(v−) =
ψi(x).
Thus, if x ≥ p̃ is the left endpoint of an interval of constancy of ψi(.) for some i,
then to the right of x, the interval of constancy extends at least until v (there may be a
jump at v).
Proof. Suppose not, i.e.:
ψi(v−)> ψi(x). (64)
Let:
y = sup{z ≥ x : ψi(z) = ψi(x)} (65)
By (64), (65) and the fact that ψi(.) is continuous below v (by Lemma 4), we get y < v.
So again by Lemma 4, no primary among {1, . . . ,n}\i has a jump at y. Also, primary i
uses prices just above y with positive probability (if not, the supremum in the RHS of
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(65) would be > y). So y is a best response for primary i and hence:
E{ui(y,ψ−i)}= (y− c)(1−F−i(y)) = ui,max = (p̃− c)r. (66)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 7.
Now, by Lemma 9, there exists a primary j 6= i who plays prices just below y with
positive probability. Since no primary among {1, . . . ,n}\ j has a jump at y, y is a best
response for primary j. Hence:
E{u j(y,ψ− j)}= (y− c)(1−Fj(y)) = u j,max = (p̃− c)r. (67)
By (66) and (67), F−i(y) = F− j(y). So by Lemma 10:
φi(y) = φ j(y). (68)
But since primary j plays prices just below y with positive probability, there exists ε> 0
such that x < y− ε and y− ε is a best response for primary j. So
φ j(y− ε)< φ j(y). (69)
But by (65) and the continuity of φi(.) at y:
φi(y) = φi(y− ε). (70)
By (68), (69) and (70), φi(y− ε)> φ j(y− ε). So by Lemma 10:
F− j(y− ε)> F−i(y− ε)
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This implies:
(p̃− c)r = E{u j(y− ε,ψ− j)}
= (y− ε− c)(1−F− j(y− ε))
< (y− ε− c)(1−F−i(y− ε))
= E{ui(y− ε,ψ−i)}
which contradicts the fact that every primary gets a payoff of (p̃−c)r at a best response
in the NE.
Lemma 13. Part 2 of Theorem 3 holds.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. Let:
Rn = inf{x ≥ p̃ : ∃ y > x and i s.t. φi(y) = φi(x)} (71)
Note that Rn is the smallest value ≥ p̃ that is the left endpoint of an interval of constancy
for some φi(.). For this i, φi(Rn) = φi(y) for some y > Rn
15. We must have Rn > p̃.
This is because, if Rn = p̃, then φi(y) = φi(p̃). But φi(p̃) = 0, since p̃ is the lower
endpoint of the support set of φi(.) by Lemma 7. So φi(y) = 0, which implies that the
lower endpoint of the support set of φi(.) is ≥ y > p̃. This contradicts Lemma 7. Thus,
Rn > p̃.
Now, by definition of Rn, all primaries play every sub-interval in [p̃,Rn) with positive
probability and hence every price x ∈ [p̃,Rn) is a best response for every primary. So
15Note that φi(.) is a distribution function and hence is right continuous [19]. So φi(Rn+) = φi(Rn).
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similar to the derivation of (14), for j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and x ∈ [p̃,Rn), E{u j(x,ψ− j)} =
(x− c)(1−F− j(x)) = (p̃− c)r. Hence, F−1(x) = . . .= F−n(x) and by Lemma 10,
φ1(x) = . . .= φn(x) = φ(x) (say), p̃ ≤ x < Rn. (72)
which proves (11) for j = n.
Case (i): Suppose Rn = v. Then φl(Rn) = ql, l = 1, . . . ,n (since ψl(v) = 1), which
proves (12).
Case (ii): Now suppose Rn < v. Then φ j(.), j = 1, . . . ,n are continuous at Rn by
Lemma 4. So by (72):
φ1(Rn) = φ2(Rn) = . . .= φn(Rn). (73)
Since Rn is the left endpoint of an interval of constancy of φi(.), by Lemma 12:
φi(Rn) = φi(v−) = φn(Rn)≤ qn (74)
where the second equality follows from (73).
Now, suppose i = 1. Then by (63) and (74):
φi(Rn)≥ q2. (75)
By (74), (75) and (8), q2 = q3 = . . . = qn = φi(Rn). Also, by (73), φ j(Rn) = q j,
j = 2, . . . ,n. So ψ j(Rn) = 1, j = 2, . . . ,n. This implies, since Rn < v by assumption,
that at most one primary (primary 1) plays prices in the interval (Rn,v) with positive
probability, which contradicts Lemma 5. Thus, i 6= 1.
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So by Lemma 11, φi(.) is continuous at v and φi(v−) = φi(v) = qi. So by (74):
φi(Rn) = qi. (76)
By (73) and (76), φn(Rn) = qi. If qi > qn, then φn(Rn) > qn, which is a contradiction
because φn(Rn) = qnψn(Rn)≤ qn. So qi ≤ qn. Also, since qi ≥ qn by (8), qi = qn. So:
φn(Rn) = qn. (77)
which proves (12) for j = n.
Now, as induction hypothesis, suppose there exist thresholds:
p̃ < Rn ≤ Rn−1 ≤ . . .≤ Ri+1 ≤ v
such that for each j ∈ {i+1, . . . ,n}, φ j(R j) = q j,
φ1(x) = . . .= φ j(x) = φ(x), p̃ ≤ x < R j, (78)
and each of primaries 1, . . . , j plays every sub-interval in [p̃,R j) with positive probabil-
ity.
First, suppose Ri+1 < v. Let:
Ri = inf{x ≥ Ri+1 : ∃ y > x and j ∈ {1, . . . , i}
s.t. φ j(y) = φ j(x)}.
If Ri = Ri+1, then clearly by (78):
φ1(x) = . . .= φi(x) = φ(x), p̃ ≤ x < Ri (79)
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which proves (11) for j = i. Also, similar to (77), it can be shown that φi(Ri) = qi,
which proves (12) for j = i and completes the inductive step. Now suppose Ri > Ri+1.
Then similar to the proof of (72), it can be shown that:
φ1(x) = . . .= φi(x) = φ(x), Ri+1 ≤ x < Ri. (80)
By (78) and (80):
φ1(x) = . . .= φi(x) = φ(x), p̃ ≤ x < Ri.
which proves (11) for j = i. Also, similar to the proof of (77), it can be shown that
φi(Ri) = qi, which proves (12) for j = i. This completes the induction.
If Ri+1 = v, then the induction is completed by simply setting R1 = . . .= Ri = v.
It remains to show that R1 = R2 = v. If R1 < v, then no primary plays a price
in (R1,v), which contradicts Lemma 5. So R1 = v. If R2 < v, then only primary 1
plays prices in (R2,v) with positive probability, which again contradicts Lemma 5. So
R2 = v.
Lemma 11 showed that if q1 > q2, then φ1(.) has a jump of size at most q1−q2 at v.
The following result shows that φ1(.) has a jump of size exactly q1 −q2 at v.
Lemma 14. If q1 > q2, then φ1(.) has a jump of size q1 −q2 at v.
Proof. By Lemma 13, φ1(x) = φ2(x) for all x < R2 = v. So:
φ1(v−) = φ2(v−)
= φ2(v) (since φ2(.) is continuous by Lemma 11)
= q2
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Also, φ1(v) = q1ψ1(v) = q1. So φ1(v)−φ1(v−) = q1 −q2.
Finally, (i) Property 1 follows from Lemmas 4, 11 and 14; (ii) Property 2 follows
from Lemmas 7 and 8; (iii) Theorem 3 follows from Properties 1 and 2 and Lemma 13.
3.5.2 Proofs of results in Section 3.3.2
We verify that with Ri as in (19), Ri ≥ Ri+1 as required by (10) in Theorem 3. Recall
from Section 3.3.2.1 that fi(qi) is the probability of K or more successes out of n−1 in-
dependent Bernoulli events, i−1 with success probability qi and n− i with qi+1, . . . ,qn.
Also, fi+1(qi+1) is the probability of K or more successes out of n−1 Bernoulli events,
i−1 with success probability qi+1 and n− i with qi+1, . . . ,qn. Since qi ≥ qi+1 by (8),
it is easy to check that fi(qi) ≥ fi+1(qi+1). So by (19), Ri ≥ Ri+1, which is consistent
with (10).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, let fi(.) be as defined in Section 3.3.2.1. To compute fi(y),
for i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, let fi,k(y) be the conditional probability given K = k, of K or more
successes out of n− 1 independent Bernoulli events, (i− 1) of which have the same
success probability y and the remaining (n− i) have success probabilities qi+1, . . . ,qn.
Clearly,
fi(y) = ∑
k
fi,k(y)γk.
Again, fi,0(y) = 1 and fi,k(y) = 0 if k > n−1.
Consider 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1. For l ∈ {0, . . . ,n− i}, let vil(qi+1, . . . ,qn) be the probability
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of exactly l successes out of n− i independent Bernoulli trials with success probabilities
qi+1, . . . ,qn. Conditioning on the number of successes, say l, out of the n− i trials with
success probabilities qi+1, . . . ,qn, we get:
fi,k(y) =
n−i
∑
l=k
vil(qi+1, . . . ,qn)
+
min(k−1,n−i)
∑
l=0
vil(qi+1, . . . ,qn)hk(y), (81)
where hk(y) = ∑
i−1
m=k−l


i−1
m

y
m(1− y)i−1−m. Now, for l satisfying:
1 ≤ k− l ≤ i−1, (82)
hk(y) is a strictly increasing function of y [70]. Also, it can be checked that l = min(k−
1,n− i), which is one of the indices in the expression in (81), satisfies (82). So fi,k(y) is
a strictly increasing function of y. Also, note that fi,k(.) is a continuous function. Thus,
fi(y) is a strictly increasing and continuous function of y as well (since by assumptions
on {γk} γk > 0 for some k between 1 and n−1).
Now, it can be checked from the definition of the function fi(.) that:
fi(qi+1) = fi+1(qi+1). (83)
Also, replacing i with i+1 in (18), we get:
fi+1(qi+1) = g(Ri+1). (84)
By (83) and (84), we get:
fi(qi+1) = g(Ri+1). (85)
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Now, as shown above, fi(y) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of y. So
fi(.) is invertible. By (23), φ(.) is unique and is given by:
φ(x) = f−1i (g(x)), Ri+1 ≤ x < Ri. (86)
Also, by (85) and (18), fi(qi+1) = g(Ri+1) and fi(qi) = g(Ri). So fi(.) is a continuous
one-to-one map from the compact set [qi+1,qi] onto [g(Ri+1),g(Ri)], and hence f
−1
i (.)
is continuous (see Theorem 4.17 in [58]). Also, g(x) in (16) is continuous for all x ∈
[p̃,v) since x ≥ p̃ > c. So from (86), φ(.) is a continuous function on [Ri+1,Ri], since it
is the composition of continuous functions f−1i and g (see Theorem 4.7 in [58]). Also,
as shown above, fi(.) is strictly increasing; so f
−1
i (.) is strictly increasing. Also, using
x ≥ p̃ > c, it can be checked from (16) that g′(x) > 0; so g(.) is strictly increasing. By
(86), φ(.) is the composition of the strictly increasing functions f−1i (.) and g(.) and
hence is strictly increasing on [Ri+1,Ri]. Also, by (11), (12), (18) and (86), φ(Ri) =
f−1i (g(Ri)) = qi.
Thus, the function φ(.) is strictly increasing and continuous within each individual
interval [Ri+1,Ri]; also, φ(Ri) = qi, i = 2, . . . ,n, and hence φ(.) is continuous at the
endpoints Ri, i = 2, . . . ,n of these intervals. So φ(.) is strictly increasing and continuous
on [p̃,v).
It remains to show that φ(p̃) = 0. By definition of the function fi(.), fn(0) = 1− r.
As shown above, fn(.) is one-to-one. So f
−1
n (1−r) = 0. Also, by (16), g(p̃)= 1−r and
by (10), Rn+1 = p̃. Putting i = n and x = Rn+1 = p̃ in (86), we get φ(p̃) = f
−1
n (g(p̃)) =
f−1n (1− r) = 0.
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Proof of Theorem 4. By Lemma 2 and equation (13), the functions φi(.), i = 1, . . . ,n
computed in Section 3.3.2 are continuous and non-decreasing on [p̃,v]; also, φi(p̃) = 0
and φi(v)= qi. This is consistent with the fact that φi(.) is the d.f. of the pseudo-price p
′
i
and hence should be non-decreasing and right continuous [19], and φi(v) = qiψi(v) = qi
(see the beginning of Section 3.3).
Now, we have shown in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 that (13) is a necessary condition for
the functions φi(.), i = 1, . . . ,n to constitute a NE. We now show sufficiency. Suppose
for each i∈ {1, . . . ,n}, primary i uses the strategy φi(.) in (13). Similar to the derivation
of (14), the expected payoff that primary i gets at a price x ∈ [p̃,v) is:
E{ui(x,ψ−i)}= (x− c)(1−F−i(x)). (87)
Now, for x∈ [p̃,Ri), by (10) and (13), φi(x) = φ1(x)= φ(x), and hence by Lemma 10,
F−i(x) = F−1(x). Also note that φ(.) is the solution of (14), (22) and (23). By (14), (87)
and the fact that F−i(x) = F−1(x), for primary i, prices x ∈ [p̃,Ri) fetch an expected
payoff of (p̃− c)r.
Now let x ∈ [Ri,v). Note that Ri ≤ x < v = R1. So by (13), φi(x) = qi and φ1(x) =
φ(x)≥ φ(Ri) = qi. So φ1(x)≥ φi(x). Hence, by Lemma 10, F−1(x)≤ F−i(x), which by
(14) and (87) implies E{ui(x,ψ−i)} ≤ (p̃− c)r.
Finally, note that a price below p̃ fetches a payoff of less than (p̃−c)r for primary i.
So each price in [p̃,Ri) is a best response for primary i; also, by (13), it randomizes over
prices only in this range under φi(.). So φi(.) is a best response. Thus, the functions
φi(.), i = 1, . . . ,n constitute a NE.
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3.5.3 Proofs of results in Section 3.3.3
Proof of Lemma 3. Since Z is the number of primaries who have unused bandwidth,
and primary i has unused bandwidth with probability qi, E(Z) = ∑
n
i=1 qi and var(Z) =
∑ni=1 qi(1−qi).
We now prove the first part. Suppose kn ≤ ∑
n
i=2(qi − ε) for some ε > 0. Let the
random variable Yn be defined as:
Yn =



Kn, if Z ≥ Kn
0, else
Then:
E{min(Z,Kn)}
≥ E(Yn)
= knP(Z ≥ Kn)
= kn(1−P(Z < Kn))
= kn(1−P(Z−Kn + kn < kn))
≥ kn(1−P(Z−Kn + kn ≤
n
∑
i=2
(qi − ε))) (since kn ≤
n
∑
i=2
(qi − ε))
≥ kn(1−P(|Z−
n
∑
i=1
qi −Kn + kn| ≥ (n−1)ε))
≥ kn
(
1−2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
n(1+α)
))
(by Hoeffding’s inequality [26], since E(Z) =
n
∑
i=1
qi and E(Kn) = kn) (88)
Now, let Z1 be the number of primaries out of primaries 2, . . . ,n who have unused
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bandwidth. Note that E(Z1) = ∑
n
i=2 qi and var(Z1) = ∑
n
i=2 qi(1−qi). We have:
1−w1 = P(Z1 < Kn)
= P(Z1 −Kn + kn < kn)
≤ P(Z1 −Kn + kn ≤
n
∑
i=2
(qi − ε)) (since kn ≤
n
∑
i=2
(qi − ε))
≤ P(|Z1 −
n
∑
i=2
qi −Kn + kn| ≥ (n−1)ε)
≤ 2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
(nα+n−1)
)
(by Hoeffding’s inequality [26]) (89)
By (24), (88) and (89):
η ≤
2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
(nα+n−1)
)
∑ni=1 qi
kn
(
1−2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
n(1+α)
))
≤
2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
(nα+n−1)
)
n
β
(
1−2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
n(1+α)
)) (since kn ≥ β and qi ≤ 1 ∀i)
→ 0 as n → ∞
which proves the first part.
Now we prove the second part. Suppose kn ≥ ∑
n
i=2(qi + ε) for some ε > 0. Since
E{min(Z,K)} ≤ E(Z) = ∑ni=1 qi, by (24):
η ≥
(1−w1)∑
n
i=1 qi
∑ni=1 qi
= 1−w1
= 1−P(Z1 ≥ Kn)
≥ 1−2exp
(
−2(n−1)2ε2
nα+n−1
)
(similar to the derivation of (89))
→ 1 as n → ∞
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which proves the second part.
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Chapter 4
Spectrum Pricing Games with
Random Valuations of Secondaries
4.1 Introduction
In the model introduced in Section 2.2, we stated that pi ≤ v for every primary i for
some constant v. This constant may either be a regulatory upper limit or the valuation
of each secondary. So far, we have assumed that v is a constant and known to all
the primaries. This would be the case in the first interpretation above, i.e. when v is a
regulatory upper limit. However, in the second interpretation, the valuations of different
secondaries may be different and unknown to the primaries. In this chapter, we study
a generalized model in which the valuations of the secondaries are not constants, but
random variables that can possibly take different values for different secondaries.
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We describe the model in Section 4.2. For simplicity, we first analyze this model
in Section 4.3 for the case where there is only one secondary and later generalize our
results to an arbitrary number of secondaries in Section 4.4.
4.2 Model
Consider the model described in Section 2.2 with the following changes 16. Instead of
a common known valuation v for all the secondaries, let v j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, denote the
valuation of secondary j for 1 unit of bandwidth– secondary j does not buy bandwidth
at a price greater than v j. The valuations v1, . . . ,vk of the secondaries for 1 unit of
bandwidth are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with
distribution function (d.f.) G(x) = P(v j ≤ x). We assume that G(.) is continuous and
G(v) = 0, G(v) = 1, where c < v < v. Thus, the valuation of each secondary lies in
the range [v,v] w.p. 1. Note that in practice, the valuations of secondaries are upper
bounded, and hence there always exists some finite upper bound v. The assumption
v > c means that a secondary’s valuation is always greater than the cost that the seller
incurs; so if trade occurs, then it is always profitable to both the buyer and the seller.
As before, we introduce the notion of a “pseudo-price”. The pseudo-price of primary
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, denoted as p′i, is the price he selects if he has unused bandwidth and
p′i = v+1 otherwise
17.
16For simplicity, as in Chapter 2, we assume that the probability of having unused bandwidth is the
same for each primary, and equals q.
17The choice v+ 1 is arbitrary. Any other value greater than v also works.
75
We formulate the above price competition as a game as in Section 2.3. Note that this
is a symmetric game. Our goal is to explicitly compute a symmetric Nash Equilibrium
(NE) and to show its uniqueness.
4.3 One Secondary
In this section, for simplicity, we find a symmetric NE and prove its uniqueness for
the case in which there is only one secondary, i.e. k = 1. This secondary buys band-
width from the primary who quotes the lowest price, provided this price is less than or
equal to his valuation. In Section 4.4, we generalize our results to allow for multiple
secondaries.
In Section 4.3.1, we will explicitly compute a symmetric NE and in Section 4.3.2
show that it is the unique symmetric NE.
4.3.1 Explicit Computation of Symmetric NE
Consider a symmetric NE under which every primary uses the strategy ψ(.). The fol-
lowing lemma provides a necessary condition that ψ(.) must satisfy.
Lemma 15. ψ(.) is continuous.
Proof. Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that ψ(.) has a jump at x0. Fix an i∈{1, . . . ,n}.
Since every primary other than primary i has a jump at x0, for primary i, a price just
below x0 fetches a higher expected payoff than x0. So x0 is not a best response for
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primary i, which contradicts the fact that primary i uses ψ(.) and hence has a jump at
x0. The result follows.
For a primary m, if
P(p′j ≤ x) = y, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}\m, (90)
then let fx(y) be primary m’s expected payoff if he sets the price pm = x. Let
h(x) = fx(q) (91)
and
g(x) = fx(0). (92)
The following lemma provides an expression for fx(y):
Lemma 16.
fx(y) = (x− c)(1−G(x))(1− y)
n−1 (93)
Proof. Suppose (90) holds. If primary m sets a price of x, he gets a payoff of (x− c) if
his bandwidth is sold and 0 otherwise. Also, his bandwidth is sold iff (i) the valuation
of the secondary is x or more, which happens w.p. 1−G(x), and (ii) no primary j ∈
{1, . . . ,n}\m who has unused bandwidth sets a price lower than y, which happens w.p.
(1− y)n−1 by (90). The result follows.
We now state some properties of fx(y), which are proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 17. 1. fx(y) is continuous in x and y.
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2. For x ≤ v, fx(y) is a strictly increasing function of x for every fixed y. Also, fc(y) =
0 for every fixed y.
3. h(v) = fv(q)> 0. Also, h(x) = 0 for all x ≥ v.
By (91) and part 1 of Lemma 17, h(.) is a continuous function and hence has a
maximizer on the compact set [c,v]. Let hmax = maxv∈[c,v] h(v) be the maximum value
of h(.) and
vT = inf{v ∈ [c,v] : h(v) = hmax} (94)
be the infimum of the set of maximizers of h(.). Since h(.) is continuous, by (94), vT is
itself a maximizer of h(.) on [c,v]. So h(vT ) = hmax. By part 2 of Lemma 17 and (91),
h(.) is strictly increasing on [c,v]. Also, h(v)> 0 and h(x) = 0 for all x ≥ v by part 3 of
Lemma 17. Since vT is the smallest maximizer of h(.) on [c,v]:
v ≤ vT < v. (95)
We will later show that the upper endpoint of the support set of ψ(.) is vT .
We now state another property of the function fx(y), which is proved in the Ap-
pendix.
Lemma 18. For every fixed x ∈ [c,vT ], fx(y) is a strictly decreasing function of y.
Lemma 19. There exists at least one x ∈ (c,vT ) such that g(x) = h(vT ). The minimum
such x exists; let it be denoted by p̃. Then g(x)< g(p̃) = h(vT ) ∀c ≤ x < p̃.
Proof. By (94) and part 3 of Lemma 17, h(vT )≥ h(v)> 0. Also, by (92) and part 2 of
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Lemma 17:
g(c) = 0 < h(vT ). (96)
By (91), (92) and Lemma 18:
h(vT ) = fvT (q)< fvT (0) = g(vT ) (97)
By (96) and (97), g(c) < h(vT ) and g(vT ) > h(vT ). Also, g(.) is continuous by (92)
and part 1 of Lemma 17. So by the intermediate value theorem [58], there exists a
solution of the equation g(x) = h(vT ) in (c,vT ). The minimum such solution, say p̃,
exists because g(.) is continuous and hence the set {x : g(x) = h(vT )} is closed.
Now, suppose, to reach a contradiction, that g(x′)≥ h(vT ) for some x
′ ∈ [c, p̃). Then
by (96) and the intermediate value theorem, there exists x′′ such that c ≤ x′′ ≤ x′ < p̃ and
g(x′′) = h(vT ). This contradicts the fact that p̃ is the smallest solution of g(x) = h(vT ).
Thus, g(x)< h(vT ) for all x < p̃.
By definition of fx(y) and by (92), if no primary in {1, . . . ,n}\i plays a price below
x, then primary i gets a payoff of g(.) at price x. It turns out that primaries do not play
prices below p̃ and p̃ is a best response for every primary in the NE. So every primary
gets a payoff of g(p̃) in the NE because when he plays a price of p̃, he is not undercut
by the other primaries.
Let:
C = {x ∈ [p̃,vT ] : g(x)≥ g(p̃)}. (98)
Note that for a price in [p̃,vT ]\C, primary i’s payoff is less than the NE payoff and
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hence each primary plays prices in [p̃,vT ]\C with zero probability.
Lemma 20. For every x ∈C, there exists a unique γ(x) ∈ [0,q] such that
fx(γ(x)) = g(p̃). (99)
Also, γ(p̃) = 0 and γ(vT ) = q.
Proof. First, note that by (91) and Lemma 19:
fvT (q) = h(vT ) = g(p̃). (100)
Now, fix an x ∈C. By (92):
fx(0) = g(x)
≥ g(p̃) (by (98), since x ∈C). (101)
Also, by (91):
fx(q) = h(x)
≤ h(vT ) (since vT is the smallest
maximizer of h(.) and x ≤ vT )
= g(p̃) (by (100)) (102)
By part 1 of Lemma 17, fx(y) is continuous in y. So by (101), (102) and the intermediate
value theorem [58], the equation fx(y) = g(p̃) has a solution y = γ(x) ∈ [0,q]. Also, by
Lemma 18, this root is unique.
Now, by (92), f p̃(0) = g(p̃). So γ(p̃) = 0. Also, by (100), fvT (q) = g(p̃). So
γ(vT ) = q.
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Now, we state a general analytic fact, which is proved in the Appendix.
Fact 1. Let F(x,y) be any real-valued continuous function, where x and y are real, and
[a,b] be an interval such that for every x ∈ [a,b], there exists a unique y = γ(x) such
that
F(x,γ(x)) = α, (103)
where α is a constant. Then the function γ(.) is continuous on [a,b].
Now, let C be as in (98). Since g(.) is continuous, C is closed. So C is the union
of a set of disjoint closed intervals– let C = ∪i∈λCi, where λ is some set of indices and
Ci = [ai,bi].
Fix an i ∈ λ. By Lemma 20, for every x ∈Ci, there exists a unique γ(x) ∈ [0,q] such
that fx(γ(x)) = g(p̃). By part 1 of Lemma 17, the function fx(y) is continuous in x and
y. So by Fact 1, γ(.) is continuous on Ci.
Thus, we have shown the following:
Lemma 21. γ(.) is continuous on each Ci, i ∈ λ.
By definition of the function fx(y) and by (99), for every x, γ(x) is a value such
that if P{p′j ≤ x}= γ(x), j 6= i, then a price of pi = x fetches a payoff of exactly g(p̃),
which is the payoff that every primary gets in the symmetric NE. This suggests γ(.) as
a candidate for the symmetric NE pseudo-price strategy d.f. But γ(x) itself need not be
a valid d.f. since it is not non-decreasing in general as shown in Fig. 4.1. So a natural
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idea is to consider the function:
φNE(x) =



max{γ(y) : y ∈C,y ≤ x}, x ≥ p̃
0, x < p̃
(104)
obtained by replacing the portions of decrease of γ(.) by horizontal segments as illus-
Figure 4.1: The figure shows φNE(.) and γ(.) versus price.
trated in Fig. 4.1.
Theorem 5. The strategy profile in which each primary uses the pseudo-price selection
strategy φNE(.) is a NE.
Proof. By (104), the function φNE(.) is non-decreasing on [p̃,vT ]. Also, by Lemma 21
and (104), it is continuous on [p̃,vT ]. By Lemma 20, γ(x) ∈ [0,q] ∀x ∈C. So by (104):
0 ≤ φNE(x)≤ q ∀x (105)
Also, since γ(p̃) = 0 and γ(vT ) = q (see Lemma 20), and by (104) and (105):
φNE(x) =



0, x ≤ p̃
q, x ≥ vT
(106)
Thus, φNE(.) is a valid pseudo-price d.f. and its support set is a subset of [p̃,vT ].
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Suppose every primary uses the strategy φNE(.) to select his pseudo-price. By defi-
nition of fx(y) and the continuity of φNE(.), if primary 1 sets a price of p1 = x, he gets
an expected payoff of:
E{u1(x,ψ−1)}= fx(φNE(x)). (107)
By (104), φNE(x)≥ γ(x) for all x ∈ [p̃,vT ].
Case (i): Suppose x ∈ [p̃,vT ]\C. Then by (107):
E{u1(x,ψ−1)} = fx(φNE(x))
≤ fx(0) (by Lemma 18 and (105))
= g(x) (by (92))
< g(p̃) (since x ∈ [p̃,vT ]\C
and by (98)) (108)
Case (ii): Suppose x∈C and φNE(x)= γ(x). Then by (107) and (99), E{u1(x,ψ−1)}=
fx(γ(x)) = g(p̃).
Case (iii): Now, suppose x ∈C and φNE(x) > γ(x). Then by (107), Lemma 18 and
(99):
E{u1(x,ψ−1)}< fx(γ(x)) = g(p̃) (109)
Also, x is part of an interval of constancy of φNE(x); so primaries play prices around x
with 0 positive probability.
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Case (iv): Suppose x < p̃. Then by (106), φNE(x) = 0. So by (107),
E{u1(x,ψ−1)} = fx(0)
= g(x) (by (92))
< g(p̃) (by Lemma 19) (110)
Case (v): Suppose x ≥ vT . Then by (106), φNE(x) = q. So by (107),
E{u1(x,ψ−1)} = fx(q)
= h(x) (by (91)) (111)
≤ h(vT ) (by (94)) (112)
= g(p̃) (by (100)) (113)
Now, since φNE(.) is non-decreasing and continuous, it has alternating intervals of
constancy and strict increase. Also, note that a primary who uses the d.f. φNE(.) to
select his pseudo-price plays prices in the intervals of constancy with 0 probability
and in the intervals of strict increase with positive probability. Now, by (106), the
intervals [c, p̃] and [vT ,v] (Cases (iv) and (v) respectively) are intervals of constancy of
φNE(.). Also, it can be checked using (104) that the intervals which lie in the regions
[p̃,vT ]\C and {x ∈C : φNE(x)> γ(x)} (Cases (i) and (iii) respectively) are also regions
of constancy. Thus, only intervals that lie in the region {x ∈C : φNE(x) = γ(x)} (Case
(ii)) can possibly be intervals of strict increase of φNE(.).
By Cases (i) to (v), primary 1 gets a payoff of at most g(p̃) at any price. Also,
as shown in the previous paragraph, he can only play intervals in the region {x ∈ C :
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φNE(x) = γ(x)} (Case (ii)) with positive probability. His expected payoff is g(p̃), the
maximum possible, at a price in this region by Case (ii). Hence φNE(.) is a best response
for primary 1. The result follows.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 5, we have shown the following:
Lemma 22. In the symmetric NE in which every primary uses the strategy φNE(.), each
primary gets an expected payoff of g(p̃).
4.3.2 Uniqueness of Symmetric NE
Now, we show that the NE in Theorem 5 is the unique symmetric NE.
Let the functions fx(y), h(.), g(.), γ(.) and φNE(.) be as in (93), (91), (92), Lemma 20
and (104) respectively. Also, let vT , p̃ and the set C be as in (94), Lemma 19 and (98)
respectively.
Consider a symmetric NE under which every primary uses the d.f. ψ̂(.) to select the
price, and let φ̂NE(.) = qψ̂(.) be the corresponding pseudo-price d.f.
Let v′T be the upper endpoint of the support set of ψ̂(.):
v′T = inf{x : ψ̂(x) = 1}. (114)
Lemma 23. v′T = vT . Also, vT is a best response for each primary in the symmetric
NE.
Thus, the upper endpoint of the support set of ψ̂(.) is vT .
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Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 15, ψ̂(.) is continuous. Also, note that by (114), each
primary plays prices in [v′T −ε,v
′
T ] with positive probability for every ε > 0. Hence, v
′
T
is a best response for each primary i.
To reach a contradiction, suppose v′T > vT . Then by (114), ψ̂(vT )< 1 and hence
φ̂NE(vT )< q. (115)
Similar to the derivation of (107):
E{ui(vT , ψ̂−i)} = fvT (φ̂NE(vT ))
> fvT (q) (by (115) and Lemma 18)
= h(vT ) (by (91))
≥ h(v′T ) (by (94)) (116)
= E{ui(v
′
T , ψ̂−i)} (117)
where (117) follows from (116) similar to the derivation of (111). Thus, E{ui(vT , ψ̂−i)}>
E{ui(v
′
T , ψ̂−i)}, which contradicts the fact that v
′
T is a best response. Thus, v
′
T > vT is
not possible
Now suppose v′T < vT . Then ψ̂(vT ) = ψ̂(v
′
T ) = 1 by (114); so φ̂NE(vT ) = φ̂NE(v
′
T ) =
q. Similar to the derivation of (111):
E{ui(vT , ψ̂−i)} = h(vT )
> h(v′T ) (by (94))
= E{ui(v
′
T , ψ̂−i)}
which is again a contradiction. Thus, v′T < vT is not possible and hence v
′
T = vT .
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Recall that we have shown in Theorem 5 that φNE(.) constitutes a symmetric NE
strategy. Now we show its uniqueness.
Theorem 6. φNE(.) constitutes the unique symmetric NE strategy.
Proof. Consider a symmetric NE in which every primary uses the strategy φ̂NE(.). We
will show that φ̂NE(.) = φNE(.).
As in the proof of Lemma 15, φ̂NE(.) is continuous. Also, by Lemma 23, vT is the
upper endpoint of the support set of φ̂NE(.) and is a best response for each primary i
in the symmetric NE. Similar to the derivation of (107), the payoff that each primary i
gets at price x in the NE is:
E{ui(x, ψ̂−i)}= fx(φ̂NE(x)) (118)
Also, similar to the derivation of (111), the payoff that each primary i gets at price vT
is:
E{ui(vT , ψ̂−i)}= h(vT ) = g(p̃), (119)
where the second equality follows from (100). Since vT is a best response, each primary
gets an expected payoff of g(p̃) in the NE.
Now, for a price x < p̃, by (118), primary i gets a payoff of:
E{ui(x, ψ̂−i)} = fx(φ̂NE(x))
≤ fx(0) (by Lemma 18) (120)
< g(p̃) (121)
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where (121) follows from (120) similar to the derivation of (110). Thus, primaries do
not play prices below p̃ in the NE and hence φ̂NE(p̃) = 0.
Similar to the derivation of (108), it can be shown that for x∈ [p̃,vT ]\C, E{ui(x, ψ̂−i)}<
g(p̃) and hence x is not a best response. Thus, only prices in C can possibly be best
responses.
If x0 is a best response for primary i, then by (118):
E{ui(x0, ψ̂−i)}= fx0(φ̂NE(x0)) = g(p̃), (122)
By (122) and Lemma 20:
φ̂NE(x0) = γ(x0), (123)
Now, since φ̂NE(.) is continuous by Lemma 15, it consists of alternating intervals
of strict increase and constancy. If [as,bs] is an interval of strict increase, then each
x ∈ [as,bs] is a best response; so φ̂NE(x) = γ(x) by (123). Thus,
φ̂NE(x)≤ max{y ≤ x : γ(y)}= φNE(x), ∀x ∈ [as,bs]. (124)
where the equality follows by (104).
Now, let [ac,bc] be a maximal interval of constancy of φ̂NE(.) such that φ̂NE(ac)> 0.
Note that ac is the right endpoint of an interval of strict increase
18. So by continuity of
φ̂NE(.), ac is a best response and hence φ̂NE(ac) = γ(ac) by (123). So for all x ∈ [ac,bc],
φ̂NE(x) = φ̂NE(ac) = γ(ac) Thus,
φ̂NE(x)≤ max{y ≤ x : γ(y)}= φNE(x), ∀x ∈ [ac,bc]. (125)
18Note that φ̂NE(ac) > 0 implies that there exists an interval of strict increase of φ̂NE(.) to the left of
ac.
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where the equality follows by (104).
By (124) and (125):
φ̂NE(x)≤ φNE(x) ∀x. (126)
Now, it remains to show that φ̂NE(x) ≥ φNE(x) for all x. To reach a contradiction,
suppose φ̂NE(x)< φNE(x) for some x. Let:
xl = inf{x : φ̂NE(x)< φNE(x)}. (127)
Then for all x < xl , φ̂NE(x) = φNE(x). So by continuity of φ̂NE(.) and φNE(.),
φ̂NE(xl) = φNE(xl). (128)
Also, by (127), there exists an x0 = xl + ε, for some small ε > 0, such that:
φ̂NE(x0)< φNE(x0). (129)
and [xl,x0] is an interval of strict increase of φNE(.). In particular, x0 is a best response
of primary 1 when the other primaries use φNE(.).
Now, by (118), the expected payoff of primary 1 for price p1 = x0 when other pri-
maries play φ̂NE(.) is:
fx0(φ̂NE(x0)) > fx0(φNE(x0)) (by (129) and Lemma 18)
= g(p̃) (130)
where (130) follows from the fact that x0 is a best response of primary 1 when the other
primaries use φNE(.) and Lemma 22. This contradicts the fact that the maximum payoff
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that primary 1 can get when the other primaries use φ̂NE(.) is g(p̃). Thus,
φ̂NE(x)≥ φNE(x) ∀x (131)
By (126) and (131), φ̂NE(x) = φNE(x) ∀x and the result follows.
4.4 Multiple Secondaries
In Section 4.3, we explicitly computed the symmetric NE and showed its uniqueness
for the case of one secondary. We now generalize our results to multiple secondaries.
Suppose there are k secondaries, where k ≥ 1.
4.4.1 Primary Secondary Matching Scheme
Let p′(1) ≤ p
′
(2) ≤ . . .≤ p
′
(n) be the pseudo-prices p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n of the primaries in increas-
ing order. Also, let v(1) ≥ v(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(k) be the valuations of the secondaries in
decreasing order.
Note that since there are multiple secondaries with possibly different valuations,
after the primaries reveal the prices they are willing to sell at and the secondaries reveal
their valuations, there are in general different possible schemes for matching primaries
with the secondaries who buy bandwidth from them. Let A be the set of all possible
schemes of matching primaries with secondaries such that bandwidth is never bought
from a primary if the bandwidth of a different primary who offers a lower pseudo-price
remains unsold. Note that under every scheme in A , the bandwidth of the primaries
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with the smallest i pseudo-prices p′(1), . . . , p
′
(i) is sold, for some i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}. Let
W be the scheme in which the secondary with the highest valuation v(1) buys from the
primary with the lowest price p′(1) (if p
′
(1) ≤ v
(1)), the secondary with the second-highest
valuation v(2) buys from the primary with the second-lowest price p′(2) (if p
′
(2) ≤ v
(2))
and so on. Ties are broken at random.
For example, suppose n = 4, k = 3, the pseudo-prices of the primaries in increasing
order are p′(1) = 1, p
′
(2) = 2, p
′
(3) = 3, p
′
(4) = 4 and the valuations of the secondaries in
decreasing order are v(1) = 3.5, v(2) = 2.5, v(3) = 1.5. For the scheme W , the following
table shows the valuation of the secondary who buys bandwidth from each primary (a
“-” indicates that the corresponding primary’s bandwidth is unsold):
Primary’s price Secondary’s valuation
1 3.5
2 2.5
3 -
4 -
Consider another scheme in A in which the secondary with the largest valuation buys
bandwidth from the primary who offers the highest price that is below his valuation, the
secondary with the second-largest valuation buys from the primary who offers the next
highest price that is below his valuation and so on (ties are broken at random). The
following table shows the matching of primaries and secondaries under this scheme for
the above example:
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Primary’s price Secondary’s valuation
1 1.5
2 2.5
3 3.5
4 -
The above tables show that the second scheme is more “efficient” than the scheme
W in the sense that more primaries sell their bandwidth. In fact, the following lemma
shows that in this sense the scheme W is the worst-case or least efficient scheme in A .
Lemma 24. For any given set of pseudo-prices of the primaries and valuations of
the secondaries, out of all the schemes in A , the bandwidth of the fewest number of
primaries is sold under the scheme W .
Proof. Fix p′(1), . . . , p
′
(n) and v
(1), . . . ,v(k). Suppose, under the scheme W , the bandwidth
of the primaries with psedo-prices p′(1), . . . , p
′
(i) is sold. By definition of W , these i pri-
maries sell their bandwidth to the secondaries with the i largest valuations v(1), . . . ,v(i)
and the primary with pseudo-price p′(i) sells to the secondary with the smallest valuation
v(i) out of these. Thus, v(i) ≥ p′(i) and hence:
v( j) ≥ p′(i), j = 1, . . . , i. (132)
Now, consider an arbitrary scheme A∈ A , and suppose, to reach a contradiction, that
under A, only the bandwidth of the primaries with pseudo-prices p′(1), . . . , p
′
(i′) is sold
for some i′ < i. Hence, at most i′ out of the secondaries with valuations v(1), . . . ,v(i) buy
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bandwidth under A and hence at least one of these secondaries does not buy bandwidth.
However, by (132), the valuation of such a secondary is ≥ the pseudo-price p(i′+1),
which contradicts the fact that the bandwidth of the primary with pseudo-price p(i′+1)
remains unsold.
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 24.
Lemma 25. Out of all the schemes in A and for any given set of pseudo-price distri-
butions of the primaries and distributions of the valuations of the secondaries, given
that a primary i has unused bandwidth and sets price pi = x, the probability that his
bandwidth is sold, and hence his expected payoff, is minimized for the scheme W .
We assume that primaries do not know the scheme that will be used to match the
primaries and secondaries, and hence, each primary, so as to maximize his worst-case
payoff, selects his price distribution assuming that the scheme W will be used.
4.4.2 Analysis
We now generalize the analysis in Section 4.3 to multiple secondaries. First, it is easy
to see that Lemma 15 generalizes without change to the case of multiple secondaries.
Now, recall from Section 4.2 that the valuations of the secondaries are i.i.d., and each
has the d.f. G(.). For i = 1, . . . ,k, let G(i)(.) be the d.f. of v(i). The following lemma
provides some simple properties of the functions G(i)(.), i = 1, . . . ,k.
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Lemma 26. G(i)(.), i = 1, . . . ,n are continuous. Also:
G(i)(x) = 0, x ≤ v; i = 1, . . . ,k (133)
G(i)(x) = 1, x ≥ v; i = 1, . . . ,k (134)
G(1)(x)≤ G(2)(x)≤ . . .≤ G(k)(x),x ∈ [c,v]. (135)
Proof. The continuity of G(i)(.), i = 1, . . . ,n follows from the continuity of G(.). Also,
(133) and (134) follow from the fact that P(v ≤ v j ≤ v) = 1 for every buyer j. Finally,
we get (135) from the fact that v(1) ≥ v(2) ≥ . . .≥ v(k).
Let fx(y) be as defined just after (90) in Section 4.3 and h(.) and g(.) be as in (91)
and (92) respectively. In Lemma 16, we derived an expression for fx(y) for the case of
one secondary. The following lemma generalizes that expression to k secondaries.
Lemma 27.
fx(y) = (x− c)
k
∑
i=1
(1−G(i)(x))


n−1
i−1

y
i−1(1− y)n−i (136)
Proof. Let Z be the number of primaries out of primaries {1, . . . ,n}\m for which the
pseudo-price p′j ≤ x. By (90), the events {p
′
j ≤ x}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}\m are independent
Bernoulli events with success probability y each. So:
P(Z = i−1) =


n−1
i−1

y
i−1(1− y)n−i. (137)
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Also, if Z = i− 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, then primary m’s bandwidth is sold iff i or
more secondaries have valuations ≥ x; the probability of the latter event is:
1−G(i)(x). (138)
If Z ≥ k, then primary m’s bandwidth is not sold. Conditioning on Z and using (137)
and (138), we get that the probability that primary m’s bandwidth is sold given that he
sets a price pm = x equals the summation in (136). This, combined with the fact that
if primary m’s bandwidth is sold at price pm = x, then he gets a payoff of x− c, gives
(136).
Let vT be defined as in (94). The following lemma generalizes the properties of
fx(y) that were shown for the case of one secondary.
Lemma 28. The properties of fx(y) in Lemma 17 and Lemma 18 hold for the case of k
secondaries.
Now, the analysis in Section 4.3 after Lemma 18 does not use the expression for
fx(y) and relies only on the properties of fx(y) in Lemmas 17 and 18. Since these prop-
erties go through for the case of k secondaries by Lemma 28, the analysis in Section 4.3
after Lemma 18 generalizes to the case of k secondaries. In particular, we define p̃, C,
the function γ(.) and the function φNE(.) as in Lemma 19, (98), Lemma 20 and (104)
respectively. Theorems 5 and 6 generalize to the case of k secondaries and provide the
unique symmetric NE strategy.
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4.5 Discussion on Structure of Symmetric NE Strategy
When the valuations of all the secondaries are constant and equal, the symmetric NE
strategy is contiguous (see Theorem 3 in Chapter 3). However, we now show by provid-
ing an example that when the valuations of the secondaries are random, the NE strategy
φNE(.) can be non-contiguous, even when k = 1.
Let c = 0, n = 2, k = 1, q = 1
6
and
1−G(x) =



1− 3x
2
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
1
4
, 1
2
< x ≤ 3
4
1− x, 3
4
< x ≤ 1
By (92), (93) and using c = 0, we get g(x) = x(1−G(x)) and hence:
g(x) =



x
(
1− 3x
2
)
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
x
4
, 1
2
< x ≤ 3
4
x(1− x), 3
4
< x ≤ 1
The function g(.) is plotted in Fig. 4.2. Also, it can be checked that p̃ = 1
4
and
vT =
3
4
. Fig. 4.2 plots the symmetric NE strategy φNE(.) and shows that it has an
interval of constancy and hence is not contiguous. The reason the interval of constancy
arises is as follows. Fig. 4.2 shows that within the interval [p̃,vT ] =
[
1
4
, 3
4
]
, there is a
sub-interval (around the local minimum of g(.) at 1
2
) in which g(x) < g(p̃). So with C
as in (98), this sub-interval is not in C. Hence, each primary plays prices in this sub-
interval with zero probability (see Case (i) in the proof of Theorem 5), which results in
an interval of constancy in φNE(.).
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Figure 4.2: The figure plots g(.) (dashed curve) and φNE(.) (solid curve) versus the price x for the
example in Section 4.5.
4.6 Appendix
Proofs of Lemmas 17 and 18. Note that the expression for fx(y) in (93) is a special case
with k = 1 of the expression for fx(y) in (136). Below, we directly prove Lemma 28,
from which the proofs of Lemmas 17 and 18 follow.
Proof of Lemma 28. By Lemma 26, G(i)(.), i = 1, . . . ,k are continuous. So by (136), it
follows that fx(y) is continuous in x and y, which proves part 1 of Lemma 17 (for the
case of k secondaries). By (133) and (136), for x ≤ v:
fx(y) = (x− c)
k
∑
i=1


n−1
i−1

y
i−1(1− y)n−i (139)
from which part 2 of Lemma 17 follows. By (139) and the facts that v> c and 0< q< 1,
it follows that h(v) = fv(q)> 0. Also, by (134) and (136), fx(y) = 0 for x ≥ v and hence
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h(x) = fx(q) = 0 for x ≥ v. This proves part 3 of Lemma 17.
It remains to prove Lemma 18 (for the case of k secondaries). By (94) and part 3 of
Lemma 17, h(vT )≥ h(v)> 0. Also, by (136) and since h(vT ) = fvT (q) by (91), we get
1−G(i)(vT ) > 0 for at least one value of i in {1, . . . ,k}. Since 1−G
(i)(vT ) = P(v
(i) >
vT ), it follows that P(v j > vT )> 0, j = 1, . . . ,k. So 1−G
(i)(vT )> 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,k.
But for each i, 1−G(i)(x) is a decreasing function of x. Hence:
1−G(i)(x)> 0, x ≤ vT , i = 1, . . . ,k. (140)
Now, fix an arbitrary x ∈ [c,vT ]. Let ai = 1−G
(i)(x), i = 1, . . . ,k. By (135) and
(140):
a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . .≥ ak > 0 (141)
Let bi(y) =


n−1
i−1

y
i−1(1− y)n−i. We have the following property from [70]:
Property 3. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1, ∑
j
i=1 bi(y) is a strictly decreasing function of y.
Now, note that for i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}:
ai =
k−1
∑
j=i
(a j −a j+1)+ak. (142)
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Now, by (136), fx(y) = (x− c)T , where
T =
k
∑
i=1
aibi(y)
=
k
∑
i=1
{
k−1
∑
j=i
(a j −a j+1)+ak
}
bi(y) (by (142))
= ak
k
∑
i=1
bi(y)+
k
∑
i=1
k−1
∑
j=1
(a j −a j+1)bi(y)I{ j ≥ i}
= ak
k
∑
i=1
bi(y)+
k−1
∑
j=1
(a j −a j+1)
k
∑
i=1
bi(y)I{ j ≥ i}
= ak
k
∑
i=1
bi(y)+
k−1
∑
j=1
(a j −a j+1)
(
j
∑
i=1
bi(y)
)
(143)
By (141), each of the terms a j − a j+1, j = 1, . . . ,k − 1 are nonnegative and ak > 0;
so by Property 3, the expression in (143) is strictly decreasing in y. So T , and hence
fx(y) = (x− c)T , is strictly decreasing in y for fixed x.
Proof of Fact 1. Let {xn : n = 1,2,3, . . .} be any sequence such that xn → x ∈ [a,b]. It
is sufficient to show that
lim
n→∞
γ(xn) = γ(x). (144)
To show (144), consider the sequence
yn = γ(xn),n = 1,2,3, . . . . (145)
Let L = liminfn→∞ yn. Then there exists a subsequence of the sequence {yn}, say
{ynk ,k = 1,2,3, . . .}, such that ynk → L as k → ∞. By (103) and (145):
F(xnk ,ynk) = α, k = 1,2,3 . . . (146)
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So:
lim
k→∞
F(xnk ,ynk) = α.
By continuity of F(.), and using xnk → x and ynk → L:
F(x,L) = α.
But since y = γ(x) is the unique value that satisfies F(x,y) = α, we get
L = γ(x). (147)
Now, let U = limsupn→∞ yn. Similar to the proof of (147), we get:
U = γ(x). (148)
By (145), (147) and (148), liminfn→∞ γ(xn) = γ(x) and limsupn→∞ γ(xn) = γ(x), from
which (144) follows. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 5
Spectrum Pricing Games with Spatial
Reuse
In Chapters 3 and 4, we analyzed price competition in a setup where there are multi-
ple primaries and secondaries in a single location. In this chapter, we analyze price
competition under spatial reuse constraints.
5.1 Introduction
Radio spectrum is a commodity that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simul-
taneously used at far-off locations without interference; on the other hand, simultane-
ous transmissions at neighboring locations on the same band interfere with each other.
Thus, spatial reuse provides an opportunity to primaries to increase their profit by sell-
ing the same band to secondaries at different locations, which they can utilize subject
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to satisfying the interference constraints. So when multiple primaries own bandwidth
in a large region, each needs to decide on a set of non-interfering locations within the
region, which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the
region, at which to offer bandwidth. This is a source of strategic interaction among
the primaries– each primary would like to select a maximum-sized independent set to
offer bandwith at; but if a lot of primaries offer bandwidth at the same locations, there
is intense competition at those locations. So a primary would have benefited by in-
stead offering bandwidth at a smaller independent set and charging high prices at those
locations.
In this chapter, we formulate the price competition scenario with spatial reuse as
a game in which each primary needs to select (i) a set of locations at which to offer
bandwidth and (ii) the price of bandwidth at each location. We first analyze the sym-
metric case q1 = . . .= qn = q for simplicity, which makes the game a symmetric game,
and focus on symmetric NE. Our first contribution is to prove a separation theorem
(Section 5.2.2), which states that in a symmetric NE, the price distributions used by the
primaries at different nodes are uniquely determined once the independent set selection
distributions are obtained. We therefore focus on computing the latter, which in turn
provides the joint independent set and price selection strategies, by virtue of the results
in Chapter 3 for the single location case.
We focus on a class of conflict graphs that we refer to as mean valid graphs. These
are graphs whose node set can be partitioned into d disjoint maximal independent sets
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I1, . . . , Id , for some integer d ≥ 2, and which satisfy another technical condition to be
introduced later (in Section 5.3). As we show in Section 5.5.1, it turns out that the
conflict graphs of a large number of topologies that arise in practice are mean valid. In
particular, several lattice arrangements of nodes in two and three dimensions are mean
valid, e.g., a grid graph in two dimensions, such as that in part (b) of Fig. 5.2 or Fig. 5.3,
which may be the conflict graph of shops in a shopping complex, the conflict graph of
a cellular network with hexagonal cells (see Figs. 5.6 and 5.7), a grid graph in three
dimensions, which may represent offices in a corporate building (see Fig. 5.5) etc.
We show that a mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE; in this NE, each
primary offers bandwidth only at some or all of the independent sets in I1, . . . , Id with
positive probability and with 0 probability at every other independent set. These proba-
bilities (and thereby the NE strategies) can be explicitly computed by solving a system
of equations that we provide. The fact that primaries offer bandwidth with a positive
probability at only a small number of independent sets is a surprising result, because in
most graphs, including the examples in the previous paragraph, the number of indepen-
dent sets is exponential in the number of nodes. Our characterization of the symmetric
NE also reveals that when the probability q that a primary has unused bandwidth is
small, primaries only offer bandwidth at the larger independent sets out of I1, . . . , Id
and as q increases, primaries also start offering bandwidth at the smaller ones. This is
because, for given prices, a larger independent set yields a larger revenue. However,
as q increases, the price competition at the large independent sets becomes intense and
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drives down the prices and revenues at those independent sets. So primaries also offer
bandwidth at the smaller independent sets.
This chapter is organized as follows. We describe our model in Section 5.2.1. We in-
troduce mean valid graphs in Section 5.3 and provide several examples. In Section 5.4,
we prove the theorem, discussed above, on characterization of the unique symmetric
NE in mean valid graphs. In Section 5.5, we show that the conflict graphs of several
topologies of practical interest as well as some other common types of graphs are mean
valid. In Section 5.6, we show that the mean validity condition is a necessary condition
for the existence of a symmetric NE of the above form when d = 2, and also find the
symmetric NE and prove its uniqueness in a specific non mean valid graph. In Sec-
tion 5.7, we generalize our results to the case in which q1, . . . ,qn may not be equal and
present numerical studies in Section 5.9.
We present some of the proofs in the main text and defer the rest until the appendix
(Section 5.11).
5.2 Model and some Basic Results
5.2.1 Model
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 primaries, each of whom owns a channel throughout a large
region which is a geographically well-separated or separately administered area, such
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as a state or a country 19. The channels owned by the primaries are all orthogonal to
each other. In every slot, each primary independently either uses its channel through-
out the region to satisfy its own subscriber demand, or does not use it anywhere in the
region. A typical scenario where this happens is when primaries broadcast the same
signal over the entire region, e.g., if they are television broadcasters. Let q ∈ (0,1) be
the probability that a primary does not use its channel in a slot (to satisfy its subscriber
demand). For simplicity, we assume that the probability q is the same for all primaries;
we discuss the effect of relaxing this assumption in Section 5.7. Now, the region con-
tains smaller parts, which we refer to as locations. For example, the large region may
be a state, and the locations may be towns within it.
We assume that there are Kv secondaries at location v, where Kv is a random variable
with probability mass function (p.m.f.) Pr(Kv = k) = γk. Also, the random variables Kv
at different nodes v may be correlated. The primaries apriori know only the γks, but not
the values of Kv for any given location v. Also, the p.m.f. {γk} satisfies the technical
assumptions described in Section 3.2 and as before, let r = P(Kv ≥ 1) = 1− γ0.
A primary who has unused bandwidth in a slot can lease it out to secondaries at a
subset of the locations, provided this subset satisfies the spatial reuse constraints, which
we describe next. The overall region can be represented by an undirected graph [71]
G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges, called the conflict
graph, in which each node represents a location, and there is an edge between two
19We assume that all the primaries own bandwidth in the same region.
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nodes iff transmissions at the corresponding locations interfere with each other. Note
that graphs have been widely used to model ad hoc networks, wherein wireless devices
are modeled as nodes in an undirected graph, with mutually interfering nodes being
connected by an edge [23], [66]. However, the concept of spatial reuse in our paper
is more closely related to the corresponding notion in cellular networks, where cells
are represented by nodes in an undirected graph, with interfering cells corresponding
to neighbors in the graph [55]. Recall that an independent set [71] (I.S.) in a graph is
a set of nodes such that there is no edge between any pair of nodes in the set. Now, a
primary who is not using its channel must offer it at a set of mutually non-interfering
locations, or equivalently, at an I.S. of nodes; otherwise secondaries20 will not be able
to successfully transmit simultaneously using the bandwidth they purchase, owing to
mutual interference. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the model.
A primary i who offers bandwidth at an I.S. I, must also determine for each node
v ∈ I, the access fee, pi,v, to be charged to a secondary if the latter leases the bandwidth
at node v. A primary incurs a cost of c ≥ 0 per slot per node for leasing out bandwidth.
As in the single location case, we assume that pi,v ≤ ν for each primary i and each
node v, for some constant ν > c. This upper bound ν may either be a regulator-imposed
limit or the valuation of each secondary for unit bandwidth. We assume that the pri-
maries know this upper limit ν.
20Note that secondaries are usually customers or local providers, and purchase bandwidth for commu-
nication (and not television broadcasts). Thus, two secondaries can not use the same band simultaneously
at interfering locations.
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Figure 5.1: The figure illustrates the network model. Part (a) shows a region containing 11 locations.
There are n = 3 primaries, and k = 2 secondaries in each location. Part (b) shows the conflict graph
corresponding to the region in part (a). The darkened nodes constitute a maximal independent set.
Secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer the lowest price. More
precisely, in a given slot, let Zv be the number of primaries who offer unused bandwidth
at a node v. Then, since there are Kv secondaries at node v, the bandwidth of the
min(Z,Kv) primaries that offer the lowest prices is bought (ties are resolved at random)
at the node. The utility of a primary i who offers bandwidth at an I.S. I and sets a price
of pi,v at node v ∈ I is given by ∑(pi,v−c), where the summation is over the nodes v ∈ I
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at which primary i’s bandwidth is bought. (The utility is 0 if bandwidth is not bought
at any node).
Thus, each primary must jointly select an I.S. at which to offer bandwidth, and the
prices to set at the nodes in it. Both the I.S. and price selection may be random. Thus,
a strategy, say ψi, of a primary i provides a probability mass function (p.m.f.) for
selection among the I.S. and the price distribution it uses at each node (both selections
contingent on having unused bandwidth). Note that we allow a primary to use different
(and arbitrary) price distributions for different nodes (and therefore allow, but do not
require, the selection of different prices at different nodes), and arbitrary p.m.f. (i.e.,
discrete distributions) for selection among the different I.S.
The vector (ψ1, . . . ,ψn) of strategies of the primaries is called a strategy profile [42].
Let ψ−i = (ψ1, . . . ,ψi−1,ψi+1, . . . ,ψn) denote the vector of strategies of primaries other
than i. Let E{ui(ψi,ψ−i)} denote the expected utility of primary i when it adopts
strategy ψi and the other primaries adopt ψ−i.
Now, let
w(q,n) = ∑
k
γk
n−1
∑
i=k


n−1
i

q
i(1−q)n−1−i (149)
This is the probability that Kv or more primaries out of a given set of n− 1 primaries
offer bandwidth at a given node v. Note that when the number of secondaries Kv is
constant, i.e., the p.m.f. {γk} is concentrated at a single value, the above expression
reduces to the expression in (2). We will later use the following fact [70]:
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Lemma 29. w(q,n) is a strictly increasing function of q for fixed n.
Let p̃ be as in Property 2 in Chapter 3. We showed in that chapter (see Section 3.3.4)
that in the price competition game at a single location, there is a unique NE in which
each primary randomizes over the prices in the range [p̃,v] using a continuous distri-
bution function (d.f.) ψ(.). Also, under this symmetric NE, each primary receives an
expected payoff of (see Property 2 in Chapter 3 and note that w(q,n) = w1):
p̃− c = (ν− c)(1−w(q,n)) (150)
5.2.2 A Separation Result
Recall that a strategy of a primary consists of a p.m.f. over I.S. and price distributions
at individual nodes. We now provide a separation framework from which the price dis-
tributions at individual nodes in a symmetric NE follow once the I.S. selection p.m.f.s
are determined.
Let I be the set of all I.S. in G. For convenience, we assume that the empty I.S.
I/0 ∈ I and we allow a primary to offer bandwith at I/0, i.e. to not offer bandwidth at
any node, with some probability. Consider a symmetric strategy profile under which
each primary offers bandwidth at I.S. I ∈ I w.p. β(I), where:
∑
I∈I
β(I) = 1. (151)
The probability, say αv, with which each primary offers bandwidth at a node v ∈ V
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equals the sum of the probabilities associated with all the I.S. that contain the node, i.e.
αv = ∑
I∈I :v∈I
β(I) (152)
Now, considering that each primary has unused bandwidth w.p. q, it offers it at node v
w.p. qαv. The price selection problem at each node v is now equivalent to that for the
single location case, the difference being that each primary offers unused bandwidth
w.p. qαv, instead of q, at node v. Thus:
Lemma 30. Suppose under a symmetric NE each primary selects node v w.p. αv if it
has unused bandwidth. Then under that NE the price distribution of each primary at
node v is the d.f. ψ(.) in the single location case, with qαv in place of q.
Thus, a symmetric NE strategy is completely specified once the I.S. selection p.m.f.
{β(I) : I ∈ I } (which will in turn provide the αvs via (152)) is obtained.
5.2.3 Node and I.S. Probabilities
Consider a symmetric NE where each primary uses the strategy ψ, under which it offers
bandwidth at I.S. I ∈ I with some probability β(I). The probability, αv, with which
each primary offers bandwidth at a node v ∈ V is determined by the I.S. distribution
{β(I) : I ∈ I } via (152).
Now, for simplicity, we normalize ν− c = 1. With w(q,n) as in (149), let:
W (α) = (1−w(qα,n))(ν− c) = (1−w(qα,n)). (153)
By Lemma 30, and similar to (150) in the single location case, in a symmetric NE if
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primaries offer bandwidth at a node with probability α (and play the single-node NE
strategy with qα in place of q at that node), then W (α) is the maximum expected payoff
that each primary i can get at that node. It gets this payoff W (α) if it sets any price in
the range [ν−w(qα,n)(ν− c),ν] at that node. Under the above symmetric NE with
strategy profile (ψ, . . . ,ψ), each primary offers bandwidth at node v ∈ V w.p. αv. So
the expected payoff of each primary i is given by:
E{ui(ψ,ψ−i)}= ∑
v∈V
αvW (αv). (154)
Now, in general, different I.S. distributions {β(I) : I ∈ I } can result in the same
node distribution 21 {αv : v ∈V}. However, by (154), the expected payoff of each pri-
mary in a symmetric NE is completely determined by the node distribution, i.e. it is the
same under different I.S. distributions that correspond to the same node distribution.
So if primary i knows the node distribution chosen by the other primaries, then it has
sufficient information to choose its best response; it does not need to know their I.S. dis-
tribution in addition. Thus, the game aspect of the price competition, i.e. the strategic
interaction between the primaries, is completely determined by the node distribution.
We now introduce a definition:
Definition 1 (Valid Distribution). An assignment {αv : v ∈ V} of probabilities to the
nodes is said to be a valid distribution if there exists a probability distribution {β(I) :
I ∈ I } such that for each v ∈V, αv = ∑I∈I :v∈I β(I).
Note that, given a valid distribution {αv : v ∈ V}, a corresponding I.S. distribution
21Although we refer to {αv : v ∈V} as a distribution, note that ∑v∈V αv need not equal 1 in general.
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can be computed by solving the system of linear equations (152).
Thus, we can equivalently define the strategy of a primary in a symmetric NE as a
node distribution {αv : v ∈V}. So henceforth, we interchangeably speak of the strategy
of a primary as either an I.S. distribution {β(I) : I ∈I } (note that the price distribution
follows by Lemma 30) or a node distribution {αv : v ∈ V}. Also, we say that the
symmetric NE is unique if the node distribution {αv : v ∈V} is unique.
Remark 3. In Theorem 4 of Chapter 3, we showed the uniqueness of the NE in the price
competition game at a single location, even for the asymmetric case in which q1, . . . ,qn
are not equal. However, in presence of spatial reuse, there are multiple NE even in the
symmetric case q1 = . . .= qn = q. For example, suppose there are two nodes v1 and v2
connected by an edge, two primaries (n = 2) and one secondary with probability 1 at
each node (k = 1). Then the strategy profiles in which primary 1 offers bandwidth at
node v1 and primary 2 at node v2 w.p. 1, or vice versa, and both primaries set a price
of ν w.p. 1, are NE, apart from the symmetric NE to be described in Theorem 8 below.
5.3 Mean Valid Graphs
We now introduce a class of graphs, which we refer to as mean valid graphs. The
motivation behind studying these graphs is that the conflict graphs of several topologies
that commonly arise in practice are mean valid graphs. Also, as we show in the next
section, these graphs have a unique symmetric NE, which can be explicitly computed
and has a simple form.
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5.3.1 Definition
Definition 2 (Mean Valid Graph). We refer to a graph G = (V,E) as mean valid if it
satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Its vertex set can be partitioned into d disjoint maximal 22 I.S. for some integer
d ≥ 2: V = I1∪I2∪ . . .∪Id , where I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, is a maximal I.S. and I j∩Im =
/0, j 6= m.
Let |I j|= M j,
M1 ≥ M2 ≥ . . .≥ Md , (155)
and I j = {a j,l : l = 1, . . . ,M j}.
2. For every valid distribution 23 in which a primary offers bandwidth at node a j,l
w.p. α j,l, j = 1, . . . ,d, l = 1, . . . ,M j,
d
∑
j=1
α j ≤ 1, (156)
where
α j =
∑
M j
l=1 α j,l
M j
, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. (157)
We now explain the two conditions in Definition 2. Recall that a graph G = (V,E)
is said to be d-partite if V can be partitioned into d disjoint I.S. I1, . . . , Id [71]. For
example, when d = 2, G is a bipartite graph. The first condition in Definition 2 says
22Recall that an I.S. I is said to be maximal if I ∪{v} is not an I.S. for all v ∈V [71].
23Note that we write α j,l in place of αa j,l to simplify the notation.
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that G is a d-partite graph and has the additional property that each of I1, . . . , Id is a
maximal I.S.
Now we explain Condition 2 in Definition 2. Let {α j,l : j = 1, . . . ,d; l = 1, . . . ,M j}
be an arbitrary valid distribution. Consider the distribution α′j,l = α j, with α j as in
(157), i.e. for each j and l = 1, . . . ,M j, α
′
j,l is set equal to the mean of α j,m,m =
1, . . . ,M j. If (156) is true, then this distribution of means is a valid distribution because
it corresponds to the I.S. distribution {β(I j)=α j, j = 1, . . . ,d,β(I/0)= 1−∑
d
j=1 α j;β(I)=
0, I 6= I1, . . . , Id, I/0}. Thus, Condition 2 in Definition 2 says that in G, the distribution of
means corresponding to every valid distribution is valid. As we will see in Section 5.4,
this condition is the crux behind the fact that in the symmetric NE in a mean valid
graph, each primary offers bandwidth with equal probabilities at all the nodes in I j for
every j = 1, . . . ,d.
5.3.2 Examples
Technical as Definition 2 may seem, it turns out that several conflict graphs that com-
monly arise in practice are mean valid. For example, consider the following graphs:
1. Let Gm denote a graph that is a linear arrangement of m ≥ 2 nodes as shown in part
(a) of Fig. 5.2, with an edge between each pair of adjacent nodes. As an example,
this would be the conflict graph for locations along a highway or a row of roadside
shops.
2. We consider two types of m×m grid graphs, denoted by Gm,m (see part (b) of
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Fig. 5.2) and Hm,m (see Fig. 5.3). In both these graphs, m
2 nodes (locations) are
arranged in a square grid. In Gm,m, there is an edge only between each pair of
adjacent nodes in the same row or column. In Hm,m, in addition to these edges,
there are also edges between nodes that are neighbors along a diagonal as shown
in Fig. 5.3. For example, Gm,m or Hm,m may represent a shopping complex, with
the nodes corresponding to the locations of shops with WiFi Access Points (AP)
for Internet access. Depending on the proximity of the shops to each other and the
transmission ranges of the APs, the conflict graph could be Gm,m or Hm,m. Hm,m is
also the conflict graph of a cellular network with square cells as shown in Fig. 5.4.
3. Let Tm,m,m be a three-dimensional grid graph (see Fig. 5.5), which may, for exam-
ple, be the conflict graph for offices in a corporate building or rooms in a hotel.
4. The conflict graph (Fig. 5.7) of a cellular network with hexagonal cells (Fig. 5.6).
5. Consider a clique 24 of size e, where e ≥ 1 is any integer. This is the conflict graph
for any set of e locations that are close to each other.
All of the above are mean valid graphs:
Theorem 7. The following graphs are mean valid, with d, the number of disjoint max-
imal I.S., indicated in each case:
1. a clique of size e ≥ 1 (d = e),
24Recall that a clique or a complete graph of size e is a graph with e nodes and an edge between every
pair of nodes [71].
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Figure 5.2: Part (a) shows a linear graph, Gm, with m = 8 and part (b) shows a grid graph, Gm,m, with
m = 5. In both graphs, the darkened and un-darkened nodes constitute I1 and I2 respectively.
2. a line graph Gm (d = 2),
3. a two-dimensional grid graph Gm,m (d = 2),
4. a two-dimensional grid graph Hm,m (d = 4),
5. a three-dimensional grid graph Tm,m,m (d = 8).
6. a cellular network with hexagonal cells, under Assumption 1 in Section 5.5.1 (d =
3).
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Figure 5.3: The figure shows a grid graph Hm,m with m = 7.
Figure 5.4: The figure shows a tiling of a plane with squares, e.g. cells in a cellular network. Transmis-
sions at neighboring cells interfere with each other. The corresponding conflict graph is H 6,6.
We defer the proof of Theorem 7 until Section 5.5.1. Also, as we show in Sec-
tion 5.5.2, some other common classes of graphs, such as a star and a κ-regular bipartite
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Figure 5.5: Part (a) shows a three-dimensional grid graph Tm,m,m for m = 5. It consists of periodic
repetitions of the graph shown in part (b). Also, in part (b), the node labels show the I.S. I1, . . . , I8 they
are in, i.e. a node with the label j is part of the I.S. I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,8}.
Figure 5.6: The figure shows a tiling of a plane with hexagons, e.g. cells in a cellular network. Trans-
missions at neighboring cells interfere with each other.
graph, are mean valid as well.
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Figure 5.7: The figure shows the conflict graph of a hexagonal tiling of a plane. Both the solid and
dotted edges are part of the graph. The nodes labelled j, j ∈ {1,2,3}, are in I.S. I j. There are four rows
of nodes. The figure also shows the construction of the graph from cliques of size 3 each, shown by the
solid edges. The dotted edges are added later. Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S.,
so the hypothesis of Lemma 38 is satisfied.
A graph obtained by considering the union of disjoint mean valid graphs, all of
which correspond to the same integer d, and then adding some edges to get a connected
graph, is a mean valid graph under some technical conditions 25, e.g., the cellular net-
works in a group of neighboring towns or the WiFi networks in the departments of a
university campus. Fig. 5.8 illustrates the latter example.
5.3.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
We state a property of mean valid graphs for later use.
Lemma 31. Let G = (V,E) be a graph that satisfies Condition 1 in Definition 2. Sup-
25These technical conditions are stated in Lemmas 38 and 39 in Section 5.5.1.
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Figure 5.8: The rectangles represent departments in a university campus and the circles are the ranges of
WiFi access points. The circles (nodes) in each rectangle constitute a grid graph Hm,m, which is mean
valid with d = 4 (see part 4 of Theorem 7). The overall graph is also mean valid with d = 4. With
I j, j ∈ {1,2,3,4}, being disjoint maximal I.S. as in Definition 2, the number in each circle indicates
the I.S. to which the corresponding node belongs, i.e. nodes corresponding to the circles numbered
j ∈ {1,2,3,4} belong to I.S. I j.
pose I ∈ I contains m j(I) nodes from I j, j = 1, . . . ,d. G is mean valid if and only
if:
d
∑
j=1
m j(I)
M j
≤ 1 ∀I ∈ I (158)
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5.4 Symmetric NE in Mean Valid Graphs
In this section, we show that a mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE; in this
NE, in the notation of Definition 2, primaries offer bandwidth at all the nodes in I j,
j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, with the same probability t j, i.e. α j,l = t j ∀l = 1, . . . ,M j, where {t j : j =
1, . . . ,d} is the unique solution of a set of equations that we provide.
Let G be a mean valid graph. Suppose there exists a symmetric NE in which each
primary offers bandwidth at node a j,l w.p. α j,l, j = 1, . . . ,d, l = 1, . . . ,M j, where {α j,l}
is a valid distribution. Let ψ denote this strategy. First, we will argue, by contradiction,
that for each j, α j,l = α j ∀l = 1, . . . ,M j, where α j is given by (157). In the symmetric
NE (ψ, . . . ,ψ), by (153) and the discussion just after it, primary 1 gets an expected
payoff of W (α j,l) at node a j,l; also, by (154), its total expected payoff is:
E{u1(ψ,ψ−1)}=
d
∑
j=1
M j
∑
l=1
α j,lW (α j,l) (159)
Suppose α j,l, l = 1, . . . ,M j are not all equal for some j. By (153) and Lemma 29,
W (α) is a strictly decreasing function of α; so primary 1 offers bandwidth with a high
probability α j,l at nodes a j,l at which it gets a low payoff W (α j,l). This seems to
suggest that primary 1 could get a higher overall payoff by unilaterally switching to an
alternative strategy, say ψ0, under which it decreases (respectively, increases) the node
probabilities at nodes that yield a low (respectively, high) payoff, if such a strategy ψ0
were to exist. This would contradict the fact that the distribution {α j,l : j = 1, . . . ,d; l =
1, . . . ,M j} is primary 1’s best response and thereby imply that α j,l, l = 1, . . . ,M j must
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be equal for every j = 1, . . . ,d.
The existence of such a strategy ψ0 is guaranteed by Condition 2 in Definition 2–
that (156) holds for every valid distribution. Let ψ0 be a strategy under which primary
1 offers bandwidth at each node in I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d} w.p. α j. Note that ∑
d
j=1 α j ≤ 1 by
(156); so ψ0 is a valid distribution since it corresponds to the I.S. distribution β(I j)=α j,
j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, β(I/0) = 1 −∑
d
j=1 α j, β(I) = 0, I 6= I1, . . . , Id, I/0. By (154), the total
expected payoff of primary 1 if it plays strategy ψ0 is:
E{u1(ψ0,ψ−1)}=
d
∑
j=1
M j
∑
l=1
α jW (α j,l) (160)
By (159) and (160):
E{u1(ψ,ψ−1)}−E{u1(ψ0,ψ−1)}
=
d
∑
j=1
(
M j
∑
l=1
α j,lW (α j,l)−α j
(
M j
∑
l=1
W (α j,l)
))
(161)
Now, we have the following algebraic fact, proved in Section 5.11.
Lemma 32. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer, α1, . . . ,αN be real numbers and α =
∑Ni=1 αi
N
. Let
f (x) be any strictly decreasing function of x. Then:
(
N
∑
i=1
αi f (αi))≤ α(
N
∑
i=1
f (αi)) (162)
with equality iff α1 = . . .= αN = α.
Intuitively, since f (.) is strictly decreasing, in the LHS of (162), the terms in which
f (αi) is large are multiplied by small factors αi and vice-versa; on the other hand, all
terms f (αi) on the RHS are multiplied by the same factor α. So the LHS is smaller.
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Now, as mentioned above, f (α) = W (α) = 1 − w(qα,n) is a strictly decreasing
function of α. So by Lemma 32, the expression in (161) is ≤ 0, with equality holding
iff α j,1 = . . . = α j,M j = α j for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. But since ψ is a best response,
E{u1(ψ,ψ−1)} ≥ E{u1(ψ0,ψ−1)}. So the expression in (161) must equal 0 and hence
α j,1 = . . .= α j,M j = α j for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}.
Now, suppose ∑dj=1 α j < 1. Then primary 1 can unilaterally offer bandwidth at each
node in Id with probability 1−∑
d−1
j=1 α j > αd instead of αd and increase its payoff. This
contradicts the fact that the distribution is a NE. So we must have ∑dj=1 α j = 1. Thus,
we have shown the following:
Lemma 33. In a mean valid graph, under every symmetric NE, each primary offers
bandwidth at each node in I j w.p. t j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, for some t j ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,d, where
∑dj=1 t j = 1.
A typical way in which the node probability distribution α j,l = t j ∀l = 1, . . . ,M j,
arises is via the I.S. distribution β(I j) = t j, j = 1, . . . ,d;β(I) = 0 ∀I 6= I1, . . . , Id .
The following result provides necessary conditions for a distribution {t j : j= 1, . . . ,d}
as in Lemma 33 to constitute a symmetric NE.
Lemma 34. If a distribution {t j : j = 1, . . . ,d} as in Lemma 33 constitutes a symmetric
NE, then I1, . . . , Id′ are best responses and Id′+1, . . . , Id are not, for some integer d
′ ∈
{1, . . . ,d}. Also, each I ∈ I containing a node from I j for some j > d
′ is not a best
response. Hence:
t j = 0, j > d
′. (163)
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Intuitively, a primary prefers to offer bandwidth at a large I.S. because it gets some
revenue at every node in the I.S. it selects and its total payoff is the sum of the revenues
at the nodes of the I.S. Also, recall that by (155), I1, . . . , Id are in decreasing order of
size. So a primary will (i) try to offer bandwidth only at the largest I.S. I1, (ii) offer
bandwidth at the next largest I.S. I2 as well with some probability only if the compe-
tition at I1 increases beyond a threshold, (iii) offer bandwidth at I3 as well with some
probability only if the competition at I1 and I2 increases beyond a certain threshold and
so on. Hence, the set of best responses out of I1, . . . , Id is of the form I1, I2, . . . , Id′ for
some 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d.
Now, if primary i offers bandwidth at I.S. I′ ∈ I , its overall expected payoff, de-
noted by U1(I
′), is the sum of the expected payoffs at the nodes in I′, which, by (153)
and the discussion just after it, is given by:
U1(I
′) = ∑
v∈I′
W (αv) = ∑
v∈I′
(1−w(qαv,n)). (164)
Now, consider a symmetric NE with {t j : j = 1, . . . ,d} as in Lemma 33. By (164) and
the fact that |I j|= M j, the payoff of primary 1 if it offers bandwidth at I j is:
U1(I j) = M jW (t j) (165)
By Lemma 34, I1, . . . , Id′ are best responses and Id′+1 is not. So:
U1(I1) = . . .=U1(Id′)>U1(Id′+1)
Substituting (165) into the above and using (163) and the fact that W (0)= 1−w(0,n)=
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1− (1− r) = r, we get:
M1W (t1) = . . .= Md′W (td′)> Md′+1r (166)
Thus, we have shown the following:
Lemma 35. A distribution {t j : j = 1, . . . ,d} as in Lemma 33 that constitutes a sym-
metric NE must satisfy (163) and (166) for some integer d′ ∈ {1, . . . ,d}.
Lemma 35 provides necessary conditions for a distribution {t j : j = 1, . . . ,d} to con-
stitute a symmetric NE. The following lemma shows that these conditions are sufficient
as well.
Lemma 36. Let 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d and t1, . . . , td be a probability distribution such that (163)
and (166) hold. Then the symmetric strategy profile in which every primary offers
bandwidth at each node in I j w.p. t j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, is a NE.
The proof of Lemma 36 (see Section 5.11) is based on the fact that the graph, being
mean valid, satisfies Condition 2 in Definition 2.
The following technical lemma shows the existence and uniqueness of a distribution
(t1, . . . , td) satisfying (163) and (166) for every value of q.
Lemma 37. For every q ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique integer d′ = d′(q) and a unique
probability distribution (t1, . . . , td) such that (163) and (166) hold. Also, d
′(q) is an
increasing function of q and, for every value of q, t1 ≥ t2 . . .≥ td.
Note that the fact that d′(q) is an increasing function of q is consistent with the intu-
ition that for small values of q, primaries tend to offer bandwidth at only the larger I.S.
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out of I1, . . . , Id , and as q, and thereby the competition from other primaries increases,
they also choose the smaller ones. Also, the fact that t1 ≥ t2 . . . ≥ td for all q is con-
sistent with the intuition that primaries offer bandwidth at the larger I.S. with a larger
probability.
Finally, putting together the above discussion, we get the main result of this section:
Theorem 8. In a mean valid graph, for every q ∈ (0,1), there is a unique symmetric
NE; in this NE, each primary offers bandwidth at every node in I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, w.p.
t j, i.e. α j,l = t j, l = 1, . . . ,M j, where (t1, . . . , td) is the unique distribution satisfying
(163) and (166).
Proof. By Lemma 33, under every symmetric NE, each primary must offer bandwidth
at all the nodes in I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, w.p. t j for some probability distribution (t1, . . . , td).
Also, by Lemma 35, (163) and (166) hold for this distribution. By Lemma 37, for a
fixed value of q ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique distribution (t1, . . . , td) satisfying (163)
and (166). Finally, by Lemma 36, the strategy profile where each primary uses this
distribution is a NE. The result follows.
Thus, every mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE, which can be explicitly
computed by solving the system of equations (163) and (166). Note that this is a sys-
tem of non-linear equations in the variables t1, . . . , td and d
′. It can be solved using a
standard solver for non-linear equations (e.g., fsolve in Matlab) in combination with a
search procedure to find d′.
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Example: Suppose there are n = 2 primaries and k = 1 secondary with probability
1. Consider a grid graph Hm,m, which was introduced in Section 5.3.2, with m = 7
(see Fig. 5.3). By part 4 of Theorem 7, this is a mean valid graph and, in the notation
of Definition 2, d = 4, the I.S. I1, I2, I3 and I4 are as described in Section 5.5.1, and
M1 = 16, M2 = M3 = 12, M4 = 9. The symmetric NE is of the form described in
Theorem 8 with d′(q), t1, t2, t3 and t4 for different q ∈ (0,1) as follows:
1. For 0 < q < 1
4
, d′ = 1, t1 = 1, t2 = t3 = t4 = 0.
2. For 1
4
≤ q < 15
16
, d′ = 3, t1 =
1
11
(
3+ 2
q
)
, t2 = t3 =
1
11
(
4− 1
q
)
t4 = 0.
3. For 15
16
≤ q < 1, d′ = 4, t1 =
1
49
(
9+ 13
q
)
, t2 = t3 =
1
49
(
1
q
+12
)
t4 =
1
49
(
16− 15
q
)
.
Note that, consistent with Theorem 8, d′(q) is an increasing function of q and t1 ≥ t2 ≥
t3 ≥ t4 for each value of q. In fact, for all q, t2 = t3, which is because I2 and I3 are of the
same size. Fig. 5.9 plots t1, t2 and t4 versus q. For small q, primaries offer bandwidth at
the largest I.S. I1 with probability 1; but as q increases, the competition at I1 increases,
inducing the primaries to shift probability mass from I1 to the other I.S. So t1 decreases
in q. However, note that for all values of q, t1 ≥ t2 ≥ t4 and t4 is very small (less than
0.02).
Remark 4. The unique symmetric NE need not be pure even with respect to the node
selections, as the above example shows. However, this mixed choice is not really an ar-
tifact of mixed price choice. For instance, consider a scenario where all primaries must
choose the same fixed price p0 (perhaps the prices have been standardized because of
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Figure 5.9: The figure shows the symmetric NE probabilities t1, t2 and t4 for the example after Theorem 8.
government regulation). Suppose there are two nodes v1 and v2 connected by an edge,
two primaries (n = 2) and one secondary with probability 1 at each node (k = 1). Then
it is easy to show that the strategy profile under which each primary offers bandwidth
at v1 and v2 w.p. 1/2 each constitutes the unique symmetric NE.
The intuition behind randomization across different I.S. in a symmetric NE is that
primaries would like to offer bandwidth at an I.S. at which other primaries do not offer
bandwidth with a high probability, whereas in a symmetric NE that is pure with respect
to the node selection, all primaries offer bandwidth at the same I.S.
5.5 Some Specific Mean Valid Graphs
Theorem 8 provides the form of the symmetric NE in mean valid graphs. So in this
section, we identify some classes of mean valid graphs.
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5.5.1 Topologies that Commonly Arise in Practice
We now prove Theorem 7.
The proof of part 1 of Theorem 7 is straightforward: let {v1, . . . ,ve} be the nodes
of the clique. I j = {v j}, j = 1, . . . ,e are disjoint maximal I.S. whose union is V . Also,
these are the only I.S. in the graph; so (158) holds and the clique is mean valid by
Lemma 31.
Next, we prove some lemmas that we use to prove the other parts of Theorem 7.
Lemma 38. Let G = (V,E) be a mean valid graph, where V = I1∪ . . .∪ Id and I1, . . . , Id
are disjoint maximal I.S. Let E ′ ⊇ E be any set such that no edge in E ′ is between two
nodes in the same I.S. I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. Then the graph G
′ = (V,E ′) is mean valid.
Thus, if a graph G is mean valid, then the graph G′ obtained by adding edges in any
fashion to G, while ensuring that I j, j = 1, . . . ,d continue to be I.S. in G
′, is a mean
valid graph as well.
Lemma 39. Suppose for each i = 1, . . . ,N, Gi = (V i,E i) is a mean valid graph, where
V i = Ii1 ∪ . . .∪ I
i
d , I
i
1, . . . , I
i
d are disjoint maximal I.S., and |I
i
j| = M
i
j, j = 1, . . . ,d. Let
Mi = (Mi1, . . . ,M
i
d). If
Mi = ciM
0, i = 1, . . . ,N (167)
for some vector M0 =(M01, . . . ,M
0
d) and positive scalars c1, . . . ,cN , then G=(∪
N
i=1V
i,∪Ni=1E
i)
is mean valid.
Lemma 39 says that if Gi, i = 1, . . . ,N are mean valid graphs, then their union G is a
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mean valid graph as well provided each of Gi, i= 1, . . . ,N contains (i) the same number,
d, of disjoint maximal I.S., and (ii) the same proportion of nodes in the d I.S. Ii1, . . . , I
i
d .
Since the union graph G is a disconnected graph with N components, Lemma 39 is
not useful by itself to prove that a graph is mean valid. But it can be effectively used
in conjunction with Lemma 38 to combine a set of N mean valid graphs into a new
connected mean valid graph by (i) first considering their union, which is a disconnected
graph, (ii) and then adding some edges to it to make it connected.
A useful special case is when each of these N graphs Gi is a clique of size d (which
is mean valid by Part 1 of Theorem 7) with vertex set V i = {vi1, . . . ,v
i
d}. Note that these
graphs satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 39 with Iij = {v
i
j}, M
i
j = 1, ∀i, j, M
0 =(1, . . . ,1)
and ci = 1 ∀i. This special case can be used to prove the mean validity of several of the
graphs mentioned in Theorem 7, as we explain below.
We introduce some notation for later use. For an integer m ≥ 1, let me (respectively,
mo) denote the greatest even (respectively, odd) integer less than or equal to m.
We now prove part 2 of Theorem 7. Consider a linear graph Gm with node set
{v1,v2, . . . ,vm} as shown in part (a) of Fig. 5.2. First, let m be even– say m = 2N.
For i = 1, . . . ,N, let Gi be the clique of size 2 with the node set V i = {v2i−1,v2i} and
the edge between the two nodes. In the notation of Lemma 39, let Ii1 = {v2i−1} and
Ii2 = {v2i}. By Lemma 39, G = G
1∪G2∪ . . .∪GN is a mean valid graph with d = 2 and
the disjoint maximal I.S. I1 = {v1,v3,v5, . . .vmo} and I2 = {v2,v4,v6, . . . ,vme}. We can
obtain Gm by adding the edges (v2,v3), (v4,v5), . . . , (v2N−2,v2N−1) to G as illustrated
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in part (a) of Fig. 5.10. Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j,
j ∈ {1,2}; so the hypothesis of Lemma 38 is satisfied. Hence, Gm is mean valid by
Lemma 38. The proof of the fact that Gm is also mean valid for m odd is deferred until
Section 5.11.
Now, we prove part 3 of Theorem 7. Consider Gm,m, where m may be odd or even.
Let vi j be the node in the i’th row and j’th column i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}(see part (b) of
Fig. 5.2). We start with a line graph Gm2 , which is mean valid by part 2 of Theorem 7,
and add some edges to obtain Gm,m as shown in Fig. 5.11. Specifically, let Gm2 be the
line graph with the set of nodes {v1,1, v1,2, . . . , v1,m, v2,m, v2,m−1, . . . , v2,1, v3,1, v3,2,
. . . , v3,m, v4,m, v4,m−1, . . . } and an edge between each pair of consecutive nodes in this
order. Gm2 is mean valid with d = 2, and the disjoint maximal I.S. I1 = {v11, v13, . . . ,
v1,mo , v22, v24, . . . , v2,me , v31, v33, . . . , v3,mo , . . . } and I2 = {v12, v14, . . . , v1,me , v21,
v23, . . . , v2,mo , v32, v34, . . . , v3,me , . . . }. Gm,m can be obtained from Gm2 by adding the
remaining edges shown dotted in Fig. 5.11. Note that no edge is between the same I.S.
I j, j = 1,2. So Gm,m is mean valid by Lemma 38.
Next, we prove part 4 of Theorem 7. Consider Hm,m (see Fig. 5.3). As in Gm,m, let
vi j be the node in the i’th row and j’th column. Let d = 4, I1 = {v11, v13, v15, . . . , v1,mo ,
v31, v33, v35, . . . , v3,mo , . . . }, I2 = {v12, v14, v16, . . . , v1,me , v32, v34, v36, . . . , v3,me , . . . },
I3 = {v21, v23, v25, . . . , v2,mo , v41, v43, v45, . . . , v4,mo , . . . } and I4 = {v22, v24, v26, . . . ,
v2,me , v42, v44, v46, . . . , v4,me , . . . } (see part (b) of Fig. 5.10). Note that I1, I2, I3 and
I4 are disjoint maximal I.S. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, let Ci, j be the clique consisting of
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the nodes {vi, j,vi, j+1,vi+1, j,vi+1, j+1} and the edges among them (see Fig. 5.17). First,
let m be even. The proof that Hm,m is mean valid is similar to the above proof of mean
validity of Gm with m even: we can obtain Hm,m by considering the union of the cliques
Ci, j, i, j ∈ {1,3,5, . . . ,m− 1}, which is a mean valid graph by Lemma 39, and then
adding the remaining edges as illustrated in part (b) of Fig. 5.10. Note that no edge is
between two nodes in the same I.S. I j, j ∈ {1,2,3,4}; so the hypothesis of Lemma 38
is satisfied. Hence, Hm,m is mean valid by Lemma 38. The proof of the fact that Hm,m
is also mean valid for m odd is deferred until Section 5.11.
The proof of part 5 of Theorem 7 is similar to that of part 4: we outline the differ-
ences. For i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let vi jl be the node in the i’th row, j’th column and l’th
level (in the direction normal to the plane of the paper). The node set of Tm,m,m can
be partitioned into 8 disjoint maximal I.S. I1, . . . , I8 similar to I1, . . . , I4 for Hm,m (see
Fig. 5.5). Also, cliques Ci jl, i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} of size 8 each can be defined similar
to the cliques Ci j for Hm,m. For m even, we can obtain Tm,m,m by considering the union
of the cliques Ci jl , i, j, l ∈ {1,3,5, . . . ,m−1} and then adding the remaining edges. The
fact that Tm,m,m is mean valid then follows from Lemmas 39 and 38. The proof of the
fact that Tm,m,m is also mean valid for m odd is outlined in Section 5.11.
We now prove part 6 of Theorem 7. Consider a cellular network as shown in Fig. 5.6,
whose conflict graph is shown in Fig. 5.7. The nodes in the graph can be partitioned
into three disjoint maximal I.S. I1, I2 and I3 as shown in Fig. 5.7. We consider this
conflict graph with the following assumption, which eliminates problems arising due to
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Figure 5.10: Part (a) (respectively, part (b)) shows the construction of G 6 (respectively, H 4,4) from 3
(respectively, 4) cliques of size 2 (respectively, 4) each. The solid edges constitute the cliques G1, G2,
G3 (respectively, C1,1, C1,3, C3,1 and C3,3) and the dotted edges are those that are added later. The
numbers next to the nodes shows the I.S. they are in, i.e., a node labeled j is in I.S. I j, where j ∈
{1,2} (respectively, j ∈ {1,2,3,4}). Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j; so the
hypothesis of Lemma 38 is satisfied.
boundary effects.
Assumption 1. There are an even number, say δ1, of rows of nodes, each containing
3δ2 nodes, for some integer δ2 ≥ 1.
Under this assumption, as illustrated in Fig. 5.7, the graph can be obtained by con-
sidering the union of δ1δ2 disjoint cliques of size 3 each, which is a mean valid graph
by Lemma 39, and then adding some edges. Note that no edge is between two nodes in
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Figure 5.11: The figure shows the construction of the grid graph Gm,m from the line graph Gm2 for m = 4.
The solid edges constitute Gm2 and the dotted edges are later added to obtain Gm,m. The un-darkened and
darkened nodes constitute I1 and I2 respectively in both Gm2 and Gm,m. Note that no edge is between a
node in I1 and a node in I2, so the hypothesis of Lemma 38 is satisfied.
the same I.S. I j, j ∈ {1,2,3} (see Fig. 5.7); so the hypothesis of Lemma 38 is satisfied.
Hence, the graph is mean valid by Lemma 38.
Note that the above proof goes through if the graph can be partitioned into cliques
of size 3 even if Assumption 1 is not satisfied. If the graph cannot be partitioned into
cliques of size 3, then the analysis is more complicated because of boundary effects.
We omit this analysis for brevity.
5.5.2 Some Other Classes of Mean Valid Graphs
In this subsection, we show that some other common classes of graphs are mean valid.
We focus on connected bipartite graphs [71], which are of the form G = (V,E) where
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V = A∪B and every edge is between a node in A and a node in B. Without loss of
generality, suppose |A| ≤ |B|. In the notation of Definition 2, d = 2, I1 = B and I2 = A.
Also, a necessary condition for a node distribution {αi, i ∈ A;γ j, j ∈ B}, under which
bandwidth is offered at node i ∈ A (respectively, j ∈ B) w.p. αi (respectively, γ j), to be
valid is that
αi + γ j ≤ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E. (168)
This is because, if αi + γ j > 1 for some (i, j) ∈ E, then with a positive probability
bandwidth would be offered at both nodes i and j, which are neighbors.
Recall that a κ-regular graph is one in which the degree of every node is κ [71].
Proposition 1. A κ-regular bipartite graph is mean valid.
Proof. Let |A|= N and |B|= M. First, we show that N = M. Since κ edges are incident
upon each node in A, |E|= |A|κ = Nκ. Similarly, |E|= Mκ. So N = M.
Now, let {αi, i∈ A;γ j, j ∈ B} be a valid distribution. Adding (168) over all (i, j)∈ E,
we get:
∑
(i, j)∈E
(αi + γ j)≤ |E|= Nκ (169)
But since exactly κ edges are incident on each node:
∑
(i, j)∈E
(αi + γ j) = κ(∑
i∈A
αi + ∑
j∈B
γ j) (170)
By (169) and (170),
∑i∈A αi
N
+
∑ j∈B γ j
N
≤ 1
So Condition 2 in Definition 2 is satisfied and the graph is mean valid.
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Recall that a star is a graph with a node a1 called the center, nodes b1, . . . ,bM called
the leaves, and edges (a1,b j), j = 1, . . . ,M [71]. Note that this is a bipartite graph with
edges only between the sets A = {a1} and B = {b1, . . . ,bM}.
Proposition 2. A star is mean valid.
Proof. Let {α1,γ1, . . . ,γM} be a valid distribution. By (168),
α1 + γ j ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . ,M
Adding these M inequalities and dividing by M gives α1 +
γ1+...+γM
M
≤ 1.
Now, note that every tree is a bipartite graph [71]. Given a tree, suppose the root
constitutes layer 1, the children of the root constitute layer 2 and the children of all
the nodes in layer i constitute layer i+ 1, i = 2,3, . . .. Not every tree is mean valid;
a counterexample is presented in Section 5.6 (see Fig. 5.13). The following result
provides a sufficient condition for a tree to be mean valid.
Proposition 3. A tree in which every node in an odd layer has exactly κ children is
mean valid.
Proof. Let a tree T in which every node in an odd layer has κ children be given. Let N j
be the total number of nodes in the j’th layer of T and N = ∑ j odd N j.
Let Ai = {ai}, Bi = {bi,1, . . . ,bi,κ} and G
i be a star with center ai and κ leaves– the
nodes in Bi. Note that each G
i is mean valid by Proposition 2. Also, Gi, i = 1, . . . ,N,
satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 39 with d = 2, Ii1 = Bi, I
i
2 = Ai, M
i
1 = κ, M
i
2 = 1 ∀i,
M0 = (κ,1) and ci = 1 ∀i. So by Lemma 39, G = G
1 ∪G2 ∪ . . .∪GN is mean valid.
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Now, we will obtain T by adding some edges to G as illustrated in Fig. 5.12. Let
the center, a1, of G
1 be the root of T . Note that its children are b1,1, . . . ,b1,κ, the leaves
of G1. For j ∈ {1, . . . ,κ}, suppose b1, j has l j children. Join b1, j by an edge to each of
the centers of l j stars out of G
2, . . . ,GN , using a different set of stars for each j. Thus,
we have obtained the nodes in the first 4 layers of the tree and the edges connecting
them. Suppose a node b in layer 4 has l′ children. Join it to the centers of l′ stars out of
G1, . . . ,GN , which have not been used so far. Proceed in this manner to get the tree T .
Note that there is no edge between two nodes in the same partition of the tree, which is
a bipartite graph (see Fig. 5.12); so the hypothesis of Lemma 38 is satisfied. Hence, T
is mean valid by Lemma 38.
5.6 Non Mean Valid Bipartite Graphs
We have shown in Theorem 8, that a mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE that
has a simple form– under this NE, for every q ∈ (0,1), each primary offers bandwidth
with the same probability t j at all the nodes in each I.S. I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. Thus, mean
validity is a sufficient condition for an arbitrary graph to have a symmetric NE of the
form in Theorem 8 for all values of q. The following result shows that for connected
bipartite graphs, mean validity is also a necessary condition.
Theorem 9. Let G be a connected bipartite graph that is not mean valid. If w(q,n) >
1− M2
M1
, then β(I1) = t1, β(I2) = t2, β(I) = 0 ∀I ∈ I , I 6= I1, I2, is not a symmetric NE
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Figure 5.12: Part (a) shows a tree in which each node in an odd layer has exactly 3 children. Part (b)
shows the construction of the tree. We start with stars with 3 leaves each, whose edges are shown in bold
and then add some edges, shown dotted. Note that none of the dotted edges is between two nodes in the
same partition of the bipartite graph, so the condition in Lemma 38 is satisfied.
for any value of t1 and t2.
Now, we provide an example of a non mean valid bipartite graph and find the sym-
metric NE and prove its uniqueness. The symmetric NE is not of the form in Theorem 8
for any value of q ∈ (0,1).
Let the set of nodes be A∪B, where A = {a1,a2,a3} and B = {b1,b2,b3}, and let
there be an edge between a1 (respectively, b1) and every edge in B (respectively, A) (see
Fig. 5.13). The only maximal I.S. are Iab = {a2,a3,b2,b3}, Ia = A and Ib = B. The I.S.
Iab contains 2 nodes from each of A and B, i.e., m1(Iab) = m2(Iab) = 2 in the notation
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Figure 5.13: A non mean valid graph.
of Lemma 31. Also,
m1(Iab)
3
+ m2(Iab)
3
> 1; so (158) is not satisfied. Hence, this is not a
mean valid graph by Lemma 31.
In every symmetric NE, β(Ia) = ta, β(Ib) = tb and β(Iab) = 1 − ta − tb for some
0 ≤ ta, tb ≤ 1.
Lemma 40. If w(q,n)> 1
2
, then f1(x) = 2W (1−x)−W(x) has a unique root t1 ∈ [0,1].
Also, 0 < t1 <
1
2
.
The following theorem provides the symmetric NE in the above graph for each value
of q ∈ (0,1).
Theorem 10. 1. If w(q,n)≤ 1
2
, then the symmetric strategy profile corresponding to
ta = tb = 0 is the unique symmetric NE.
2. If w(q,n)> 1
2
, then the symmetric strategy profile in which ta = tb = t1, the root of
f1(.), is the unique symmetric NE.
Note that Iab, which contains 4 nodes, is the largest I.S. So for all values of q,
primaries offer bandwidth with positive probability at the I.S. Iab in the symmetric NE.
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Since Iab contains nodes from both A and B, the node probabilities at different nodes in
A (and B) are different. Thus, the symmetric NE is not of the form in Theorem 8 for
any value of q.
Again, since Iab is the largest I.S., Theorem 10 shows, consistent with intuition, that
for small values of q, primaries offer bandwith only at Iab with positive probability;
when q, and thereby the competition at Iab, increases beyond a threshold, they also
offer bandwidth at A and B with positive probability.
5.7 Asymmetric q
So far, we have analyzed the symmetric case q1 = . . .= qn = q. Now we briefly outline
how our results generalize to the general case where the q’s may not be equal.
As noted in Remark 3, there are multiple NE in general in the spatial reuse setting.
Hence, although the bandwidth availability probabilities q1, . . . ,qn may be unequal, we
focus on the special class of NE in which the I.S. selection probabilities {β(I) : I ∈I }
of each primary is the same. As before, let αv = ∑v∈I β(I) be the total probability with
which a primary who has unused bandwidth offers it at node v ∈V .
Since primary i has unused bandwidth w.p. qi and offers it at node v ∈ V w.p. αv,
he offers bandwidth at node v ∈ V w.p. qiαv. Let wi(αv) be the probability that Kv or
more out of primaries {1, . . . ,n}\i offer it at node v.
Lemma 41. w1(α) is a strictly increasing function of α on [0,1].
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Next, we explain how the results for symmetric q generalize to the asymmetric q
case. First, Lemma 30 readily generalizes to give:
Lemma 42. Suppose under a NE in which the I.S. selection distribution {β(I) : I ∈I }
of each primary is the same (symmetric), each primary selects node v w.p. αv if he has
unused bandwidth. Then under that NE, the price distribution of primary i at node v is
the price distribution ψi(.) in the single location case with αvq1, . . . , αvqn in place of
q1, . . . ,qn.
Now, recall from Property 2 and Theorem 4 in Chapter 3 that when there are n
primaries with bandwidth availability probabilities q1, . . . ,qn at a single location, there
is a unique NE; in this NE, each primary gets the same payoff, equal to (ν− c)(1−
w1(1)) = 1−w1(1), where the equality follows from the fact that we have normalized
ν− c to 1. Let
W (α) = 1−w1(α). (171)
By Lemma 42, and similar to Property 2 in Chapter 3 in the single location case, in a
NE with symmetric I.S. distributions {β(I) : I ∈ I } of the primaries, if all primaries
offer bandwidth at a node with probability α (and play the single-node NE strategy with
q1α, . . . ,qnα in place of q1, . . . ,qn at that node), then W (α) is the maximum expected
payoff that each primary i can get at that node.
Now, we define the notions of valid distribution and mean valid graph as in the
symmetric q case and the proofs that the specific topologies such as a line, grid graph,
cellular network, star etc. are mean valid remain unchanged, since they are properties
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of the graphs and are independent of q1, . . . ,qn.
Consider a mean valid graph G = (V,E), where V = I1 ∪ . . .∪ Id and I1, . . . , Id are
disjoint maximal I.S. Let |I j|= M j, j = 1, . . . ,d.
Theorem 8 generalizes to:
Theorem 11. In a mean valid graph, for every 1 > q1 ≥ . . .≥ qn > 0, there is a unique
NE with symmetric I.S. distributions {β(I) : I ∈ I }; in this NE, each primary offers
bandwidth at every node in I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, w.p. t j, i.e. α j,l = t j, l = 1, . . . ,M j, where
(t1, . . . , td) is the unique distribution satisfying the equations:
t j = 0, j > d
′. (172)
and
M1W (t1) = . . .= Md′W (td′)> Md′+1r. (173)
The proof of the above theorem changes from the symmetric q case only in that we
now use the following lemma, which generalizes the corresponding lemma (Lemma 45)
for the symmetric q case.
Lemma 43. (i) For 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 ≤W (α)≤ r, (ii) W (0) = r, and (iii) W (α) is strictly
decreasing in α.
The proof of the above lemma follows from (171) and Lemma 41.
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5.8 Threshold behavior
In this section, as in Section 5.7, we allow the bandwidth availability probabilities
q1, . . . ,qn of the primaries to be unequal. As in Section 3.3.3, we define the efficiency,
η, of a NE as η = RNE
ROPT
, where RNE is the expected sum of payoffs of the n primaries at
the NE and ROPT is the maximum possible (optimal) expected sum of payoffs, attained
when all primaries jointly select the independent sets and prices to maximize their ag-
gregate revenue. Clearly, η ≤ 1 quantifies the loss in aggregate revenue incurred owing
to lack of cooperation among primaries. Also, since the NE in Section 5.7 is unique
in the class of NE with symmetric I.S. distributions, η quantifies fundamental limits on
the performance of NE in this category.
Let limn→∞ ∑
n
i=1
qn
n
= q for some q ∈ (0,1). Here, q represents the “average” band-
width availability probability of the primaries. For simplicity, we assume that each
secondary from a given pool independently seeks bandwidth, and let kn be the expected
number of secondaries at any given location26. Then, the NE structure exhibits inter-
esting threshold behavior as n → ∞; in particular, η switches from 1 to 0 depending on
the relations between nq (availability) and kn (demand).
Lemma 44. Let 27 qn =
q1+...+qn
n
and let p̃ j denote the common lower endpoint of the
price distributions of the primaries who have unused bandwidth in the NE at nodes in
26We allow (but do not require) the number (rather statistics) of the secondaries to scale with increase
in n.
27For simplicity, we state this lemma under the assumption that M1, . . . ,Md are distinct. In the Ap-
pendix, we provide the lemma with this assumption relaxed.
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I.S. I j (if they select I.S. I j).
1. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all large n, q < kn/(n−1)−ε, then η → 1 as
n → ∞. Also, for all large n, d′ = 1, t1 = 1, t2 = t3 = . . . td = 0, p̃1 → ν.
2. Let l < d. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all large n, lkn/(n−1)+ ε < q <
(l+1)kn/(n−1)−ε, then for all large n, d
′ ≥ l+1, and t jqn → kn/(n−1) for all
j ≤ l.
3. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all large n, q > knd/(n−1)+ ε, then η → 0
as n → ∞. Also, for all large n, d′ = d and p̃ j → c, j = 1, . . . ,d.
Intuitively, if availability is less than demand, then owing to limited competition, pri-
maries with available bandwidth select only the maximum-sized I.S. among I1, . . . , Id ,
and choose prices in a neighborhood of ν. Thus, η → 1, since no other strategy can
enhance any primary’s payoff. As availability increases, under NE, primaries diver-
sify their choices among the I.S. I1, . . . , Id and are more likely to select low prices as
well (the lower limits of the price distributions hover around c once availability exceeds
demand), thereby drastically reducing the efficiency of the NE.
5.9 Numerical Studies
In this section, we describe numerical computations that are directed towards assessing
the impact of price competition among the primaries on the aggregate revenue of the
primaries and the affordability of spectrum for the secondaries. We consider the specific
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case of a grid graph Hm,m, which was introduced in Section 5.3.2 (see Fig. 5.3). By
part 4 of Theorem 7, this is a mean valid graph and, in the notation of Definition 2,
d = 4 and the I.S. I1, I2, I3 and I4 are as described in Section 5.5.1. Throughout, we use
the parameter values ν = 1 and c = 0, and a constant number of secondaries k at each
node. Also, q1, . . . ,qn are uniformly spaced in [qL,qH ] for some parameters qL and qH .
Let q = qL+qH
2
be the mean bandwidth availability probability of the primaries.
In Hm,m, the NE is of the form in Theorem 8 and the plot on the left in Fig. 5.14 re-
veals, as expected, that price competition significantly reduces the aggregate revenue of
the primaries under this NE relative to OPT, the optimal scheme in which the primaries
collaborate to attain ROPT, the maximum aggregate revenue of the primaries (Note that
under OPT, the I.S. I1, . . . , I4 are selected in order of size and all the primaries always
select the highest price ν). Also, overall, the efficiency (η) decreases as q increases
since the competition increases. The plot on the right in Fig. 5.14 shows that the trends
are similar for a larger topology (larger m). The plot on the left in Fig. 5.15 shows that
η improves as k increases. This is because, for small values of k, demand for bandwidth
is scarce at each node. Under the NE, bandwidth is wasted at several nodes since k+1
or more primaries offer bandwidth at those nodes, resulting in a shortage of bandwidth
at other nodes. On the other hand, since all primaries cooperate in OPT, it judiciously
supplies bandwidth precisely where it is needed. So OPT outperforms the NE by a large
margin for small values of k. For large values of k, the demand is high and so is the
tolerable margin of error in assigning the primaries to I.S.; and hence the performance
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of the NE improves relative to OPT. The plot on the right in Fig. 5.15 shows that η
increases as m increases, which is because the four I.S. I1, . . . , I4 become closer to each
other in size as m increases and hence the loss in revenue resulting from choosing a
smaller I.S. is lower.
Fig. 5.16 shows that under price competition, the expected price per unit of band-
width is lower at the nodes in the larger I.S. This is because primaries prefer larger I.S.
and hence the competition is more intense there, driving down the prices.
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Figure 5.14: Both figures plot the aggregate revenues of the primaries, RNE and ROPT , under the NE and
OPT respectively, and the efficiency of the NE, η = RNE
ROPT
, versus q. In both figures, n = 10, k = 5 and
qH −qL = 0.2 are used. Also, m = 15 (respectively, m = 25) for the figure on the left (respectively, right).
η is scaled by a factor of 500 (respectively, 1000) in the figure on the left (respectively, right) in order to
show it on the same figure as the other plots.
5.10 Conclusions, Discussion and Future Work
We analyzed price competition among multiple primaries in a CRN in the presence of
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Figure 5.15: The figure on the left (respectively, right) plots the efficiency η of the NE versus k (respec-
tively, m). For both figures, n = 10, qL = 0 and qH = 1 are used. Also, m = 15 for the figure on the left
and k = 5 for the figure on the right.
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Figure 5.16: The figure shows the mean price of bandwidth, given that it is offered, at a (fixed) node in
each of I1, I2 and I4 under the NE vs q. Note that since |I3|= |I2|, the mean price of bandwidth at nodes
in I3 is the same as that at nodes in I2. The parameter values used are m = 15, n = 8 and k = 3. Also,
qH − qL = 0.2.
spatial reuse in the symmetric setting in which each primary has unused bandwidth with
the same probability and in a class of graphs which we denote as mean-valid. We have
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proved that there exists a unique symmetric NE in this case, and have characterized
this symmetric NE as a solution of a set of non-linear equations. Such equations can
be easily solved even for large networks such as those consisting of 600 or more nodes
and multiple (e.g., 10) primaries and secondaries. Our numerical computations reveal
interesting insights regarding the efficiency of the NE and also the price and indepen-
dent set selections of the primaries. We have also considered the asymmetric setting
and investigated a special class of NE in which the independent set selection strategies
of the primaries are symmetric.
It would be interesting to investigate whether the NE is stable to minor perturbations
in the selections of the primaries. In this chapter, we characterized the NE in a special
non mean valid graph. The characterization of the NE in other general (non mean
valid) graphs both in the symmetric and the asymmetric settings remain open. We
have also assumed that each primary knows the statistical distribution governing the
bandwidth availabilities of other primaries and the number of secondaries at each node.
Characterization of the NE when primaries have imperfect knowledge of the above,
and seek to enhance their knowledge using learning strategies, remains open. Finally,
we have only characterized the NE strategies in a one-shot game. Primaries may play
this game repeatedly and may use their experience from previous slots and a learning
algorithm to choose their strategy in the current slot. An investigation into whether the
symmetric NE for the one-shot game constitutes a steady-state outcome of some natural
learning algorithms in such a setting is an interesting direction for future research.
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5.11 Appendix
Let W (α) be as in (153). We will use the following result throughout.
Lemma 45. (i) For 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 ≤W (α)≤ r, (ii) W (0) = r, and (iii) W (α) is strictly
decreasing in α.
Lemma 45 follows from (153), the fact that w(0,n) = 1− r and Lemma 29.
5.11.1 Proofs of results in Section 5.3
Proof of Lemma 31. Suppose G is mean valid. Fix an I ∈ I . Let
1I(a j,l) =



1, if a j,l ∈ I
0, else
Consider a distribution {α j,l : j = 1, . . . ,d; l = 1, . . . ,M j} in which bandwidth is offered
at node a j,l ∈ I j w.p. α j,l = 1I(a j,l). This is a valid distribution because it corresponds
to the I.S. distribution {β(I) = 1,β(I′) = 0∀I′ ∈ I , I′ 6= I}. Also,
M j
∑
l=1
α j,l =
M j
∑
l=1
1I(a j,l) = m j(I), j = 1, . . . ,d (174)
Let α j be given by (157). Since the graph is mean valid, (156) holds. Substituting
∑
M j
l=1 α j,l = m j(I) from (174) into (156), we get (158).
To prove the converse, suppose (158) holds. Let {α j,l : j = 1, . . . ,d; l = 1, . . . ,M j}
be a valid distribution. By definition, there exists a distribution {β(I) : I ∈ I } such
that:
α j,l = ∑
I∈I :a j,l∈I
β(I) (175)
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which can be written as:
α j,l = ∑
I∈I
β(I)1I(a j,l) (176)
Now,
d
∑
j=1
(
∑
M j
l=1 α j,l
M j
)
=
d
∑
j=1
1
M j
{
M j
∑
l=1
∑
I∈I
β(I)1I(a j,l)
}
(by (176))
= ∑
I∈I
β(I)
{
d
∑
j=1
∑
M j
l=1 1I(a j,l)
M j
}
= ∑
I∈I
β(I)
{
d
∑
j=1
m j(I)
M j
}
(since
M j
∑
l=1
1I(a j,l) = m j(I))
≤ 1 (by (158))
So (156) holds and hence G is mean valid.
5.11.2 Proofs of results in Section 5.4
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 32.
Lemma 46. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer and α1, . . . ,αN, f1, . . . , fN be real numbers. Then:
N(
N
∑
i=1
αi fi)− (
N
∑
i=1
αi)(
N
∑
i=1
fi) = ∑
1≤i< j≤N
(α j −αi)( f j − fi) (177)
Proof. We prove the result by induction. For N = 2:
LHS = 2(α1 f1 +α2 f2)− (α1+α2)( f1 + f2)
= (α2 −α1)( f2 − f1)
= RHS
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Suppose the result is true for N. For N +1:
LHS = (N +1)(
N
∑
i=1
αi fi +αN+1 fN+1)−
(
N
∑
i=1
αi +αN+1)(
N
∑
i=1
fi + fN+1)
=
{
N(
N
∑
i=1
αi fi)− (
N
∑
i=1
αi)(
N
∑
i=1
fi)
}
+NαN+1 fN+1 +
N
∑
i=1
αi fi +αN+1 fN+1
−αN+1(
N
∑
i=1
fi)− (
N
∑
i=1
αi) fN+1 −αN+1 fN+1
= ∑
1≤i< j≤N
(α j −αi)( f j − fi)
+
N
∑
i=1
(αN+1 fN+1 +αi fi −αN+1 fi −αi fN+1)
(by induction hypothesis and collecting terms)
= RHS
The result follows by induction.
Proof of Lemma 32. By symmetry, we can assume WLOG that α1 ≤α2 . . .≤αN . Since
f (.) is strictly decreasing, f (α1)≥ f (α2)≥ . . .≥ f (αN). Now:
(
N
∑
i=1
αi f (αi))−α(
N
∑
i=1
f (αi))
=
1
N
(
N(
N
∑
i=1
αi f (αi))− (
N
∑
i=1
αi)(
N
∑
i=1
f (αi))
)
=
1
N
∑
1≤i< j≤N
(α j −αi)( f (α j)− f (αi)) (by (177)) (178)
For i < j, αi ≤ α j and f (αi) ≥ f (α j). So each term in (178) is ≤ 0. Hence, the
expression in (178) is 0 iff each term is 0, which happens iff α1 = . . .= αN = α.
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Proof of Lemma 34. Let
U∗ = max{U1(I j) : j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}}
= max{M jW (t j) : j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}} (by (165))
and B = { j ∈ {1, . . . ,d} : M jW (t j) = U
∗}. Note that B is the set of indices of the I.S.
out of I1, . . . , Id that yield the highest payoff and U
∗ is the value of that payoff.
By definition of B:
W (t j) =
U∗
M j
, ∀ j ∈ B (179)
W (t j)<
U∗
M j
, ∀ j /∈ B. (180)
Let I be any I.S. containing m j(I) nodes from I j, j = 1, . . . ,d. By (164):
U1(I) =
d
∑
j=1
m j(I)W(t j)
≤
d
∑
j=1
m j(I)
(
U∗
M j
)
(by (179) and (180)) (181)
≤ U∗ (by (158))
So maxI∈I U1(I)≤U
∗, and since U1(I j) =U
∗, j ∈ B, each I j, j ∈ B, is a best response.
Now, for I as defined above, suppose m j(I)≥ 1 for some j /∈ B. Then the inequality in
(181) is strict. So U1(I)<U
∗ and I is not a best response. Thus, each I ∈I containing
a node from I j for some j /∈ B is not a best response. In particular, ∀ j /∈ B, I j is not a
best response and, since primaries offer bandwidth at I j w.p. t j in the above NE, t j = 0
for all j /∈ B.
It now suffices to show that B = {1, . . . ,d′} for some 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d. Suppose not. Then
there exist j, l ∈ {1, . . . ,d} such that j < l, j /∈ B and l ∈ B. Since j /∈ B, t j = 0 by the
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previous paragraph. Now, by (164):
U1(I j) = M jW (t j)
= M jr (by part (ii) of Lemma 45)
≥ Mlr (by (155), since j < l)
≥ MlW (tl) (by part (i) of Lemma 45)
= U∗
So I j is a best response, which is a contradiction since j /∈ B.
Proof of Lemma 36. Suppose primaries 2, . . . ,n use the strategy ψ, under which band-
width is offered at the nodes in I j w.p. t j, j = 1, . . . ,d. By (163) and part (ii) of
Lemma 45, W (t j) = r, j > d
′. So by (164), the payoff of primary 1 if it plays I.S. I j,
j ∈ {1, . . . ,d′} (resp., j ∈ {d′+ 1, . . . ,d}) is U1(I j) = M jW (t j) (resp., U1(I j) = M jr).
Hence, by (166) and (155), for some U∗,
U∗ =U1(I1) = . . .=U1(Id′)>U1(Id′+1)≥ . . .≥U1(Id).
The maximum payoff that primary 1 can get at a node v ∈ I j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,d
′} equals
W (t j) =
U1(I j)
M j
=
U∗
M j
. (182)
Now, for j > d′, M jr =U1(I j)<U
∗. So the maximum payoff that primary 1 can get at
a node v ∈ I j, j > d
′ is
r <
U∗
M j
. (183)
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Now, let I be an I.S. containing m j(I) nodes from I j, j = 1, . . . ,d. By (182) and
(183):
U1(I) ≤ U
∗
(
d
∑
j=1
m j(I)
M j
)
(184)
≤ U∗ (by (158))
Since U1(I1) = . . .=U1(Id′) =U
∗, I1, . . . , Id′ are best responses. Under the strategy ψ,
primary 1 can only play I1, . . . , Id′ with positive probability; hence, ψ is a best response.
Proof of Lemma 37. Existence: For convenience, let Md+1 = 0. Fix q ∈ (0,1). For
x ∈ [M1W (1),M1r] and j ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, if M jr ≥ x, then we show that the equation:
M jW (t j) = x (185)
has a unique solution t j(x) ∈ [0,1]. Let h(t j) = M jW (t j). By part (ii) of Lemma 45,
h(0) = M jr ≥ x. Also,
h(1) = M jW (1)
≤ M1W (1) (by (155))
≤ x
Also, by (2) and (153), h(t j) is a continuous function of t j. So by the intermediate value
theorem [58], h(t j) = x has a solution in [0,1]. By part (iii) of Lemma 45, h(t j) is a
strictly decreasing function of t j; so this solution, say t j(x), is unique. For x = M jr,
t j = 0 satisfies (185) by part (ii) of Lemma 45. So t j(M jr) = 0.
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Since h(t j) is strictly decreasing on 0≤ t j ≤ 1, it is invertible. Also, since the inverse
of a continuous function is continuous (see Theorem 4.17 in [58]), h−1(x) is continuous.
But x = h(t j(x)). So t j(x) = h
−1(x). Thus, t j(x) is continuous in x for x ≤ M jr. For
x > M jr, define t j(x) = 0. As shown above, t j(M jr) = 0. So t j(x) is continuous on
[M1W (1),M1r]. Let,
T (x) =
d
∑
j=1
t j(x) (186)
As shown above, h(t j) is strictly decreasing on 0 ≤ t j ≤ 1 for j = 1, . . . ,d. So t j(x) =
h−1(x) is strictly decreasing for x ≤ M jr. Also, by definition, t j(x) = 0 on M jr <
x ≤ M1r. So by (186), T (x) is strictly decreasing on [M1W (1),M1r] (note that t1(x) is
strictly decreasing on x ≤ M1r). Also, t j(M1r) = 0, j = 1, . . . ,d. So
T (M1r) = 0. (187)
Now, for j = 1 and x = M1W (1), t1 = 1 satisfies (185). So t1(M1W (1)) = 1 and hence,
by (186):
T (M1W (1))≥ 1. (188)
Now, since each t j(x), j = 1, . . . ,d, is continuous on [M1W (1),M1r], so is T (x)
by (186). Hence, by (187), (188) and the intermediate value theorem, the equation
T (x) = 1 has a solution x∗ ∈ [M1W (1),M1r], which is unique because T (x) is strictly
decreasing. Let d′(q) = max{ j : M jr ≥ x
∗}. By definition of t j(x), for j = 1, . . . ,d
′(q),
M jW (t j(x
∗))= x∗ and for j> d′(q), M jr < x
∗ and hence t j(x
∗)= 0. Thus, (t1(x
∗), . . . , td(x
∗))
satisfy (163) and (166). Also, by (186), ∑dj=1 t j(x
∗) = T (x∗) = 1; so (t1(x
∗), . . . , td(x
∗))
is a probability distribution. The result follows.
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Uniqueness: Fix q. We now show the uniqueness of d′(q) and the distribution
(t1, . . . , td) satisfying (163) and (166). Assume, to reach a contradiction, that there exist
e, f ∈ {1, . . . ,d} and probability distributions t = (t1, . . . , td) and s = (s1, . . . ,sd) such
that t j = 0 (respectively, s j = 0) for j > e (respectively, j > f ) and for some y and z:
y = M1W (t1) = . . .= MeW (te)> Me+1r (189)
z = M1W (s1) = . . .= M fW (s f )> M f+1r (190)
First, suppose e = f . If y = z, then by (189) and (190), M jW (t j) = M jW (s j), j =
1, . . . ,e. By part (iii) of Lemma 45, W (.) is a one-to-one function; so t j = s j, j =
1, . . . ,e. Also, t j = s j = 0, j > e. So t = s.
Now, suppose z > y. Then M jW (s j) > M jW (t j), j = 1, . . . ,e. So W (s j) > W (t j),
and by part (iii) of Lemma 45, s j < t j, j = 1, . . . ,e. So 1= ∑
e
j=1 s j < ∑
e
j=1 t j = 1, which
is a contradiction. Thus, z > y is not possible. By symmetry, z < y is also not possible.
Now, suppose e < f . Then by (189) and (190), z = Me+1W (se+1) ≤ Me+1r < y. So
for j ∈ {1, . . . ,e}:
M jW (s j) = z < y = M jW (t j)
which implies s j > t j. So ∑
e
j=1 s j > ∑
e
j=1 t j = 1, which is a contradiction. So e < f is
not possible. By symmetry, e > f is also not possible. The result follows.
Monotonicity Now, we show that d′(q) is an increasing function of q. Suppose not.
Then there exist q and q′ such that q < q′, d′(q) = e, d′(q′) = f and e > f . Hence,
by (166) and (153), there exist probability distributions (t1, . . . , td) and (s1, . . . ,sd) such
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that for some y and z:
y = M1(1−w(qt1,n)) = . . .= Me(1−w(qte,n))> Me+1r (191)
z = M1(1−w(q
′s1,n)) = . . .= M f (1−w(q
′s f ,n))> M f+1r (192)
So
y = M f+1(1−w(qt f+1,n))≤ M f+1r < z.
Hence, for j= 1, . . . , f , M j(1−w(qt j,n))<M j(1−w(q
′s j,n)). So w(q
′s j,n)<w(qt j,n).
By Lemma 29, w(x,n) is strictly increasing in x. So q′s j < qt j. Since q < q
′, t j > s j.
Thus, ∑
f
j=1 t j > ∑
f
j=1 s j = 1, which contradicts the fact that (t1, . . . , td) is a probability
distribution. The result follows.
Finally, we show that t1 ≥ t2 . . .≥ td . For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d
′(q), MiW (ti) = M jW (t j) by
(166). But Mi ≥ M j by (155); so W (ti) ≤W (t j) and hence, by part (iii) of Lemma 45,
ti ≥ t j. For l > d
′(q), tl = 0 by (163). The result follows.
5.11.3 Proofs of results in Section 5.5
Proof of Lemma 38. Since no edge in E ′ is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j, it
follows that in G′, I1, . . . , Id are disjoint maximal I.S. whose union is V . Using the
notation in Definition 2, let {α j,l : j = 1, . . . ,d; l = 1, . . . ,M j} be a valid distribution in
G′. We will show that (156) holds. Then it will follow from Definition 2 that G′ is mean
valid.
Let IG′ (respectively, IG) be the set of I.S. in G
′ (respectively, G). Since E ⊂ E ′,
each I.S. in G′ is an I.S. in G as well, i.e. IG′ ⊂ IG.
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Now, since the distribution {α j,l} is valid in G
′, by definition, there exists a distri-
bution {β′(I) : I ∈ IG′} such that
αv = ∑
I∈IG′ :v∈I
β′(I) ∀v ∈V. (193)
Define a distribution on IG as follows:
β(I) =



β′(I) if I ∈ IG′
0 if I ∈ IG \IG′
(194)
By (193) and (194):
αv = ∑
I∈IG:v∈I
β(I) ∀v ∈V. (195)
So by definition, {αi, j} is a valid distribution in G as well. Since G is mean valid, (156)
holds, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 39. First, note that {(I1j ∪ . . .∪ I
N
j ) : j = 1, . . . ,d} are disjoint maximal
I.S. in G; so the first condition in Definition 2 is satisfied.
Let {αij,l : j = 1, . . . ,d; l = 1, . . . ,M
i
j} be a valid distribution in G
i. Since Gi is mean
valid:
d
∑
j=1

∑
Mij
l=1 α
i
j,l
Mij

≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,N (196)
Now, it is given that:
Mij = ciM
0
j , i = 1, . . . ,N; j = 1, . . . ,d (197)
Adding (197) over i = 1, . . . ,N:
M0j (c1 + . . .+ cN) = M
1
j + . . .+M
N
j , j = 1, . . . ,d (198)
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Multiplying (196) by ci, using (197) and adding over i = 1, . . . ,N, we get:
N
∑
i=1
d
∑
j=1

∑
Mij
l=1 α
i
j,l
M0j

≤ c1 + . . .+ cN
Dividing both sides by c1 + . . .+ cN and using (198):
d
∑
j=1

 ∑
N
i=1 ∑
Mij
l=1 α
i
j,l
M1j + . . .+M
N
j

≤ 1
So G satisfies the second condition in Definition 2 as well and hence is mean valid.
Proof of part 2 of Theorem 7. In Section 5.5.1, we showed that Gm is mean valid for
even m. Now, let m be odd, say m = 2N −1 for some integer N ≥ 2. Consider a valid
distribution {αi : i = 1, . . . ,2N −1}, where αi is the probability with which bandwidth
is offered at node vi. With I1 and I2 as defined in Section 5.5.1, note that |I1| = N and
|I2|= N −1. Let
α1 =
α1 +α3 + . . .+α2N−1
N
and
α2 =
α2 +α4 + . . .+α2N−2
N −1
To show that Condition 2 in Definition 2 is satisfied, we need to show that α1+α2 ≤ 1,
i.e.
(N−1)(α1 +α3 + . . .+α2N−1)
+ N(α2 +α4 + . . .+α2N−2)≤ N(N −1) (199)
Since G2N−1 is a bipartite graph and the distribution {αi} is valid, the necessary condi-
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tion in (168) holds and in this case becomes:
αi +αi+1 ≤ 1, i = 1,2, . . . ,2N −2 (200)
Now,
LHS of (199)
= {(N −1)(α1+α2)+(α2+α3)}
+{(N −2)(α3 +α4)+2(α4 +α5)}
+{(N −3)(α5 +α6)+3(α6 +α7)}
+ . . .
+{2(α2N−5 +α2N−4)+(N−2)(α2N−4 +α2N−3)}
+{(α2N−3 +α2N−2)+(N −1)(α2N−2 +α2N−1)}
≤ {(N −1)+1}+{(N−2)+2}+ . . .
+{2+(N −2)}+{1+(N−1)} (by (200))
= N(N −1)
which proves (199) and the result follows.
Proof of part 4 of Theorem 7. In Section 5.5.1, we showed that Hm,m is mean valid for
even m. Now, let m be odd. With I1, I2, I3 and I4 as defined in Section 5.5.1, it is easy
to check that |I1|=
(
m+1
2
)2
, |I2|=
m2−1
4
, |I3|=
m2−1
4
and |I4|=
(
m−1
2
)2
.
Consider a valid distribution {αz : z ∈ V}, where αz is the probability with which
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bandwidth is offered at node z. We now show that the graph is mean valid by showing
that (156) holds, which in this case becomes:
(m−1)2(∑
z∈I1
αz)+(m
2−1)(∑
z∈I2
αz)+(m
2 −1)(∑
z∈I3
αz)
+(m+1)2(∑
z∈I4
αz)≤
(m2 −1)2
4
. (201)
Consider cliques Ci, j, i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, Ci, j is as defined in
Section 5.5.1. For i or j (or both) equal to 0 or m, let Ci, j be “dummy cliques”, defined
for convenience (see Fig. 5.17). For i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}:
∑
z∈Ci j
αz ≤ 1, (202)
because, if not, then bandwidth would be offered simultaneously at two or more of the
nodes in Ci j (which are neighbors) with a positive probability. For i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, let:
ei =



m− i, i odd
i, i even
(203)
For i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, let
fi j = eie j. (204)
Note that by definition of the cliques {Ci, j}, node vi j belongs to each of the cliques
Ci−1, j−1, Ci−1, j, Ci, j−1 and Ci, j as shown in Fig. 5.18. So multiplying (202) by fi j and
adding over i, j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,m} gives:
∑
z∈V
gzαz ≤ g0 (205)
where,
gvi j = fi−1, j−1 + fi−1, j + fi, j−1 + fi j (206)
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and
g0 =
m
∑
i=0
m
∑
j=0
fi, j =
m
∑
i=0
m
∑
j=0
eie j =
(
m
∑
i=0
ei
)2
=
(
m
∑
i=0,i odd
(m− i)+
m
∑
i=0,i even
i
)2
=
(m2 −1)2
4
(207)
We will show below that
gz =



(m−1)2, z ∈ I1
(m2−1), z ∈ I2 or z ∈ I3
(m+1)2, z ∈ I4
(208)
Note that (201) follows from (205), (207) and (208), which shows that Hm,m is mean
valid.
Now we show (208). By definition of the I.S. I1, I2, I3 and I4 (see Section 5.5.1), for
vi j ∈ I1, i and j are odd, for vi j ∈ I2, i is odd and j is even, for vi j ∈ I3, i is even and j is
odd and for vi j ∈ I4, i and j are even. So for vi j ∈ I1, by (203), (204) and (206):
gvi j = (i−1)( j−1)+(i−1)(m− j)+(m− i)( j−1)
+(m− i)(m− j)
= (m−1)2
Similarly, for vi j ∈ I2:
gvi j = (i−1)(m− j+1)+(i−1) j+(m− i)(m− j+1)
+(m− i) j
= m2 −1
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For vi j ∈ I3, gvi j = m
2 −1 by symmetry with the case vi j ∈ I2. For vi j ∈ I4:
gvi j = (m− i+1)(m− j+1)+(m− i+1) j
+i(m− j+1)+ i j
= (m+1)2
Thus, we have shown (208), which completes the proof.
Figure 5.17: The figure shows the cliques in H 5,5. The cliques with dotted outlines are the dummy
cliques.
Proof of part 5 of Theorem 7. In Section 5.5.1, we considered the case m even. The
proof of the fact that Tm,m,m is mean valid for m odd is similar to that for Hm,m with m
odd; we outline the differences. We define the cliques Ci jl, i, j, l ∈ {0,1, . . . ,m}, similar
to Ci j for the case Hm,m. Consider a valid distribution {αz : z ∈ V}. Then similar to
163
Figure 5.18: The node vi j and the cliques Ci−1, j−1, Ci−1, j, Ci, j−1 and Ci, j.
(202), we get:
∑
z∈Ci jl
αz ≤ 1 (209)
Let ei be as in (203) and fi jl = eie jel , i, j, l ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. Multiplying (209) by fi jl
and adding over i, j, l ∈ {0,1, . . . ,m}, we get (205) for some numbers {gz : z ∈V} and
g0. Now, node vi jl is at the center of the cliques Ci−1, j−1,l−1, Ci−1, j−1,l , Ci−1, j,l−1,
Ci−1, j,l, Ci, j−1,l−1, Ci, j−1,l, Ci, j,l−1, and Ci, j,l. Using this fact, gvi jl for vi jl in each of
I1, . . . , I8 can be computed similar to the derivation of (208). Also, g0 can be calculated
similar to (207). Substituting these values of {gz : z ∈ V} and g0 into (205), we get
(156) for Tm,m,m and thereby the mean validity follows from Definition 2.
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5.11.4 Proofs of results in Section 5.6
Proof of Theorem 9. Suppose β(I1) = t1, β(I2) = t2, where t1 + t2 = 1 is a symmetric
NE. By (164):
U1(I j) = M jW (t j), j = 1,2. (210)
First, suppose t1 = 0, t2 = 1. Since β(I2) = t2 > 0, I2 is a best response. By (210)
and part (ii) of Lemma 45, U1(I1) = M1. Again, by (210), and since W (1)< 1 by part
(i) of Lemma 45:
U1(I2) = M2W (1)< M2 ≤ M1 =U1(I1)
which contradicts the fact that I2 is a best response. So t1 = 0, t2 = 1 is not a symmetric
NE.
Now, suppose t1 = 1, t2 = 0. Then I1 is a best response. Similar to the previous
paragraph, U1(I1) = M1W (1) and U1(I2) = M2. So by (153):
U1(I1)−U1(I2) = M1
(
1−
M2
M1
−w(q,n)
)
< 0
since w(q,n) > 1 − M2
M1
. This contradicts the fact that I1 is a best response. Thus,
t1 = 1, t2 = 0 is not a symmetric NE.
Suppose 0 < t1, t2 < 1. Let I ∈ I be such that:
m1(I)
M1
+
m2(I)
M2
> 1, (211)
which exists by Lemma 31 since G is not mean valid. Since β(I1),β(I2) > 0, I1 and I2
are best responses. So U1(I1) =U1(I2) =U
∗, where U∗ is the maximum payoff of any
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I.S. By (210):
W (t j) =
U∗
M j
, j = 1,2 (212)
Now, by (164):
U1(I) = m1(I)W(t1)+m2(I)W(t2)
= U∗
(
m1(I)
M1
+
m2(I)
M2
)
(by (212))
> U∗ (by (211))
which contradicts the fact that U∗ is the maximum payoff of any I.S.
Proof of Lemma 40. By (2) and (153), W (.) is a continuous function. So f1(x) is con-
tinuous on [0,1]. Also, it can be shown that [15] the derivative of w(x,n) with respect
to x is given by:
w′(x,n) = (n−1)


n−2
k−1

x
k−1(1− x)n−k−1.
Note that w′(x,n) > 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1). So by (153), W ′(α) < 0 ∀α ∈ (0,1). Hence, for
x ∈ (0,1):
f ′1(x) =−2W
′(1− x)−W ′(x)> 0.
So f1(x) is strictly increasing on [0,1] [58].
Also, by (153), f1(0) = 2W (1)−W (0) = 1− 2w(q,n) < 0 since w(q,n) >
1
2
, and
f1
(
1
2
)
=W
(
1
2
)
= 1−w
(
q
2
,n
)
> 0. So by the intermediate value theorem [58], f1(x) has
a root t1 ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
. Also, t1 is the unique root in [0,1] since f1(x) is strictly increasing.
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5.11.4.1 Proof of Theorem 10
Consider a symmetric strategy profile under which each primary offers bandwidth at
Ia (respectively, Ib) w.p. ta (respectively, tb) and at Iab w.p. 1− ta − tb. By (152), the
corresponding node probabilities are αa1 = ta, αa2 =αa3 = 1−tb, αb1 = tb, αb2 =αb3 =
1−ta. So by (164), the total expected payoffs of primary 1 if it offers bandwidth at each
of the three I.S. are:
U1(Iab) = 2W (1− tb)+2W (1− ta) (213)
U1(Ia) = 2W (1− tb)+W (ta) (214)
U1(Ib) =W (tb)+2W (1− ta) (215)
Intuitively, since Iab is the largest I.S., we expect that in a symmetric NE, primaries
would not offer bandwidth at one or both of Ia and Ib without offering it at Iab. The
following result confirms this.
Lemma 47. Let q ∈ (0,1) be arbitrary. None of the following can hold in a symmetric
NE: (i) ta = 1, (ii) tb = 1 (iii) 0 < ta, tb < 1 and ta+ tb = 1.
Proof. First, suppose ta = 1 in a symmetric NE. Since ta > 0, Ia is a best response.
Also, tb = 0. So by (213), (214), (153) and the fact that w(0,n) = 0:
U1(Iab)−U1(Ia) = 1+w(q,n)> 0
So U1(Iab) >U1(Ia), which contradicts the fact that Ia is a best response. Thus, ta = 1
is not possible. By symmetry, tb = 1 is also not possible.
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Now, suppose 0 < ta, tb < 1 and ta + tb = 1. Since ta, tb > 0, Ia and Ib are best
responses. So U1(Ia) =U1(Ib). By (214), (215), (153) and the fact that ta + tb = 1, we
get w(qta,n) = w(qtb,n). So by Lemma 29, ta = tb =
1
2
. Hence, by (213), (214) and
(153):
U1(Iab)−U1(Ia) =
(
1−w
(q
2
,n
))
> 0
which contradicts the fact that Ia is a best response.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 10.
Case 1: w(q,n)≤ 1
2
. Let ta and tb be arbitrary. By (213), (214) and (153):
U1(Iab)−U1(Ia)
= 1−2w(q(1− ta),n)+w(qta,n)
≥ 1−2w(q,n) (by Lemma 29) (216)
≥ 0
(
since w(q,n)≤
1
2
)
Note that if ta > 0, then the inequality in (216) is strict. So U1(Iab) > U1(Ia), which
is a contradiction because ta > 0 implies that Ia is a best response. Hence, ta = 0. By
symmetry, tb = 0. If ta = tb = 0, then U1(Iab)≥U1(Ia) and U1(Iab)≥U1(Ib); so Iab is a
best response, which is consistent with the fact that it is played w.p. 1. Thus, ta = tb = 0
is the unique symmetric NE.
Case 2: w(q,n)> 1
2
. By Lemma 47, ta + tb < 1 for every symmetric NE and hence
Iab is a best response. Now, suppose ta = 0. By (213), (214), (153) and the fact
that w(0,n) = 0, we get U1(Iab)−U1(Ia) = 1− 2w(q,n) < 0 since w(q,n) >
1
2
. So
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U1(Ia) > U1(Iab), which contradicts the fact that Iab is a best response. Hence, ta > 0.
By symmetry, tb > 0.
Thus, all three of Ia, Ib and Iab are best responses. So U1(Iab) = U1(Ia) = U1(Ib).
Substituting (213), (214) and (215), these are satisfied iff ta = tb = t1, the root of f1(x) =
0. This completes the proof.
5.11.5 Proofs of results in Section 5.7
Proof of Lemma 41. Let 0 ≤ α < α′ ≤ 1. It suffices to show that w1(α)< w1(α
′).
Let Yi, i = 2, . . . ,n be independent Bernoulli random variables and let Yi have mean
qiα. Also, let Zi, i = 2, . . . ,n be independent Bernoulli random variables that are inde-
pendent of Yi, i = 2, . . . ,n and let Zi have mean
qiα
′−qiα
1−qiα
.
For i = 2, . . . ,n, let:
Xi =



1, if Yi = 1 or Zi = 1 (or both)
0, else
(217)
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P(Xi = 1) = P({Yi = 1}∪ (Zi = 1)})
= P(Yi = 1)+P(Zi = 1)
−P({Yi = 1}∩{Zi = 1})
= P(Yi = 1)+P(Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1)P(Zi = 1)
(since Yi and Zi are independent)
= qiα+
qiα
′−qiα
1−qiα
− (qiα)
(
qiα
′−qiα
1−qiα
)
= qiα
′
So Xi is Bernoulli with mean qiα
′. Also, since Yi, i = 2, . . . ,n and Zi, i = 2, . . . ,n are
independent, Xi, i = 2, . . . ,n are independent.
But by (217),
{Yi = 1} ⊂ {Xi = 1}, i = 1, . . . ,n (218)
Also,
P{Xi = 1,Yi = 0} = P(Zi = 1,Yi = 0)
= P(Zi = 1)P(Yi = 0)
=
(
qiα
′−qiα
1−qiα
)
(1−qiα)
= qiα
′−qiα
> 0 (219)
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By (218) and (219):
P(Xi = 1)> P(Yi = 1). (220)
Now, let X = ∑ni=2 Xi and Y = ∑
n
i=2Yi. We interpret Xi (respectively, Yi) as the in-
dicator of the event that primary i offers bandwidth at a node v with node probability
αv = α
′ (respectively, αv = α). So X (respectively, Y ) is the number of primaries who
offer bandwidth at node v when αv = α
′ (respectively, αv = α). By definition of the
function w1(.), and conditioning on Kv, the number of secondaries at node v:
w1(α
′) = ∑
k
P(X ≥ k)P(Kv = k) = ∑
k
γkP(X ≥ k) (221)
and
w1(α) = ∑
k
γkP(Y ≥ k). (222)
By (220), (221), (222) and the facts X = ∑ni=2 Xi, Y = ∑
n
i=2Yi and ∑
n−1
k=1 γk > 0, it
follows that w1(α)< w1(α
′).
5.11.6 Proof of Lemma 44
In Lemmas 48, 49 and 50 below, we state and prove a generalization of Lemma 44 in
which we relax the assumption that M1, . . . ,Md are distinct.
Lemma 48. Let z = |{i : Mi = M1}|. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all large n,
q < zkn/(n− 1)− ε, then η → 1, p̃ j → ν, j = 1, . . . ,z as n → ∞. Also, for all large n,
d′ = z, t1 = . . .= tz = 1/z, tz+1 = tz+2 = . . . td = 0.
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Proof. Note that for all large enough n, for each i,
∑nj=1 q j−qi
z
< (n−1)q/z+(n−1)ε/2z.
Thus, if each primary selects an I.S. w.p. 1/z, for a given primary with available
bandwidth, the expected number of primaries among the rest minus the expected num-
ber of secondaries is less than −(n− 1)ε/2z. Clearly, then, for each i, wi(1/z) → 0
as n → ∞ (convergence is exponentially fast by Hoeffding’s inequality [26]). Thus,
W (1/z) → 1 as n → ∞. Thus, for all large enough n, M1W (1/z) = M2W (1/z) =
. . .MzW (1/z)>Mz+1r. Thus, (1/z, . . . ,1/z,0, . . . ,0) satisfies the requisite equations for
the symmetric NE I.S. selection p.m.f. The last part follows. For j = 1, . . . ,z, clearly
(ν−c)(1−w1(1/z))≤ p̃ j −c ≤ ν−c. Thus, p̃ j → ν as n → ∞. Thus, the expected util-
ity of any primary with available bandwidth converges to M1, the maximum possible
value, and the error decays exponentially with increase in n. Thus, η → 1.
Lemma 49. Consider l < d. Let lmin = min{i ≤ l : Mi = Ml} and lmax = max{i ≥ l :
Mi = Ml}. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all large n, lkn/(n−1)+ ε < qn < (l +
1)kn/(n−1)−ε, then for all large n, d
′
n ≥max(l+1, lmax). Also, tmnqn → kn/(n−1) for
m = 1, . . . , lmin −1 and tmnqn → min
(
qn−
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax−lmin+1
,kn/(n−1)
)
for m = lmin, . . . , lmax.
Proof. First let d′n ≤ l. Then t1n ≥ 1/d
′
n ≥ 1/l. Thus, t1nqn ≥ kn/(n− 1)+ ε/l. Thus,
W (t1n)→ 0 and M1W (t1n)→ 0 as n→∞. Thus, M1W (t1n)<Ml+1 for all large enough n
(contradiction). Thus, d′n ≥ l+1. However, the fact that d
′
n ≥ l implies that d
′
n ≥ lmax. To
prove this, suppose not. Then MlW (tl)>Mlmaxr =Mlr. So W (tl)> r, which contradicts
Lemma 43. So d′n ≥ lmax and hence d
′
n ≥ max(lmax, l + 1). Thus, the first part of the
lemma holds.
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Now, consider a m ≤ lmax. Let there exist a δ > 0 such that tmnqn > kn/(n−1)+δ
for a certain subsequence {qn,kn}. Then W (tmn) → 0 for that subsequence. Thus,
MmW (tmn)→ 0 for that subsequence. Let d
′
n = d in a subsequence of the above subse-
quence. In this subsequence td′n ≤ 1/d, and thus td′nqn < kn/(n− 1)− ε, W (td′n) → 1
and Md′nW (td′n) > 0. Thus, MmW (tmn) 6= Md′W (td′n) for all large enough n (contra-
diction). Thus, d′n < d throughout the above subsequence. But then MmW (tmn) <
Md′n+1r for all large enough n (contradiction). Thus, no such subsequence exists. Thus,
limsuptmnqn ≤ kn/(n−1).
Now, for m∈ {1, . . . , lmin−1}, let there exist a δ > 0 such that tmnqn < kn/(n−1)−δ
for a certain subsequence {qn,kn}. Then W (tmn)→ 1 for that subsequence. Thus, in that
subsequence, MmW (tmn) > Mlminr for all large enough n. Then for all large enough n,
d′n ≤ lmin −1 < lmax (contradiction). Thus, liminftmnqn ≥ kn/(n−1). Hence,
tmnqn → kn/(n−1), m = 1, . . . , lmin−1. (223)
Now, let m ∈ {lmin, . . . , lmax}. Since Mlmin = . . . = Mlmax and MlminW (tlmin) = . . . =
MlmaxW (tlmax), it follows that tlmin = . . . = tlmax = tl. Suppose for a subsequence, tlqn >
qn−
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax−lmin+1
+δ. This implies
(lmax − lmin +1)tl +
(
1
qn
(lmin −1)kn
n−1
)
>
δ(lmax − lmin +1)
qn
+1
Taking limits as n → ∞ on both sides and using (223) and the fact that tlmin = . . . =
tlmax = tl, we get:
lmax
∑
m=lmin
tm+
lmin−1
∑
m=1
tm > 1+
δ(lmax − lmin +1)
q
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which contradicts the fact that (t1, . . . , td) is a probability distribution. Hence,
limsuptlqn ≤
qn −
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax − lmin +1
.
Now, we consider two cases.
Case (i):
lim
n→∞
qn −
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax − lmin +1
≤ lim
n→∞
kn
n−1
. (224)
Suppose there exists δ > 0 such that for a subsequence tln:
tlnqn <
qn −
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax − lmin +1
−δ (225)
For this subsequence, after accounting for the probability masses put on I1, . . . , Ilmax,
there is still some left. So d′ ≥ lmax +1 for this subsequence. However, by (224) and
(225):
tlnqn <
kn
n−1
−δ
for large enough n. So W (tln) → 1 for the subsequence. So in the subsequence,
MlW (tln)> Mlmax+1r, which contradicts the fact that d
′
n ≥ lmax +1. Thus,
liminftlnqn ≥
qn −
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax − lmin +1
(226)
and hence tlnqn →
qn−
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax−lmin+1
.
Case (ii):
lim
n→∞
kn
n−1
< lim
n→∞
qn −
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax − lmin +1
(227)
Suppose
tlnqn <
kn
n−1
−δ (228)
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for a subsequence. Then
W (tln)→ 1 (229)
for that subsequence. Now, by (227) and (228):
tlnqn <
qn −
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax − lmin +1
for large enough n. So similar to Case (i), after accounting for the probability masses
put on I1, . . . , Ilmax, there is still some left. So
d′n ≥ lmax +1. (230)
But by (229), MlW (tln)> Mlmax+1, which contradicts (230). Thus, in Case (ii), tlnqn →
kn
n−1 .
Hence, in both cases, tmnqn → min
(
qn−
(lmin−1)kn
n−1
lmax−lmin+1
,kn/(n−1)
)
and we are done.
Lemma 50. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all large n, q > knd/(n−1)+ε, η → 0
as n → ∞. Also, for all large n, d′ = d and p̃ j → c, j = 1, . . . ,d.
Proof. Clearly, t1 ≥ 1/d. Thus, t1q ≥ kn/(n− 1)+ ε/d. Now, for all large enough n,
for each i, ∑nj=1 t1q j − t1qi > (n− 1)t1q− t1(n− 1)ε/2. Thus, if a given primary with
available bandwidth selects I1, then the expected number of other primaries he sees
at a node there minus the expected number of secondaries is greater than (n− 1)ε/2.
Clearly, then for each i, wi(t1) → 1 as n → ∞ (convergence is exponentially fast by
Hoeffding’s inequality [26]). Thus, W (t1) → 0 and M1W (t1) → 0 as n → ∞. Thus,
M1W (t1) < Mdr for all large enough n. Thus, d
′ = d. So for j = 1, . . . ,d, M jW (t j) =
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M1W (t1)→ 0 as n → ∞ and hence p̃ j → c. Thus, the second part of the lemma holds.
Since M1W (t1) → 0 as n → ∞, expected utility of each primary approaches 0, and
the approach is exponentially fast. Thus, the overall expected utility of all primaries
approach 0. Clearly, the expected utility attained by OPT is bounded away from 0. The
result follows.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic Contract Trading in
Spectrum Markets
In this chapter, as in Chapters 2 to 5, we focus on the two-step allocation scenario in
which the regulator such as the FCC in the USA first allocates primary rights to opera-
tors on its channels, who then allocate unused portions on their channels to secondary
users. In Chapters 2 to 5, we assumed that the number of players (primaries and secon-
daries) is small and hence that each player exerts considerable influence on the market
prices. In this chapter, we consider the case in which there are a large number of players
in the market and the price is determined by the market.
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6.1 Introduction
We consider a spectrum market where the license holders (referred to as primary providers
henceforth) can potentially sell to the secondary providers the spectrum they have li-
censed from the FCC but do not envision using in the near future. Primary providers
may either be providers of TV broadcasts, or large providers of wireless service who
operate nationwide. Secondary providers are relatively smaller, but larger in number,
and can be geographically limited providers, whose access to spectrum occurs through
the bandwidth (service) contracts that they buy from primary providers. Providers in
both categories have their subscriber (TV or mobile communication subscriber) bases
whom they need to serve using the spectrum they respectively license from the FCC
or buy in the spectrum market. This spectrum market structure is motivated by, and
closely resembles, secondary financial markets used for trading of financial instruments
(such as stocks, bonds) among investment banks, hedge-funds etc. Like in secondary
financial markets, we allow trading in spectrum markets, not only of the raw spectrum
(bandwidth), but also of the different kinds of service contracts derived from the use
of spectrum. A question that is key to the efficient operation of the spectrum market
is how the players in the market – the primary and the secondary providers – should
trade spectrum (bandwidth/service) contracts dynamically, based on time-varying de-
mand patterns arising from their subscribers, to maximize their returns while satisfying
their subscriber base. This is the central focus of this chapter.
We formulate and evaluate the solutions for the spectrum contract trading problem
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for the primary and the secondary providers. We consider two basic forms of contracts
that are used for selling/buying spectral resources: i) Guaranteed-bandwidth (Type-G)
contracts, and (ii) Opportunistic-access (Type-O) contracts. Under the Type-G con-
tracts, a secondary provider purchases a guaranteed amount of bandwidth (in units of
frequency bands or sub-bands) for a specified duration of time (typically a “long term”)
from a primary provider, and pays a fixed fee (either as a lump-sum or as a periodic
payment through the duration of the contract) irrespective of how much it uses this
bandwidth. If after selling the contract, the primary is unable to provide the promised
bandwidth (this may for example happen when the primary is forced to use a band it
has sold due to an unexpected rise in its subscriber demand), the primary financially
compensates the secondary for contractual violation. On the other hand, Type-O con-
tracts are short-term (one time unit in our model), and a secondary which buys a Type-O
contract pays only for the amount of bandwidth it actually uses on the corresponding
band. The primary does not provide any guarantee on a Type-O contract and may use
the channel sold as a Type-O contract without incurring any penalty. Thus, a Type-O
contract provides the secondary the right to use the channel if the primary is not using
it.
The spectrum contract trading problem that we formulate and solve allows the pri-
mary (secondary) provider to dynamically adjust its spectrum contract portfolio, i.e,
choose how much of each type of contract to sell (buy) at any time, so as to maximize
(minimize) its profit (cost) subject to satisfying its own subscriber demand that varies
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with time, and given the current market prices of Type-G and Type-O contracts which
also vary with time. The exact nature of the spectrum contract trading (selling/buying)
question will depend on whether it is considered from the perspective of the primary
provider (seller) or the secondary provider (buyer). We therefore separately address the
Primary’s Spectrum Contract Trading (Primary-SCT) problem (Section 6.2) and the
Secondary’s Spectrum Contract Trading (Secondary-SCT) problem (Section 6.3). We
formulate each problem as a finite horizon stochastic dynamic program whose com-
putation time is polynomial in the input size. We prove several structural properties
of the optimum solutions. For example, we show that the optimal number of Type-
G contracts, for both primary and secondary providers, are monotone (increasing or
decreasing) functions of the subscribers’ demands and the contract prices. These struc-
tural results provide more insight into the problems, and allow us to develop faster
algorithms for solving the dynamic programs. Finally, using numerical evaluations,
we investigate properties of the optimal solutions and demonstrate that the revenues
they earn substantially outperform static spectrum portfolio optimization strategies that
determine the portfolio based on the steady-state statistics of the contract price and
subscriber demand processes (Section 6.4).
Although the spectrum contract trading problem has been motivated by analogues
in financial markets, the actual questions posed and the techniques used to answer them
turn out to be quite different owing to the nature of the specific commodity, that is RF
spectrum, under consideration. First, both the primary and the secondary must de-
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cide their trading strategies considering their subscriber demand which changes with
time. For example, a primary (or secondary) can not simply decide to sell (buy) a large
number of Type-G contracts at any given time at which their market prices are high
(low). This is because a primary will need to pay a hefty penalty if it can not deliver the
promised bandwidth owing to an increase in its subscriber demand, and the secondary
will need to pay for the contract even if it does not use the corresponding bands owing
to a decrease in its subscriber demand. The portfolio optimization literature in finance
does not usually address the demand satisfaction constraint. Next, spectrum usage must
satisfy certain temporal and spatial constraints that are perhaps unique. Specifically, a
frequency band can not be simultaneously successfully used at neighboring locations
(without causing significant interference), but can be simultaneously successfully used
at geographically disparate locations. Thus, the spectrum trading solution for the pri-
mary provider must also take into account spatial constraints for spectrum reuse, and
therefore the computation of the optimal trading strategy requires a joint optimization
across all locations. We prove a surprising separation theorem in this context: when
the same signal is broadcast at all locations, the Primary-SCT problem can be solved
separately for each location and the individual optimal solutions can subsequently be
combined so as to optimally satisfy the global reuse constraints, and obtain the same
revenue as the solution of a computationally prohibitive joint optimization across loca-
tions (Section 6.2).
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6.2 The Primary’s Spectrum Contract Trading (SCT) Problem
In this section we pose and address Primary-SCT, the spectrum contract trading ques-
tion from a primary provider’s perspective. We first formulate the problem when a
primary provider owns channels in a single region (Section 6.2.1), solve it using a
stochastic dynamic program (Section 6.2.2), and identify the structural properties of
the optimal solution (Section 6.2.3). Later we formulate and solve the trading problem
when the primary owns channels in multiple locations, considering the spatial reuse of
channels across different locations (Section 6.2.4).
6.2.1 SCT in a single region
We now define the Primary-SCT problem for a primary provider that owns M frequency
bands (channels) in a single region, which it sells as Type-G or Type-O contracts to sec-
ondary providers. We assume that each channel corresponds to one unit of bandwidth
and at most one contract – either Type-G or Type-O – can stand leased on a channel at
any time. We also assume that the market has infinite liquidity: there is a large number
of buyers, and hence the primary provider can sell any or all of the channels it owns
anytime and in any combination of Type-G and Type-O contracts.
We assume that time is slotted. Trading of bandwidth is done between primary and
secondary providers separately in each of successive windows of duration T slots each.
Henceforth, we focus on the optimization in a single window or time horizon of T time
slots. At the beginning of each slot t, the primary determines the number of channels
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xG(t) and xO(t) to be sold as Type-G and Type-O contracts respectively. A Type-G
(“long term”) contract that is sold at the beginning of any slot t = 1, . . . ,T lasts till the
end of the horizon. T therefore represents the maximum duration of a Type-G contract.
Type-O contracts last for a single slot from the time they are negotiated.
The prices of both types of contracts (i.e, the prices at which they can be bought/sold
in the spectrum market) vary randomly with time and are determined “by the market”,
possibly depending on the current supply-demand balance in the market and other fac-
tors. The “per-slot” market prices for Type-G and Type-O contracts at time t are de-
noted by cG(t) and cO(t) respectively. When a Type-G contract is sold at slot t, it
remains active for T − t + 1 slots (that is, until the end of the optimization horizon),
and therefore fetches a revenue of α(T − t + 1)cG(t), where α(n) is a (deterministic)
increasing function of n and captures the increase in value of a Type-G contract with the
number of slots for which it remains active, e.g., α(n) = n. We assume that the process
{cG(t)} (respectively, {cO(t)}) constitutes a Discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) with
a finite number of states and transition probability HGc,d (respectively, H
O
c,d) from state c
to d. For simplicity, we assume that the DTMCs {cG(t)} and {cO(t)} are independent
of each other, although our results readily extend to the case when the joint process
{cG(t),cO(t)} is a DTMC.
Each primary provider is associated with a randomly time-varying demand process,
{i(t)} which corresponds to its subscriber demand (of TV channel subscribers or wire-
less service subscribers, for example) that it must satisfy. We assume that the process
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{i(t)} constitutes a DTMC with a finite number of states and transition probability Qi j
from state i to j, that is independent of the price process; each demand state corresponds
to an integral amount of bandwidth consumption in subscriber demand.
We assume that the transition probabilities {HGc,d}, {H
O
c,d} and {Qi j} are known to
the primary provider. They can be estimated from the history of the price and demand
processes.
The contract trading is done at the beginning of time slot t, and (xG(t),xO(t)) are
determined after the market prices cG(t), cO(t) and demand levels i(t) are known. Let
(aG(t),xO(t)) denote the spectrum contract portfolio held by the primary during time
slot t, i.e. the number of Type-G and Type-O contracts that stand leased. Since Type-G
contracts last till the end of the time horizon, we have:
aG(t) = ∑
t ′≤t
xG(t
′) (231)
The bandwidth not leased as Type-G contracts or used to satisfy the demand is sold as
Type-O contracts. Thus, at any time t:
xO(t) = K(aG(t), i(t)) := max{0,M−aG(t)− i(t)}. (232)
However, for all slots, t, for which aG(t)+ i(t) > M, the primary will have to use
channels already sold under Type-G contracts to satisfy its subscriber demand, due
to unavailability of additional bandwidth. In this case, the primary incurs a penalty,
Y (aG(t), i(t)), for breaching Type-G contracts. The penalty is proportional to the num-
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ber of such channels the provider uses for satisfying its subscriber demand. Thus,
Y (aG(t), i(t)) = βmax{0,aG(t)+ i(t)−M}, (233)
where β is the proportionality constant. We make the natural assumption that the
penalty is hefty; in particular, β is greater than or equal to the maximum possible price
of a Type-O contract.
The Primary-SCT problem then is to choose the primary’s trading strategy ((xG(t),xO(t)),
t = 1, . . .T , so as to maximize its expected revenue, expressed as
E
(
T
∑
t=1
(α(T − t +1)cG(t)xG(t)+ cO(t)xO(t)−Y (aG(t), i(t)))
)
, (234)
subject to relations (231)-(233). The optimum strategy must be causal in that for each
t ∈{1, . . .T}, (xG(t),xO(t))must be chosen by time t. Note that at time t, {i(t
′),cG(t
′),cO(t
′) :
t ′ = 1, . . . , t} are known, but {i(t ′),cG(t
′),cO(t
′) : t ′ = t+1, . . . ,T} are not known to the
primary provider. From (231) and (232), xO(t) is a function of {xG(t
′) : t ′ = 1, . . . , t}
and the current demand i(t). Therefore, the Primary-SCT problem as defined above
reduces to finding the optimal (xG(t), t = 1, . . . ,T ).
Note that the revenue function in (234) ignores any revenue earned from the pri-
mary’s subscribers. Since the subscriber demand process i(t) is unaffected by the trad-
ing decisions, such revenue adds a constant offset to the revenue in (234), and therefore
does not influence the optimal spectrum trading decisions.
Generalizations:
1) For a Type-O contract, the secondary provider pays the primary only for the amount
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of bandwidth it uses. Thus, the expected revenue earned by a primary on selling such
a contract equals the secondary’s expected usage of such a channel times the market
price of such a contract. We can incorporate this by considering the revenue from a
Type-O contract in slot t as κcO(t), where κ is the secondary’s expected usage of such
a channel. The formulation and the results extend to this case.
2) Our formulation and results can be extended to consider the case that i(t) is only
an estimate of the demand in slot t, and the estimation error in each slot is an inde-
pendent, identically distributed random variable whose distribution is known to the
primary. Then, xO(t) must be selected so that M − xO(t)− aG(t) is greater than or
equal to the actual demand with a desired probability. Thus, xO(t) will be a function,
K (aG(t), i(t)), of (aG(t), i(t)), which may be different from that in (232), but can nev-
ertheless be determined from the knowledge of the distribution of the estimation error.
Also, in this case, the lack of exact knowledge of the demand will force the primary to
use part or whole of the bandwidth it has sold as Type-O contracts to satisfy its demand.
This will not incur any penalty for the primary owing to the nature of the contract, but
will reduce the secondary’s expected usage κ of each channel sold as a Type-O con-
tract, and thereby reduce the expected amount κcO(t) the secondary pays the primary
for each such channel.
3) For clarity of exposition, we assumed integral demands i(t). However, in practice,
the demands may be fractional. For example, when a set of subscribers intermittently
access the Internet on a channel, a fraction of the bandwidth on a channel is used every
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slot. In this case, a Type-G or Type-O contract may be sold on the channel (while in-
curring a penalty proportional to the fraction used on the channel for the former). All
our results apply without change in this case.
6.2.2 Polynomial-time optimal trading
We show that the Primary-SCT problem defined in Section 6.2.1 can be solved as a
stochastic dynamic program (SDP) [54]. A policy [54] is a rule, which specifies the
decisions (xG(t) and xO(t)) at each slot t, as a function of the demands and prices and
past decisions. Now, since the demand and prices are Markovian, the statistics of the
future evolution of the system from slot t onwards are completely determined by the
vector (aG(t −1), i(t),cG(t),cO(t)), which we call the state at slot t, and the primary’s
decisions {xG(t
′) : t ′ = t, . . . ,T} under the policy being used. Now, in general, a policy
may determine (xG(t),xO(t)) at slot t based on all past states and actions. However,
a well-known result (Theorem 4.4.2 in [54]) shows that there exists an optimal policy
which specifies the optimal xG(t) at any slot t only as a (deterministic) function of the
current state and t 28. We next compute such an optimal policy by solving a SDP.
For a given t, let n = T − t +1 be the number of slots remaining until the end of the
horizon, and Vn(a, i,cG,cO) denote the maximum possible revenue from the remain-
ing n slots, under any policy, when the current state is (aG(t − 1), i(t),cG(t),cO(t)) =
28Such a policy is called a deterministic Markov policy [54].
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(a, i,cG,cO). In particular, note that VT (0, i,cG,cO) is the maximum possible value
of the expected revenue in (234) under any policy when i(1) = i, cG(1) = cG and
cO(1) = cO. The function Vn(.) is called the value function [54]. We have:
Vn(a, i,cG,cO) = max
0≤x≤M−a
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x), (235)
where Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) = α(n)cGx+ J(x+a, i,cO)
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi jVn−1(a+ x, j,dG,dO), and (236)
J(aG(t), i(t),cO(t)) = cO(t)K(aG(t), i(t))−Y(aG(t), i(t)), (237)
and the maximum in (235) is over integer values of x in [0,M − a]. Equation (235) is
called Bellman’s optimality equation [54] and holds because, by definition of Vn−1(.),
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) defined by (236) is the maximum possible expected revenue when n
slots remain until the end of the horizon and xG(t) = x is chosen. Note that the first
two terms in (236) account for the revenue earned in slot t from the sale of Type-G
and Type-O contracts minus the penalty paid. The last term in (236) is the maximum
expected revenue from slot t + 1 onwards. The summations over dG,dO and j take
the expectation of the revenue over the prices of Type-G and Type-O contracts and
the demand respectively in slot t + 1. We get (235) by taking the maximum over all
permissible values of x. Denote the (largest) x that maximizes Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) by
x∗n(a, i,cG,cO). The function x
∗
n(.) provides the optimal solution to the Primary-SCT
problem.
Now, the value function and optimal policy can be found from (235) using backward
induction [54], which proceeds as follows. Note that V0(.)= 0. Thus, W1(.) can be com-
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puted using (236), and V1(.) and x
∗
1(.) using (235), and similarly, W2(.),V2(.),x
∗
2(.), . . .Wn(.),Vn(.),x
∗
n(.)
can be successively computed. This backward induction consumes O((NGNOM
2)2T )
time, where NG (NO) is the number of states in the Markov Chain {cG(t)} ({cO(t)})–
the computation time is therefore polynomial in the input size.
Remark 5. Note that we consider a finite horizon formulation. An alternative would
be to consider an infinite horizon formulation, in which a Type-G contract is valid for
T slots from the time of sale (instead of until the end of horizon). But in this case,
at a given slot, the state would include (yG1 (t), . . . ,y
G
T (t)), where y
G
j (t) is the number
of Type-G contracts that are valid for j slots more. Thus, the size of the state space
is O(MT ), which is exponential in T . Hence, we do not consider an infinite horizon
formulation.
6.2.3 Properties of the optimal solution
We analytically prove a number of structural properties of the optimal policy, which
provide insight into the nature of the optimal solution. Our results are quite general
in that they hold not only for the K(.),Y(.) functions defined in (232), (233), but also
for any functions that satisfy the following properties (which are of course satisfied
by those in (232), (233)). This loose requirement allows our results to extend to the
generalizations described at the end of Section 6.2.1.
Property 4. K(a, i) decreases in a and Y (a, i) increases in a for each i. Hence, by
(237), for each i and cO, J(a, i,cO) decreases in a.
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Property 5. The K(.),Y(.) functions are such that J(a, i,cO) is concave
29 in a for fixed
i,cO.
Property 6. The K(.),Y (.) functions are such that, for each a, J(a, i,cO)− J(a +
1, i,cO) is an increasing function of i.
We next state a technical assumption on the statistics of the demand and price pro-
cesses that we need for our proofs.
Assumption 2. If Xi is the demand in the next slot given that the present demand is i,
or, if Xi is the price of a Type-G (respectively, Type-O) contract in the next slot given
that the present price is i, then for i ≤ i′, Xi ≤st Xi′ (Xi is stochastically smaller [57]
than Xi′), i.e., for each b ∈ R, Pr(Xi > b)≤ Pr(Xi′ > b).
Intuitively, this assumption says that the primary’s demand and the prices do not
fluctuate very rapidly, and the demand (or price) in the next slot is more likely to be
high when the current demand (or price) is high as opposed to when the current demand
(or price) is low.
We are now ready to state the structural properties of the optimum trading policy.
We defer the proofs of these properties until Section 6.5.1.
The first property identifies the relation between x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) and a:
Theorem 12. For each n, i,cG,cO,
x∗n(a+1, i,cG,cO) = max(x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)−1,0). (238)
29A function f (k) with domain being a subset of the integers is concave [7] if f (k+ 2)− f (k+ 1)≤
f (k+ 1)− f (k) for all k [57]. If the inequality is reversed, f (.) is convex.
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Intuitively, this theorem suggests that for each n, i,cG,cO, there exists an optimal
portfolio level of Type-G contracts, a∗G(t), such that if aG(t −1) = a, then xG(t) should
be chosen so as to make aG(t) = a
∗
G(t). That is, the optimal xG(t) = a
∗
G(t)− a (if the
latter is non-negative).
Also, due to Theorem 12, for each n, i, cG and cO, it is sufficient to find x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)
only for a = 0 while performing backward induction, and x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) for other a can
be deduced using (238). This reduces the overall computation time by a factor of M:
the optimal policy can now be computed in O((NGNO)
2M3T ) time.
The next two results identify the nature of the dependence between x∗n(a, i,cG,cO)
and the demand i and prices cG, cO.
Theorem 13. For each n, a, cG and cO, x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone decreasing in i.
Theorem 13 confirms the intuition that when the primary’s demand is high, it should
sell fewer Type-G contracts so as to reserve bandwidth to meet its demand and vice
versa. At the same time, note that this result is not obvious– when the demand is lower,
more free bandwidth is available, which can be sold as Type-G or as Type-O contracts.
Clearly, the number of Type-G versus Type-O contracts sold would influence the states
reached in the future and the revenue earned. Theorem 13 asserts that the primary
should sell at least as many Type-G contracts as before (that is, as for the high demand
state), while possibly also increasing the number of Type-O contracts to sell.
Theorem 14. x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone increasing in cG for fixed n,a, i,cO and mono-
tone decreasing in cO for fixed n,a, i,cG.
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Theorem 14 confirms the intuition that the primary should preferentially sell the
type of contract (G or O) with a “high” price.
Remark 6. Theorems 2 and 3 can be used to speed up the computation of the optimal
policy using the monotone backward induction algorithm [54]. Similarly, in Theo-
rem 21 (in Section 6.5.1), we prove that the value function is concave in a for fixed
n, i,cG,cO, which can be used to speed up the computation of x
∗
n(.) from the value func-
tion since the maximizer in (235) can be found in O(logM) time using a binary search
like algorithm [25]. In both cases, the worst case asymptotic running time remains the
same, although substantial savings in computation can be obtained in practice.
6.2.4 SCT across multiple locations
We now consider spectrum contract trading across multiple locations from a primary
provider’s point of view. Wireless transmissions suffer from the fundamental limitation
that the same channel can not be successfully used for simultaneous transmissions at
neighboring locations, but can support simultaneous transmissions at geographically
disparate locations. Thus, a primary provider can not trade contracts in the same chan-
nel at neighboring locations, but can do so at far off locations. Hence, the spectrum
contract trading problem at different locations is inherently coupled, and must be opti-
mized jointly. We now extend the problem formulation to consider the case of multiple
locations, taking into account possible interference relationships between adjacent re-
gions.
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We model the overall region under consideration using an undirected graph G with
the set of nodes S. Each node represents a certain area at some location in the overall
region. There is an edge between two nodes if and only if transmissions at the corre-
sponding locations on the same channel interfere with each other. A primary provider
owns M channels throughout the region. At any time slot, at a given node, on each
channel (a) either a Type-G contract can be sold, (b) a Type-O contract can be sold or
(c) no contract can be sold, subject to the constraint that at no point in time, a contract
can stand leased at neighbors on the same channel. That is, on each channel, the set of
nodes at which a contract stands leased constitutes an independent set [71].
A primary provider needs to satisfy its subscriber demand which is also subject
to certain reuse constraints. We consider the case where the subscribers of a primary
provider require broadcast transmissions. This, for example, happens when the primary
is a TV transmitter that broadcasts signals across all locations over different channels.
At any given slot t, the primary needs to broadcast over a certain number, say i(t),
channels which randomly varies with time depending on subscriber demands. When-
ever the primary broadcasts on a channel, the broadcast reaches all nodes, and thus the
channel can not be used by the secondaries at any node. Hence, if the primary has sold
a Type-G contract on the channel at any node it incurs a penalty of β at the node. Thus,
at slot t, i(t) represents the primary’s demand at all nodes. Note that the set of nodes at
which the primary uses a given channel for demand satisfaction does not constitute an
independent set (as opposed to the set of nodes at which contracts stand leased). Also,
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the primary’s usage status on any given channel at any given time (i.e., whether or not
the primary is using the channel for subscriber demand satisfaction) is the same across
all nodes.
The durations of Type-G and Type-O contracts are as described in Section 6.2.1.
We assume that at any slot t, Type-G (respectively, Type-O) contracts have equal prices
cG(t) (respectively, cO(t)) at all nodes. The processes (i(t),cG(t),cO(t)) evolve as per
independent DTMCs as stated in Section 6.2.1.
The spectrum contract trading problem across multiple locations for a primary
(Primary-SCTM) is to optimally choose at each slot t, the type of contract to sell (if
any) at each location on each channel so as to maximize the total expected revenue
from all nodes over a finite horizon of T slots.
Theorem 15. Primary-SCTM is NP-Hard.
The proof is deferred until Section 6.5.2.
We now characterize the optimal solution of the Primary-SCTM problem.
Lemma 51. Consider the class of policies F , such that a policy f ∈ F operates as
follows. At the beginning of the horizon, it finds a maximum independent set, I(S), in
G . Then, in each slot, it sells contracts only at nodes in I(S). There exists a policy in
F that optimally solves the Primary-SCTM problem.
The proof is deferred until Section 6.5.2.
We refer to a policy in F , which at each node in I(S), sells contracts according
194
to the optimal solution of the Primary-SCT problem with demand and price processes
{i(t),cG(t),cO(t)} as a Separation Policy.
Theorem 16 (Separation Theorem). A Separation Policy optimally solves the Primary-
SCTM problem.
Proof of Theorem 16. By Lemma 51, we can restrict our search for an optimal policy
to the policies in F . Now, the total revenue of a policy in F is the sum of the revenues
at the nodes in I(S). Clearly, the total revenue is maximized if the stochastic dynamic
program for the single node case is executed at each node. Note that this solution
satisfies the interference constraints since I(S) is an independent set.
Note that the optimum solution at any node can be computed in polynomial time
using the SDP presented in Section 6.2.1. However, computation of a maximum size
independent set is an NP-hard problem [35]. This computation therefore seems to be
the basis of the NP-hardness of Primary-SCTM. Also, the following theorem, which is
a direct consequence of Theorem 16, shows that Primary-SCTM can be approximated
in polynomial time within a factor of µ if the maximum independent set problem can
be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of µ.
Theorem 17 (Approximate Separation Theorem). Consider a µ-separation policy that
differs from a separation policy in that it sells contracts as per the single node optimum
solution, at each node of an independent set whose size is at least 1
µ
times that of a
maximum independent set. This policy’s expected revenue is at least 1
µ
times the optimal
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expected revenue.
However, in a graph with N nodes, the maximum size independent set problem
can not in general be approximated to within a factor of O(Nε) for some ε > 0 in
polynomial time unless P = NP [3]. Nevertheless, polynomial time approximation
algorithms (PTAS) i.e., algorithms that compute an independent set whose size is within
(1−ε) of the maximum size independent set, for any given ε > 0, using a computation
time of O(N1/ε) are known in important special cases, e.g., when the degree of each
node is upper-bounded [4] (this happens in our case when the number of locations each
location interferes with is upper-bounded). Thus, in view of Theorem 17, for any given
ε > 0, the Primary-SCTM problem can be approximated within a factor of 1− ε using
a computation time of O(N1/ε) in such graphs.
6.3 Secondary’s Spectrum Contract Trading Problem
In this section we pose and address Secondary-SCT, the spectrum contract trading ques-
tion from a secondary provider’s (buyer’s) perspective. First note that the Secondary-
SCT problem need not consider the interference constraints for channels since the sec-
ondary provider buys the spectrum bands that are offered in the market (presumably in
a manner that satisfies the reuse constraints), and also because they are usually local-
ized (i.e., operate in small regions). Thus, the secondary’s spectrum trading decisions in
different regions can be separately optimized. So henceforth in this section, we restrict
ourselves to the case of a single location.
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6.3.1 Formulation
We consider an arbitrary secondary provider that is interested in buying contracts in the
secondary spectrum market. Our assumptions regarding the optimization horizon T ,
the durations of Type-G and Type-O contracts and their price processes (cG(t),cO(t))
remain the same as in Section 6.2.1. Let ĩ(t) denote the subscriber demand of the
provider at time t– it is a DTMC similar to {i(t)} in Section 6.2.1, but with transition
probabilities Pi j in place of Qi j.
The secondary decides the number of Type-G and Type-O contracts it will buy (from
primary providers) at slot t, (x̃G(t), x̃O(t)), after it learns the market prices cG(t) and
cO(t) and the demand level ĩ(t) at t. We continue to assume that the market has infinite
liquidity, which now implies that the market has a lot of sellers (i.e., primary providers),
and hence the secondary can buy as many contracts of any type by paying their market
price. Let (ãG(t), x̃O(t)) denote the spectrum contract portfolio held by the secondary
during slot t, where ãG(t) denotes the number of Type-G contracts that the secondary
has leased out until time t. Then we have
ãG(t) = ∑
t ′≤t
x̃G(t
′). (239)
The secondary provider’s spectrum trading goal is to meet its time-varying subscriber
demand in every time slot at the minimum cost, by choosing an appropriate portfolio
of Type-G and Type-O contracts, {(ãG(t), x̃O(t))}, adjusted dynamically.
Note that there are uncertainties on how much bandwidth the secondary actually
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ends up getting from each contract at a time t during its duration, since a Type-O con-
tract only allows the secondary the right to use the channel when the owner (primary)
is not using it, and there is a non-zero probability of contract violation for a Type-G
contract by the primary due to its subscriber demand level plus the number of Type-G
contracts sold exceeding its total owned spectrum (see the Primary-SCT formulation
in Section 6.2). Due to this, the subscriber demand ĩ(t) can be met only in statisti-
cal terms, e.g., in expectation, or with a certain probability, by any spectrum contract
portfolio. (We assume that statistics on such contract violations are available (possi-
bly from historical data) to the buyers, and can be incorporated in the corresponding
contract trading decision.) We generalize this notion by associating with each value of
subscriber demand δ, a demand satisfaction set Fδ within which a spectrum contract
portfolio (ãG, x̃O) must lie for meeting the demand level δ satisfactorily. A portfolio
(ãG(t), x̃O(t)) is said to be demand-satisfactory at time t if it can meet the demand level
at time t satisfactorily, i.e., if (ãG(t), x̃O(t)) ∈ F ĩ(t).
Thus, the Secondary-SCT problem is to minimize the expected contract trading cost
subject to the spectrum contract portfolio being demand-satisfactory at all times t. The
objective is thus to minimize
E
(
T
∑
t=1
(α(T − t +1)cG(t)x̃G(t)+ cO(t)x̃O(t))
)
, (240)
subject to (239) and
(ãG(t), x̃O(t)) ∈ F ĩ(t), ∀t, (241)
and such that for each t ∈ {1, . . .T}, (x̃G(t), x̃O(t)) must be chosen by time t. Note that
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at time t, {ĩ(t ′),cG(t
′),cO(t
′) : t ′ = 1, . . . , t} are known, but {ĩ(t ′),cG(t
′),cO(t
′) : t ′ =
t +1, . . . ,T} are not known.
We assume that the sets Fδ for different δ are given. Typically, we will have Fδ′ ⊆ Fδ
for δ ≤ δ′. Also, we make the natural assumption that if (ãG, x̃O) ∈ Fδ for some δ,
then (ãG, x̃
′
O) ∈ Fδ ∀x̃
′
O ≥ x̃O. Accordingly, let L(ãG(t), ĩ(t)) be the minimum number
of Type-O contracts x̃O required for a portfolio (ãG(t), x̃O) to be in F ĩ(t), for a given
(ãG(t), ĩ(t)). It is easy to see that for a given (ãG(t), ĩ(t)), it is optimal to select x̃O =
L(ãG(t), ĩ(t)) (not more).
For example, suppose the secondary seeks to meet the current demand level in ex-
pectation. Due to the uncertain amount of bandwidth available on Type-G and Type-O
contracts, suppose the expected amount of bandwidth obtained from a Type-G contract
is γ (0 < γ ≤ 1). Also, η Type-O contracts are required, on average, to meet one unit of
demand, where η is a positive integer. For simplicity, assume that the product γη is an
integer. Then:
L(ãG(t), ĩ(t)) = max
{
η(ĩ(t)− γãG(t)),0
}
(242)
Remarks: 1) Note that in (240), we do not consider the revenue earned from the penal-
ties paid by the primary due to Type-G contract violations. Such penalties lead to a net
decrease in the price of a Type-G contract, and their effects can be incorporated by con-
sidering the price process of Type-G contracts as {c̃G(t)}, where c̃G(t) = cG(t)−κ(t),
where κ(t) is i.i.d and independent of {cG(t)}. Subsequent formulations and analysis
do not change owing to the above modification.
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2) Like for the Primary-SCT problem, our results can be extended to the case where the
secondary knows only an estimate of ĩ(t) at the beginning of time slot t.
3) Like for the Primary-SCT problem, the cost function in (240) ignores any revenue
earned from the secondary’s subscribers. Since the subscriber demand process ĩ(t) is
unaffected by the trading decisions, such revenue adds a constant offset to the cost in
(240), and therefore does not influence the optimal spectrum trading decisions.
6.3.2 Analysis
We formulate the secondary’s problem as a stochastic dynamic program (SDP) and
prove a number of structural properties of the optimal solution. The formulation and
analysis are very similar to that for the primary; hence we only provide a brief outline.
Let (ãG(t −1), ĩ(t),cG(t),cO(t)) be the state at the beginning of slot t, n = T − t +
1 and Vn(a, i,cG,cO) denote the value function, i.e., the minimum possible cost over
the remaining slots, starting from slot t. In particular, note that VT (0, i,cG,cO) is the
minimum possible value of the expected cost in (240) under any policy when ĩ(1) = i,
cG(1) = cG and cO(1) = cO. Then the optimality equation is given by:
Vn(a, i,cG,cO) = min
x
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) (243)
where
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) = α(n)cGx+ cOL(x+a, i)
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Pi jVn−1(a+ x, j,dG,dO) (244)
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and the minimum in (243) is over nonnegative integer values of x. Denote the (smallest)
x that minimizes Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) by x̃
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO). The value function and optimal
policy can be found from (243) using backward induction [54] in O((NGNOD
2)2T )
time, where D is the number of states in the Markov Chain {ĩ(t)}.
We now identify the structure of the optimal trading strategy {x̃∗n(a, i,cG,cO),n =
1, . . . ,T} for the following properties of the L(.) function, which are analogous to Prop-
erties 4, 5 and 6 of the J(.) function for the Primary-SCT problem. (i) For each i, L(a, i)
decreases in a, (ii) L(a, i) is convex in a for fixed i, (iii) For each a, L(a, i)−L(a+1, i)
is an increasing function of i. It can be checked that these properties are true for the
function L(.) in (242). We also assume that the price and demand processes satisfy
Assumption 2.
We have the following structural results, which closely parallel Theorems 12 to 14.
The proofs are similar to those of Theorems 12 to 14, and hence omitted.
Theorem 18. For each n, i,cG,cO, x̃
∗
n(a+1, i,cG,cO) = max(x̃
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)−1,0) .
Theorem 19. For each n, a, cG and cO, x̃
∗
n(i,a,cG,cO) is monotone increasing in i.
Theorem 20. x̃∗n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone decreasing in cG for fixed n,a, i,cO and mono-
tone increasing in cO for fixed n,a, i,cG.
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6.4 Numerical Studies
We next study the properties of the optimal trading strategy using numerical investi-
gations, and explore how the expected revenue varies as a function of key system pa-
rameters. Due to the similarity in the results for Primary-SCT and Secondary-SCT, we
only present our results for the former. We consider M = 20 channels, penalty param-
eter β = 3.0 and a birth-death demand process with 21 states and integral state values
{0,1, . . . ,20}. The price process cG (cO) is again a birth-death process that varies be-
tween 1.0 and 4.0 (1.0 and 2.0, respectively) with a total of 10 uniformly-spaced states.
For both the demand and price processes, we assume that the forward and backward
transition probabilities equal p (a parameter).
In Theorems 13 and 14, we have established the monotonicity properties of the
optimal solution x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) with respect to the demand level i and prices cG,cO.
Recall that n = T − t + 1 at slot t, and represents the duration of a Type-G contract
made at slot t. Now, our numerical evaluations suggest that the optimal solution x∗n(.)
is decreasing in n, and when n is close to T , x∗n(.) is zero (see Figure 6.1). Thus,
the primary prefers Type-G contracts towards the end of the optimization horizon, and
Type-O towards the beginning. This is because when n is close to T , Type-G contracts
are very long-term, and hence likely to incur hefty penalties since demand and prices
may be difficult to predict long-term.
The two plots in Figure 6.2 show the variation in the primary’s average (expected)
revenue per slot with respect to p and T . For these results, the initial state for the de-
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mand and price processes are chosen according to the steady state distributions of these
processes. The average revenue obtained from the optimal dynamic trading strategy
is compared with that of an optimal static strategy. In the latter strategy, the number
of Type-G contracts is chosen only once (optimally, based on the steady state distribu-
tion of the demand and price processes), at the very beginning of the time horizon; the
number of Type-O contracts made is adjusted dynamically to the amount of “free band-
width” available at any slot (i.e., the number of channels minus the sum of the demand
and Type-G contracts made). We observe that the average revenue for the optimal static
strategy is invariant to changes in p or T – this happens because the initial states for the
demand and price processes follow their steady state distributions, which in our case is
uniform and does not depend on p or T. We observe that the optimal dynamic contract
trading strategy significantly outperforms the optimal static strategy, demonstrating the
benefits of dynamic choice of the number of Type-G contracts. Note that if the static
strategy buys a Type-G contract, it must buy one that is really long-term (i.e., one that
lasts for the entire T slots), whereas the dynamic strategy can choose the duration of
Type-G contracts it buys by deciding when they are purchased, based on its demand and
prices of the contracts that evolve dynamically. The figures also show that the primary’s
average revenue per slot under dynamic choice increases with an increase in p and T
(for the same value of the other parameters). Note that a larger p (respectively, larger
T ) implies larger temporal variation in the prices (respectively, a longer optimization
horizon), giving the primary more opportunities in which the price of a Type-G con-
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Figure 6.1: x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) versus n for a = 0, i = 4, cG = 2.0,cO = 1.0 and T = 50.
tract is high and the primary can “lock in” a good price for a contract. From the bottom
plot in Figure 6.2, we also observe that the average per-slot revenue shows diminishing
returns as T increases, and appears to stabilize eventually (at a faster rate for a larger
p). This is intuitive since the revenue earned per unit time is upper bounded, and also
because very long-term Type-G contracts offer small returns.
6.5 Appendix
6.5.1 Proofs of results in Section 6.2.3
Notation: Let R denote the set of real numbers.
Let Xi be as in Assumption 2. Recall that Qi j, H
G
i j and H
O
i j are the transition proba-
bilities of the demand and the prices of Type-G and Type-O contracts respectively. So,
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Figure 6.2: The top plot shows the average per-slot revenue vs transition probability p. The bottom plot
shows the average per-slot revenue vs time horizon T .
if Xi represents the demand, price of a Type-G contract or price of a Type-O contract
respectively in the next slot given that the present demand, price of a Type-G con-
tract or price of a Type-O contract equals i, then for a function f (.), E( f (Xi)) equals
∑ j Qi j f ( j), ∑ j H
G
i j f ( j) and ∑ j H
O
i j f ( j) respectively. The assumption Xi ≤st Xi′ for i≤ i
′
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in Assumption 2 is equivalent to the following condition [57]:
Condition 1. For every increasing function f (i),
E( f (Xi))≤ E( f (Xi′)) ∀i ≤ i
′
i.e., ∑ j Qi j f ( j), ∑ j H
G
i j f ( j) and ∑ j H
O
i j f ( j) are increasing functions of i.
Note that in the summations in Condition 1, as well as in those in the rest of this
section, the summation is over all possible states of the respective Markov Chain.
6.5.1.1 Proof of Theorem 12
We first prove that the value function is concave in a (Theorem 21). Then, using The-
orem 21, we prove Theorem 12. We start with a simple lemma, which is used in the
proof of Theorem 21.
Lemma 52. For fixed i,cG,cO, Vn(a, i,cG,cO) decreases in a.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. Let V0(a, i,cG,cO) = 0. Then the claim is true
for n = 0. Suppose Vn−1(a, i,cG,cO) decreases in a for each i,cG,cO. Now, let a1 ≥ 1
and x∗n(a1, i,cG,cO) = x1 for some x1. Then, by (235):
Vn(a1, i,cG,cO) =Wn(a1, i,cG,cO,x1) (245)
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Now,
Vn(a1 −1, i,cG,cO)
≥ Wn(a1 −1, i,cG,cO,x1) (by (235))
= α(n)cGx1 + J(x1 +a1 −1, i,cO)
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi jVn−1(a1 + x1 −1, j,dG,dO)
≥ α(n)cGx1 + J(x1 +a1, i,cO)
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi jVn−1(a1 + x1, j,dG,dO)
(by induction hypothesis and Property 4)
= Wn(a1, i,cG,cO,x1)
= Vn(a1, i,cG,cO) (by (245))
The result follows.
Theorem 21. For each n, Vn(a, i,cG,cO) is concave in a for fixed i, cG, cO.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. V0(a, i,cG,cO) is concave in a since it is
equal to 0. Suppose Vn−1(a, i,cG,cO) is concave in a for fixed i,cG,cO. Recall that
Vn−1(a, i,cG,cO) is defined for integer values of a. Now, for fixed i, cG and cO, define
Ṽn−1(a, i,cG,cO) for a real as the function obtained by linearly interpolatingVn−1(a, i,cG,cO)
between each pair of adjacent integers a0 and a0 +1. Similarly, define J̃(a, i,cO).
Now, J(x+a, i,cO) (respectively, Vn−1(x+a, i,cG,cO)) is concave decreasing in x+
a for fixed i,cO (respectively, for fixed i,cG,cO) by Properties 4 and 5 (respectively, by
Lemma 52 and induction hypothesis). Hence, we get:
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Property 7. J̃(x+a, i,cO) (respectively, Ṽn−1(x+a, i,cG,cO)) is concave decreasing in
x+a for fixed i,cO (respectively, for fixed i,cG,cO).
Now, consider the function
W̃n(a, i,cG,cO,x) = α(n)cGx+ J̃(x+a, i,cO)
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi jṼn−1(a+ x, j,dG,dO) (246)
as a function of the two real variables a,x, i.e. the vector (a,x).
Recall the following property of composition of functions [7]:
Property 8. Let h : R → R, g : Rk → R, where k ≥ 1 and Rk denotes the k-dimensional
Euclidean space. Let f : Rk → R be defined by f (v) = h(g(v)). If h(.) is concave and
decreasing, and g(v) is convex in v, then f (v) is concave in v.
By the fact that a+ x is linear and hence [7] convex in (a,x), Property 7 and Prop-
erty 8, it follows that J̃(x+ a, i,cO) (respectively, Ṽn−1(a+ x, j,dG,dO)) is concave in
(a,x) for fixed i,cO (respectively, for fixed j,dG,dO). Also, x is clearly concave in
(a,x). Hence, W̃n(a, i,cG,cO,x) being a nonnegative weighted linear combination of
these functions, is concave in (a,x) for fixed i,cG,cO.
Now, define:
Ṽn(a, i,cG,cO) = sup
x∈R,0≤x≤M−a
W̃n(a, i,cG,cO,x) (247)
Note that {x : x ∈ R,0 ≤ x ≤ M − a} is a non-empty convex set. Recall the following
property [7]:
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Property 9. If f (a,x) is concave in (a,x) and C is a convex nonempty set, then the
function
g(a) = sup
x∈C
f (a,x)
is concave in a, provided g(a)< ∞ for some a.
Now, Ṽn(a, i,cG,cO) < ∞ (since the costs of Type-G and Type-O contracts are up-
per bounded). So by (247), Property 9 and the fact that W̃n(.) is concave in (a,x),
Ṽn(a, i,cG,cO) is concave in a for fixed i,cG,cO.
Now, we will show that Vn(a, i,cG,cO) = Ṽn(a, i,cG,cO) for a integer, which will
imply that Vn(a, i,cG,cO) is concave.
Fix i,cG,cO and an integer a. Note that by (235) and (247) and since W̃n(.) =Wn(.)
at integer a and x, Vn(a, i,cG,cO) is the maximum of W̃n(a, i,cG,cO,x) over integer x,
whereas Ṽn(a, i,cG,cO) is the supremum over real x in the range [0,M−a]. Hence, to
prove that Vn(a, i,cG,cO) = Ṽn(a, i,cG,cO), it will suffice to show that the supremum
over real x occurs at integer x.
Now, by the definition of the functions J̃(.) and Ṽn−1(.), f (x) = W̃n(a, i,cG,cO,x) is
continuous and piecewise linear in x, with breakpoints at the integers. Also, note that
the endpoints of the domain of f (x), viz. 0 and M−a are integers that are contained in
the domain. As a result, it can be checked that the maximum of f (x) must occur at an
integer. This completes the proof.
Note that Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) is concave in (a,x) and Vn(a, i,cG,cO) is the maximum
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of Wn(.) over a non-convex set, namely the set of integers in [0,M − a]. This makes
the above proof more involved, since had the maximum been over a convex set, the
concavity of Vn(a, i,cG,cO) would have simply followed from Property 9.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 12.
Proof of Theorem 12. From (236), we have:
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) =Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,x−1)+α(n)cG, ∀x ≥ 1 (248)
Now, by optimality of x∗n(a, i,cG,cO):
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO))≥Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) ∀x ≥ 1 (249)
If x∗n(a, i,cG,cO)≥ 1, then from (248) and (249) and some algebra, we get:
Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)−1)≥Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,x−1) ∀x ≥ 1
which shows that x∗n(a+1, i,cG,cO) = x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)−1 if x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)≥ 1.
Now, suppose x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) = 0. By Theorem 21 and Property 5, since Vn−1(a+
x, j,dG,dO) and J(x + a, i,cO) are concave in x for fixed a, j,dG,dO, i,cO, it follows
from (236) that Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) is concave in x. For x ≥ 2, we have:
Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,x−1)−Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,0)
= Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x)−Wn(a, i,cG,cO,1) (by (248))
≤ Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x−1)−Wn(a, i,cG,cO,0)
(by concavity)
≤ 0 (since x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) = 0)
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which shows that x∗n(a+1, i,cG,cO) = 0.
6.5.1.2 Proofs of Theorems 13 and 14
The proofs of Theorems 13 and 14 are based on the concepts of submodularity and
supermodularity, which we briefly review. Let I ⊆ R and X ⊆ R be two sets. A function
g(i,x) : I ×X → R is called supermodular [54] if for i+ ≥ i− in I and x+ ≥ x− in X ,
g(i+,x+)+g(i−,x−)≥ g(i+,x−)+g(i−,x+)
If the inequality is reversed, g is called submodular [54].
We will require the following key result [54].
Theorem 22. If g(i,x) is supermodular (submodular) on I×X, then the (largest) max-
imizer of g(i,x) for a given i:
f (i) = max{x′ : x′ ∈ argmax
x
g(i,x)}
is increasing (decreasing) in i.
To prove Theorem 13, we show that Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) is submodular in (i,x). The
monotonicity of x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) in i then follows from Theorem 22. First, we prove
some lemmas.
The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for submodular-
ity.
Lemma 53. Let g(i,x) be a function with domain being integer values of x and real val-
ues of i. g(i,x) is submodular in (i,x) if and only if g(i,x)−g(i,x+1) is an increasing
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function of i for all x.
Proof. The necessity directly follows from the definition of submodularity. We now
prove sufficiency. Suppose g(i,y)− g(i,y+ 1) is an increasing function of i for all y.
For an integer z > 0:
g(i,x)−g(i,x+ z) = [g(i,x)−g(i,x+1)]+ . . .+[g(i,x+ z−1)−g(i,x+ z)]
So g(i,x)−g(i,x+ z), being the sum of increasing functions, is increasing in i.
Hence, for x− < x+, g(i,x−)−g(i,x+) is increasing in i. So for i− < i+:
g(i−,x−)−g(i−,x+)≤ g(i+,x−)−g(i+,x+)
Hence, g(i,x) is submodular in (i,x) by definition.
For m ≥ 1, define 30
imn (a,cG,cO) = max{i : x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO)≥ m} . (250)
Lemma 54. If x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone decreasing in i, then
i1n(a,cG,cO)≥ i
2
n(a,cG,cO)≥ . . .≥ i
M−a
n (a,cG,cO)
Also, x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) = m if and only if i
m
n (a,cG,cO)≥ i > i
m+1
n (a,cG,cO).
Proof. The result follows by definition of imn (.).
The next lemma establishes a sufficient condition for monotonicity of x∗n(i,a,cG,cO).
30If x∗n(a, i,cG,cO)< m ∀i, then let i
m
n (a,cG,cO) be equal to the smallest demand state.
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Lemma 55. Fix n. Suppose Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)−Vn−1(a+1, j,dG,dO) is an increasing
function of j for each a, dG and dO. Then x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone decreasing in i
for each a,cG and cO.
It is important to note that the lemma requires Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)−Vn−1(a+1, j,dG,dO)
to be increasing in j for a fixed n, and asserts that x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone decreasing
in i for that n.
Proof. By (236):
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x)−Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x+1)
=−α(n)cG+[J(a+ x, i,cO)− J(a+ x+1, i,cO)]
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi j (Vn−1(a+ x, j,dG,dO)
−Vn−1(a+ x+1, j,dG,dO))
The first term on the right hand side is constant, the second term is increasing in i by
Property 6 and the third term is increasing in i since Vn−1(a+ x, j,dG,dO)−Vn−1(a+
x+1, j,dG,dO) is increasing in j and by Condition 1.
So Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x)−Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x+1) is increasing in i. Hence, by Lemma 53,
Wn(a, i,cG,cO,x) is submodular in (i,x) and so by Theorem 22, x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO) is mono-
tone decreasing in i.
The next lemma is a simple consequence of (238).
Lemma 56. Fix n. If x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) is monotone decreasing in i for each a,cG,cO, then
im+1n (a,cG,cO) = i
m
n (a+1,cG,cO) for m = 1,2, . . ..
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Proof. Fix cG and cO, and let m ≥ 1. Separately with a and with a+1, start with i = M
(the highest demand state) and keep decreasing it to the next lower state, one at a time.
By (238), the maximum i at which x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) ≥ m+1 is precisely the maximum i
at which x∗n(a+1, i,cG,cO)≥ m. So i
m+1
n (a,cG,cO) = i
m
n (a+1,cG,cO) by definition of
imn (.).
Lemma 57. For each n, Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+ 1, i,cG,cO) is an increasing function
of i for each a,cG,cO.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. Since V0(a, i,cG,cO)≡ 0, the claim is true for
n = 0.
Suppose the statement is true for n−1, i.e., Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)−Vn−1(a+1, j,dG,dO)
is an increasing function of j for each a,dG,dO. Then by Lemma 55, x
∗
n(a, i,cG,cO) is
monotone decreasing in i. Hence, by Lemma 56, im+1n (a,cG,cO) = i
m
n (a+1,cG,cO) for
m = 1,2, . . ..
Now, we show that Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+1, i,cG,cO) is an increasing function of
i. Fix a,cG and cO. We have the following cases:
Case 1: i > i1n(a,cG,cO)
By Lemma 54 and Lemma 56:
i > i1n(a,cG,cO)≥ i
2
n(a,cG,cO) = i
1
n(a+1,cG,cO)
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So by Lemma 54, x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) = x
∗
n(a+1, i,cG,cO) = 0. Hence, by (235) and (236):
Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+1, i,cG,cO)
= Wn(a, i,cG,cO,0)−Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,0)
= (J(a, i,cO)− J(a+1, i,cO))
+ ∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi j(Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)
−Vn−1(a+1, j,dG,dO)) (251)
Case 2: imn (a,cG,cO)≥ i > i
m+1
n (a,cG,cO), where m ≥ 1.
By Lemma 54, x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) = m and hence by Theorem 12, x
∗
n(a+ 1, i,cG,cO) =
m−1. So by (235) and (236) and some cancellation of terms, we get:
Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+1, i,cG,cO)
= Wn(a, i,cG,cO,m)−Wn(a+1, i,cG,cO,m−1)
= α(n)cG (252)
By (251) and (252), Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+1, i,cG,cO)
=



α(n)cG if i ≤ i
1
n(a,cG,cO),
(J(a, i,cO)− J(a+1, i,cO))
+∑dG ∑dO H
G
cGdG
HOcOdO ∑ j Qi j(Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)
−Vn−1(a+1, j,dG,dO)) if i > i
1
n(a,cG,cO).
The expression for Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+1, i,cG,cO) for i> i
1
n(a,cG,cO) is an increas-
ing function of i by Property 6, induction hypothesis and Condition 1. Thus, to show
that Vn(a, i,cG,cO)−Vn(a+1, i,cG,cO) is increasing in i, it is sufficient to show that for
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i > i1n(a,cG,cO):
(J(a, i,cO)− J(a+1, i,cO))
+∑
dG
∑
dO
HGcGdGH
O
cOdO ∑
j
Qi j(Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)
−Vn−1(a+1, j,dG,dO))≥ α(n)cG (253)
By (236), (253) is equivalent to Wn(a, i,cG,cO,0) ≥ Wn(a, i,cG,cO,1), which is true
because x∗n(a, i,cG,cO) = 0 for i > i
1
n(a,cG,cO). The result follows.
From the above lemmas, we get the desired monotonicity of x∗n(i,a,cG,cO).
Proof of Theorem 13. Fix n, a, cG and cO. By Lemma 57, Vn−1(a, j,dG,dO)−Vn−1(a+
1, j,dG,dO) is an increasing function of j for each dG,dO. The result follows by
Lemma 55.
Proof of Theorem 14. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 13 and hence
omitted.
6.5.2 Proofs of results in Section 6.2.4
Proof of Theorem 15. We show that the Maximum Independent Set (MIS) problem is a
special case of Primary-SCTM. Consider the following special case of Primary-SCTM:
M = 1, T = 1. At each node, the primary’s demand is always 0, and the prices of Type
G and O contracts are fixed, equal to 1
2
and 1 respectively. Thus, it is optimal never to
sell a type G contract.
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The Primary-SCTM problem reduces to that of finding a maximum independent set
of nodes (at which to sell Type O contracts). The result follows, since the MIS problem
is NP-Hard [35].
Proof of Lemma 51. Let Nte, j be the number of Type- j contracts ( j ∈ {G,O}) sold by a
policy P in slot t on channel e. We make the following key observations:
(1) The revenue of any policy depends only on the number of Type-G and Type-O
contracts it sells on each channel, in each slot, independent of which nodes it sells them
at. That is, the revenue of the policy P is completely determined by:
{Nte,G,N
t
e,O : e = 1, . . . ,M; t = 1, . . . ,T}
This follows from the fact that on each channel, the prices of both types of contracts
and the usage status (i.e., whether or not the primary is using the channel for subscriber
demand satisfaction) are the same at all nodes.
(2) For every policy, on each channel, at any time, the total number of Type-G and
Type-O contracts currently leased is at most equal to |I(S)|.
That is, for the above policy P, for every slot t:
t
∑
τ=1
Nτe,G +N
t
e,O ≤ |I(S)|, e = 1, . . . ,M (254)
This follows from the fact that I(S) is a maximum independent set.
Now, let P be an optimal policy. Consider a policy f ∈ F , which initially finds a
maximum independent set I(S). Also, whenever P sells a contract, f sells the same
type of contract on the same channel at a node in I(S) at which no contract has been
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sold on this channel. More precisely, number the nodes in I(S) from 1 to |I(S)|. In slot
t, on channel e, policy f sells Type-G contracts at the nodes ∑t−1τ=1 N
τ
e,G+1 to ∑
t
τ=1 N
τ
e,G
and Type-O contracts at the nodes ∑tτ=1 N
τ
e,G+1 to ∑
t
τ=1 N
τ
e,G+N
t
e,O. It can be checked
that on each channel e, (a) for policy f , two or more contracts never stand leased at the
same node and (b) by (254), in each slot t, f finds enough nodes in I(S) to sell contracts
at.
Now, by observation (1), the revenue of f is the same as that of P, and therefore f
is optimal.
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Chapter 7
A Spectrum Auction Framework for
Joint Access Allocation to Primaries
and Secondaries
7.1 Introduction
Recall from Section 1.1 that there are two possibilities for spectrum allocation in CRNs–
one-step and two-step allocation. In Chapters 2 to 6, we focussed on the two-step allo-
cation scenario. In this chapter, we consider the one-step allocation scenario; recall that
in this scenario, a regulator such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in the United States jointly allocates the rights to be the primary and the secondary
networks on its channels in a single allocation.
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Different networks may attach different value to being primary and secondary. A
network may wish to mainly transmit delay-sensitive traffic like voice or video. Such
a network will attach a high value to the rights to be primary. On the other hand, a
network may be mainly interested in transmitting delay-insensitive traffic like email or
file transfer. Such a network would not need primary rights and would prefer secondary
rights since the latter would be priced lower than the former. Also, a network whose
traffic is a mixture of delay-sensitive and delay-insensitive traffic would want primary
rights on some channels and secondary rights on some channels.
Auctions are suitable for selling the rights to be primary and secondary on the chan-
nels. Since the regulator need not know the values that bidders attach to primary and
secondary rights, auctions provide a mechanism for the regulator to get a higher rev-
enue than that obtainable through static pricing [22]. Auctions are also beneficial for
the bidders since in general they assign goods to the bidders who value them most [22].
FCC has been conducting spectrum auctions since 1994 to allocate licenses for radio
spectrum [1] (however, so far, no auctions have been conducted for cognitive radio
networks).
In this chapter, we develop a comprehensive auction framework for the one-step
allocation scenario, using which a regulator can simultaneously allocate the rights to
be primary and secondary on the channels. One-step allocation may be more desirable
than its two-step counterpart in certain cases. For example, one-step allocation gives a
greater degree of control to the regulator. In particular, it allows the regulator to choose
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a “socially beneficial” channel allocation that maximizes the social welfare. Note that
in one-step allocation, a network can bid for, and can even be granted, primary and
secondary access to more than one or even all channels. Also, the allocation resulting
from two-step allocation may indeed turn out to be that for one-step allocation but only
when it is the most socially beneficial allocation.
We consider a scenario in which the regulator conducts an auction to sell the rights
to be primary and secondary networks on a set of channels. Networks can bid for these
rights based on their utilities and traffic demands. The regulator uses these bids to solve
the access allocation problem, i.e., the problem of deciding which networks will be the
primary and secondary networks on each channel. The goal of the regulator may be
either to maximize its revenue or to maximize the social welfare of the bidding net-
works. Now, networks can have utilities or valuations that are functions of the number
of channels on which they get primary and secondary rights, how many and which other
networks they share these channels with etc. The number of valuations of a network
may be large and an exponential amount of space may be required to express a bid
for each valuation. So we design bidding languages, that is, compact formats for net-
works to express bids for their valuations. For different bidding languages, we design
algorithms for the access allocation problem.
This chapter is organized as follows. We describe the system model in Section 7.2.
In Section 7.3, we describe how the bidding languages and algorithms that we design
in the paper can be used to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue or to maximize social
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welfare. In Section 7.4, we describe a model in which the bids of a network depend on
which other networks it shares a channel with. In Section 7.4.1, we design an optimal
algorithm for the access allocation problem for a simple case with only one secondary
network on each channel. We show the intractability (NP-Competeness of the access
allocation problem or exponential size of bids) of the extensions of this simple case
in Section 7.4.2. In Section 7.5, we consider the case in which the bids of a network
are independent of which networks it shares a channel with and provide an optimal
dynamic programming algorithm for the access allocation problem in Section 7.6. The
algorithm is polynomial-time when the number of possible cardinalities of the set of
secondary networks on a channel is upper-bounded. In Section 7.7, we describe a bid-
ding language that can be used for the independent bids case for an arbitrary number
of cardinalities of the set of secondary networks on a channel and provide a greedy 2-
approximation algorithm for the access allocation problem. In Section 7.8, using simu-
lations, we show that the above approximation algorithm in fact performs optimally in
a variety of scenarios.
7.2 System Model
We consider a scenario in which there are M identical orthogonal channels in a region.
A regulator conducts an auction to sell the rights to be the primary and secondary
networks on the channels. N bidders participate in the auction. Each bidder is an
independent network of multiple wireless nodes. Each bidding network submits bids to
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the regulator and based on the bids, the latter allocates the rights to be the primary and
secondary networks on the channels.
A primary network on a channel must have priortized access to the channel. If two
or more independent networks were to be the primary networks on a single channel,
then the access of each one of them would be constrained by the transmissions of the
other primary networks, which would transmit at the same priority level. To avoid this,
we assume that there is exactly one primary network on each channel. However, we
allow multiple networks to have secondary rights on a channel.
We assume that all the secondary networks on a channel have equal rights on the
channel. This is because complicated multiple access protocols [5] would be required
to grant access at different priority levels to different secondary networks on a channel
(with all of them getting lower priority access than the primary network). On the other
hand, simple multiple access protocols would suffice if all secondary networks have
equal rights on the channel.
Now, since a primary network has priortized access on a channel, the average delay
of its traffic is low. On the other hand, the average delay of a secondary network’s
traffic is high. Hence, primary rights (respectively secondary rights) are suitable for
communicating delay-sensitive (respectively delay-insensitive) traffic. We assume that
each network has two kinds of traffic: (a) delay-sensitive traffic like voice, video etc.
and (b) delay-insensitive or elastic traffic like email, file-transfer etc. A network uses its
primary rights to transmit its delay-sensitive traffic and its secondary rights to transmit
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its elastic traffic.
A single network i may be both the primary network and one of the secondary net-
works on a channel. In this case, we assume that it transmits its delay-sensitive traffic
as a primary network, i.e., with high-priority, and when it does not have any delay-
sensitive traffic to transmit, it transmits its elastic traffic as a secondary network. Also,
the other secondary networks on the channel can transmit whenever network i is not
transmitting its delay-sensitive traffic.
Let K be the set of all possible ways in which the M channels can be allocated to the
N bidders. For example, consider the simple case in which M = 3, N = 9 and there can
be at most four secondary networks on a channel. An example of an allocation of the
channels is one in which network 1 becomes the primary network on channels 1 and
2, network 2 becomes primary on channel 3, network 3 becomes the sole secondary
network on channel 1, networks 4 and 5 become secondary networks on channel 2,
networks 1, 4, 6 and 7 become secondary networks on channel 3 and networks 8 and 9
do not become primary or secondary networks on any channel.
Let xi(k) be network i’s valuation or utility from the channel allocation k ∈ K, i.e.,
the value that it conjectures or expects to derive from the allocation k when it submits
the bids. Note that since network i will share channels with other networks in the
allocation k, the actual utility that network i will derive from an allocation k after the
networks start using the allocated channels depends on the transmission patterns of the
other networks that are not completely known to network i when it submits the bids.
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So a network can only submit bids based on the expected utilities xi(k), which reflect
its expectations about the actual utilities that it will eventually get. Henceforth, we
use the terms valuation or utility for xi(k), but they should be understood to mean the
conjectured utility or valuation of network i for the channel allocation k.
The valuations xi(.) of network i for the allocations in K depend on its traffic de-
mands, i.e., the volumes of delay-sensitive and elastic traffic that it wants to transmit.
Now, for given traffic demands, the valuation of a network i for a channel allocation
k ∈ K may depend upon the number of channels on which network i has primary and
secondary rights in the allocation k, how many and which other networks have rights
on each of the channels on which network i has primary or secondary rights etc. For
example, a network that wants to transmit a lot of delay-sensitive traffic will ascribe a
high valuation to an allocation in which it is primary on several channels. Note that
network i may have the same valuation for different allocations k ∈ K.
Network i’s net utility is of the form:
ui(k,τi,xi) = xi(k)− τi (255)
where τi is the payment that network i makes to the auctioneer. The auctioneer de-
termines the channel allocation and the payment τi that each network i makes to the
auctioneer. The social welfare of an allocation k is defined to be the quantity:
N
∑
i=1
xi(k)
Thus, the social welfare is the sum of utilities of all bidders from the allocation k.
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Now, there could be two goals for designing the auction: revenue maximization
and maximizing social welfare. In the first goal, based on its valuations, each network
submits a set of bids to the auctioneer. Let zi(k) be the bid of network i for the allocation
k ∈ K, i.e., the amount of money it is willing to pay if the allocation k ∈ K is chosen.
Let k∗ be the channel allocation that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer, given the
bids zi(.) for bidders 1, . . . ,N. That is, k
∗ satisfies:
N
∑
i=1
zi(k
∗)≥
N
∑
i=1
zi(k) ∀k ∈ K (256)
In the second goal of maximizing social welfare, zi(.) are not the bids of the networks,
but have a different interpretation: they are the declared valuations of the networks
(explained in Section 7.3). In this case, the channel allocation that maximizes the social
welfare of the N networks can again be found by finding the k∗ satisfying equation
(256).
For both goals, the access allocation problem is to determine the channel allocation
k∗ satisfying (256). Depending on the interpretation of zi(.), this allocation k
∗ either
maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue or the social welfare of the N networks.
Now, the set K of possible channel allocations may be exponential in size. Hence,
the total number of different valuations of network i may be exponential in general.
However, it is not computationally tractable to communicate a bid for each valuation
in this large set. So we introduce bidding languages for the auction models that we
consider. A bidding language [13] is a format to compactly encode the bid information
of a bidder. When there are an exponential number of valuations, a bidding language
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expresses the bids approximately, not exactly.
We now remark on some implementation issues: (i) One way in which the regula-
tor can implement the auction is by deploying a central controller in the region, which
would periodically collect bids that are sent by the bidding networks over a common
control channel, compute the channel allocation and payments and send them to the
bidders over the control channel. (ii) The frequency at which auctions are conducted
is determined by the following tradeoff: the higher the frequency, the more respon-
sive is the channel allocation to changes in traffic demands and higher is the spectrum
utilization, but the overhead is also higher. Hence, the inverval between successive auc-
tions is chosen to be as small as possible while ensuring that the overhead is below an
acceptable limit.
7.3 Solution Framework
As stated earlier, an auction could be designed for two different objectives. In our con-
text, the first objective is to choose the channel allocation that maximizes the regulator’s
revenue for a given set of bids of the bidders. This can be done by choosing the allo-
cation k∗ satisfying (256) when zi(k) is the bid of network i for the channel allocation
k.
The second possible objective for the auction could be to achieve efficiency, that
is, to choose the allocation that maximizes social welfare. To this end, each bidder is
asked to declare its valuation function xi(.). With an abuse of notation, let zi(k) denote
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the declared valuation of network i for the allocation k, which may be different from
xi(k) if bidder i believes that falsely declaring its valuations will improve its net utility.
Truth-telling is said to be a weakly-dominant strategy [42] for network i, if for any
possible declarations of networks other than i, the net utility of network i is maximized
when it sets zi(k) = xi(k) ∀k ∈ K. It follows from the revelation principle [42] that to
maximize social welfare, it is sufficient to consider mechanisms in which the payments
τi are chosen such that for each bidder i, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy.
Such a mechanism is called incentive compatible.
To date, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [42] is the only known gen-
eral incentive compatible mechanism that can be used to maximize social welfare. Un-
der this mechanism, given the declared valuation functions zi(.) of the bidders, the
allocation k∗ satisfying (256) is chosen. Let k∗−i be the allocation which would have
maximized the social welfare if network i did not participate in the auction. That is, k∗−i
satisfies:
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
z j(k
∗
−i)≥
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
z j(k) ∀k ∈ K (257)
Under the VCG mechanism, the payment made by network i to the auctioneer is given
by:
τi =
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
z j(k
∗
−i)−
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
z j(k
∗) (258)
The key to implementing the VCG mechanism is to find the allocations k∗ and k∗−i,
i = 1, . . . ,N. Now, k∗ can be found using an algorithm for the access allocation prob-
lem (256) and k∗−i can be found by running the same algorithm on the set of bidders
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{1, . . . ,N}\i.
Now, in general, the set of different valuations of a bidding network is exponential
in size. First, we consider the special case when the number of different valuations of
each bidding network is of poynomial space complexity. But K can still be exponential
in size. This is because a bidder may have the same valuation for two or more allo-
cations in K. Even in this case, it is sometimes computationally intractable to devise
an algorithm to find the optimal allocation k∗ satisfying (256), possibly because this
is NP-hard, but instead an approximation algorithm for the access allocation problem
can be devised. In this case, if the payments are chosen according to the VCG formula
(258) with sub-optimal allocations instead of k∗ and k∗−i, then truth-telling is no longer
a weakly dominant strategy for the bidders. To address this problem, Nisan and Ro-
nen [45] devised the second-chance mechanism under which, the auctioneer publishes
the sub-optimal algorithm that it will use for the access allocation problem. Each bidder
submits its (declared) valuations zi(.) and a so-called appeal function (see [45]) to the
auctioneer. Each bidder optimizes the valuations and the appeal functions to submit so
as to maximize its own utility. The auctioneer specifies a time limit by which the val-
uations and appeal functions must be submitted. The auctioneer uses the sub-optimal
algorithm for the access allocation problem to find the channel allocation using the sub-
mitted valuations and appeal functions. The VCG formula (258) is used to determine
the payment that each bidder will make. Now, the strategic knowledge of a bidder i is a
function that for a set of valuations submitted by the other bidders, gives the valuation
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that bidder i must declare so as to get the maximum utility. It is shown in [45] that
when there is a bound on the time each bidder i can take to compute its strategic knowl-
edge and when the time limit allowed to each bidder to compute the valuations and
appeal functions to submit is at least as much as this bound, then truthfully declaring
the valuation function is a dominant strategy for each bidder under the second-chance
mechanism. Moreover, the social welfare attained by the second-chance mechanism is
at least as good as the social welfare of the sub-optimal algorithm used for the access
allocation problem.
Now, in some cases, the set of valuations of a bidder takes an exponential amount
of space and hence bidders have to use incomplete bidding languages (see Section 7.2)
to convey their valuations. In this case as well, incentive compatibility does not hold
if the VCG formula (258) is used for payments. As a solution to this problem, Ro-
nen [56] devised the extended second-chance mechanism. In these mechanisms, each
bidder submits a description of its set of valuations in some bidding language, an appeal
function, and an oracle [56], which is a program that can be queried by the auctioneer
for the bidder’s valuation. The auctioneer determines an allocation based on the above
submitted quantities using a (possibly sub-optimal) algorithm for the access allocation
problem. It is shown in [56] that under reasonable assumptions (see [56]), truth-telling
is a dominant strategy for the bidders under the extended second-chance mechanism.
Note that in addition to incentive compatibility, the VCG, second-chance and ex-
tended second-chance mechanisms have the desirable property of individual rational-
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ity [42], i.e., bidders get a non-negative utility when they participate in the auction.
In this paper, we propose several spectrum auction models and design bidding lan-
guages and algorithms for the access allocation problem. These can be used for the ob-
jective of maximizing the revenue of the auctioneer or for maximizing the social welfare
of the bidders in conjunction with the VCG, second-chance or extended second-chance
mechanism, as appropriate. In particular, in Section 7.4.1, we describe an auction
model that allows networks to completely express their bids under certain assumptions
(Assumptions 3 and 4). We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds the optimal
solution in the access allocation problem. This algorithm can be used to maximize the
auctioneer’s revenue or, in conjunction with the VCG mechanism, to maximize the so-
cial welfare of the bidders. In the auction model in Section 7.5, we provide a bidding
language that allows bidders to completely express their bids when they have no knowl-
edge of the channel usage behavior (defined in Section 7.4) on a channel of the other
bidders and approximately express their bids when they have this knowledge. Sec-
tion 7.6 provides a polynomial-time algorithm to optimally solve the access allocation
problem for the model in Section 7.5 when the number of cardinalities of the set of sec-
ondary networks on a channel is upper-bounded. When bidders have no knowledge of
the channel usage behavior of other bidders, this algorithm can be used to maximize the
auctioneer’s revenue or to maximize social welfare in conjunction with the VCG mech-
anism. When bidders have this knowledge, the algorithm can be used to maximize the
auctioneer’s revenue or in conjunction with the extended second-chance mechanism to
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maximize social welfare. Finally, in the auction model in Section 7.7, we provide a
bidding language and a 2-approximation algorithm for the access allocation problem
that is polynomial-time for an arbitrary number of cardinalities of the set of secondary
networks on a channel. This algorithm can be used to approximate the maximum rev-
enue of the auctioneer or in conjunction with the extended second-chance mechanism
to approximate the maximum social welfare.
For notational convenience, throughout the paper, we assume that zi(.) are the bids
expressed by bidder i and view the access allocation problem as the problem of maxi-
mizing the revenue of the auctioneer. However, our framework applies without change
to the problem of maximizing social welfare.
7.4 Auction with Dependent Bids
A primary or secondary network on a channel shares the channel with other networks
and hence its actual utility from the channel depends on the transmissions of those net-
works. A network may have some knowledge or beliefs about the typical transmission
patterns of the other bidding networks. For example, the agency owning the network
may conduct a survey on the typical transmission patterns of the other networks in its
region or, if auctions are periodically conducted to allocate spectrum in the region, the
agency may gain this knowledge about the networks with whom it shared channels pre-
viously. Thus, the conjectured utilities and hence the bids of a network would depend
on which networks it will share different channels with.
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7.4.1 Basic Model
In the basic model with dependent bids, we consider the model described in Section 7.2
with the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 3. There is only one secondary network on each channel.
Assumption 4. Each network can be either the primary or the secondary network on
only one channel.
We explore the effect of relaxing either of these assumptions in Section 7.4.2. We
assume that N ≥ 2M, so that all M channels can be allocated.
A secondary network on a channel can use the channel whenever the primary net-
work is not using it. So the throughput and delay of the secondary network on the
channel depends on the channel usage behavior of the primary on the channel, i.e., on
the rate of its transmissions on the channel and how these transmissions are spread over
time. On the other hand, the primary network on a channel has priortized access to
the channel. That is, when the secondary network wants to transmit on the channel,
it senses the channel and can transmit only if it finds that the primary network is not
transmitting. However, due to the imperfect nature of sensing, the secondary network
will sometimes transmit while the primary network is transmitting, resulting in a colli-
sion. Hence the primary network’s utility depends on the channel usage behavior of the
secondary network on the channel. Thus, the actual utility of a primary or secondary
network depends on which network it shares a channel with. As explained above, a
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network may in general have certain beliefs about the channel usage behavior of other
networks and hence may wish to express bids dependent on the network with whom it
shares the channel. To model this, let
z
p
i ( j), j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}\{i}
be the bid of network i for the case when it is the primary network on a channel and
network j is the secondary network on the channel. Similarly, let
zsi ( j), j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}\{i}
be the bid of network i for the case when it is the secondary network on a channel and
network j is the primary network.
Let
k = {(i1, j1), . . . ,(iM, jM)}
be an allocation of the M channels to a set of networks. k is a set of M orderered pairs
(it, jt) such that network it is the primary network on channel t and network jt is the
secondary network on channel t. Note that the revenue of the allocation k is:
M
∑
t=1
(z
p
it
( jt)+ z
s
jt
(it))
We describe an algorithm for determining k∗, the allocation that maximizes the rev-
enue, by reduction to a maximum weight matching problem in a graph. Let G be a
weighted undirected graph with N nodes, one node corresponding to each network. G
is a complete graph, i.e., between every pair of nodes, there is an edge. Let the weight
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of the edge joining nodes i and j be
wi j = max(z
p
i ( j)+ z
s
j(i),z
p
j (i)+ z
s
i( j)) (259)
Note that the weights are nonnegative real numbers. The interpretation of the weights
wi j is as follows. If network i (respectively, network j) is the primary network on a
channel and network j (respectively, network i) is the secondary network, then the sum
of the amounts paid by networks i and j is z
p
i ( j)+z
s
j(i) (respectively, z
s
i ( j)+z
p
j (i)). So
wi j, the greater of these two quantities, is the maximum sum of payments of networks
i and j if they are the two networks on the same channel.
A matching M in a graph is defined to be a subset of the edges such that no two
edges in the subset share a common node. The weight of a matching is the sum of the
weights of its edges.
The following algorithm finds the channel allocation k∗ that maximizes the revenue:
STEP1: In graph G, find a matching M ∗M of maximum weight among matchings
with exactly M edges 31 (we say how later).
STEP2: Let e1, . . . ,eM be the M edges in the matchingM
∗
M . Let e
1
t and e
2
t be the two
endpoints of edge et . The allocation k
∗ is chosen such that for t = 1, . . . ,M, networks
e1t and e
2
t become the two networks (primary and secondary) on channel t. If
z
p
e1t
(e2t )+ z
s
e2t
(e1t )≥ z
p
e2t
(e1t )+ z
s
e1t
(e2t )
then network e1t becomes the primary network on channel t and network e
2
t becomes
31Note that there exists a matching with exactly M edges since there are N ≥ 2M nodes and G is a
complete graph.
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the secondary network, otherwise network e2t becomes the primary network on channel
t and network e1t becomes the secondary network.
Theorem 23. The allocation k∗ found from the matchingM ∗M in the above algorithm is
the one that maximizes the revenue.
Proof. There is a many-to-one correspondence between the set of channel allocations
and the set of matchings with exactly M edges. (It is many-to-one since the alloca-
tions obtained from any allocation by swapping the roles of the primary and secondary
networks on one or more channels correspond to the same matching). From the inter-
pretation of the weight of an edge given above, it follows that the weight of a matching
MM has the maximum revenue among the revenues of the channel allocations that cor-
respond to it. Therefore, the weight of the maximum weight matching M ∗M equals the
maximum revenue among the revenues of all the channel allocations. Also, note that
Step 2 of the above algorithm ensures that we select the channel allocation k∗, whose
revenue is the same as the weight of M ∗M. It follows that the allocation k
∗ found from
the matchingM ∗M is the one that maximizes the revenue.
Now, it remains to show how to find the matching M ∗M . Edmonds [17] gave a
polynomial-time algorithm for finding the maximum weight matching (with any num-
ber of edges) in a graph. However, we are interested in a maximum weight matching
among matchings with M edges, which cannot be directly obtained by Edmonds’ algo-
rithm. It can be obtained in O(M4 +M2N2) time 32 using White’s modification [72],
32Recall that a function f (n) is said to be O(g(n)) if there exist positive constants c and n0 such that
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[73] to Edmonds’ algorithm.
7.4.2 Intractability of Extensions
We now explore the effect of relaxing either one of Assumptions 3 and 4. Suppose
Assumption 3 is relaxed and Assumption 4 is retained. That is, we assume that each
network can be the primary or a secondary network on only one channel. However,
there can be multiple secondary networks on a channel. We show that even if there are
two secondary networks on a channel, the problem of finding a channel allocation that
maximizes the revenue is NP-complete.
Let z
p
i ( j1, . . . , jv−1) be the bid of network i for the case in which it is primary on a
channel and networks j1, . . . , jv−1 are secondary. Let z
s
j1
(i, j2, . . . , jv−1) be the bid of
network j1 for the case in which network i is the primary and networks j1, . . . , jv−1 are
the secondary networks. Also, let z
p
i be the bid of network i for the case in which it is
primary on a channel with no secondary on the channel. We now define the r-Network
Dependent Bid Access Allocation Problem (r-DBA).
Definition 3 (The r-DBA Problem). Suppose M channels are to be allocated to N
bidders such that on each channel, one network is primary and at most r−1 networks
are secondary, where r is a fixed positive integer. Each bidder can be a primary or
secondary network on at most one channel and the bids of networks are as given above.
Find the allocation that maximizes the revenue.
f (n)≤ cg(n) for all n ≥ n0 [11].
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We show that r-DBA is NP-Complete. To this end, we first show that a simpler ver-
sion of r-DBA, which we call the Exactly r-Network Dependent Bid Access Allocation
Problem (r-EDBA) is NP-Complete. The r-EDBA problem is defined in the same way
as r-DBA, except that on each channel, exactly r− 1 networks are secondary, instead
of at most r−1 networks.
Note that if in an instance of r-EDBA, N < rM, then there is no channel allocation
with r networks on each channel. In this case, we define the optimal revenue of the
r-EDBA instance to be −∞.
The decision version of r-DBA or r-EDBA is as follows: given a bound D, is there
a channel allocation such that the revenue under the allocation is at least D? We next
show that (the decision version of) 3-EDBA is NP-Complete.
Lemma 58. 3-EDBA is NP-Complete.
Proof. Given an allocation of the M channels, we can verify in polynomial time whether
the revenue under the allocation is at least D. This shows that 3-EDBA is in the class
NP.
Next, we show that the 3-Dimensional Matching problem (3DM), which is known to
be NP-complete [35], is polynomial-time reducible to 3-EDBA, i.e., 3DM ≤p 3-EDBA.
An instance of 3DM is as follows [35]: Given disjoint sets A, B, C of m elements each
and a set T of ordered triples of the form (a,b,c), where a ∈ A, b ∈ B and c ∈C, does
there exist a set of m triples in T so that each element of A∪B∪C is contained in exactly
one of these triples?
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From this instance of 3DM, we construct an instance of 3-EDBA as follows. Let
there be M =m channels and 3m networks– one network corresponding to each element
of A∪B∪C. We now design the bids, which will complete the construction. For every
set {i, j, l} of three networks such that (i, j, l) (or one of its permutations ( j, l, i), (l, j, i)
etc.) is a triple in T , define all of the following bids to be equal to 1
3
: z
p
i ( j, l), z
p
j (i, l),
z
p
l (i, j), z
s
i ( j, l), z
s
i (l, j), z
s
j(i, l), z
s
j(l, i), z
s
l (i, j), z
s
l ( j, i). For every set {i, j, l} of three
networks such that no permutation of (i, j, l) is a triple in T , let all of the above bids
be equal to 1
6
. In this 3-EDBA problem, we ask: is there a channel allocation of the m
channels with revenue of at least D = m? We claim that the answer is yes if and only if
the answer in the original 3DM problem is yes.
To prove sufficiency, suppose there exists a subset T ′ ⊆ T of m triples such that each
element of A∪B∪C is contained in exactly one of these triples. Let
T ′ = {(at,bt ,ct) : t = 1, . . . ,m}
Then allocate the m channels such that network at is the primary network and networks
bt and ct are the secondary networks on channel t, t = 1, . . . ,m. The revenue of this
allocation is:
m
∑
t=1
{zpat (bt,ct)+ z
s
bt
(at ,ct)+ z
s
ct
(at ,bt)}
=
m
∑
t=1
{
1
3
+
1
3
+
1
3
}
= m
Hence, the answer in the 3-EDBA problem is yes.
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Conversely, suppose there exists an allocation of the m channels with revenue of at
least m. In this allocation, let at be the primary and bt and ct be the secondary networks
on channel t, t = 1, . . . ,m. If (at ,bt ,ct) or its permutation is a triple in T , then the sum
of payments of networks at , bt and ct is 1, else it is
{
1
6
+ 1
6
+ 1
6
}
= 1
2
. Since there are
m channels and the revenue of the allocation is at least m, it follows that the revenue
is exactly m and that for each t, (at ,bt ,ct) or one of its permutations is a triple in T .
Moreover, since each network can be the primary or a secondary network on only one
channel, it follows that each of the 3m networks is a primary or secondary network
on exactly one channel. Hence, the m triples in T corresponding to (at ,bt,ct) or its
permutation for t = 1, . . . ,m are such that each element of A∪B∪C is contained in
exactly one of the triples. So the answer to the 3DM problem is yes. This shows that
3DM ≤p 3-EDBA and hence that 3-EDBA is NP-Complete.
By an analogous reduction from r-Dimensional Matching, it can be shown that r-
EDBA is NP-Complete for fixed r > 3. Note that for r > 3, r-Dimensional Matching is
NP-Complete, which follows from a trivial reduction from 3-Dimensional Matching.
Now we show that for any fixed r ≥ 3, (the decision version of) r-DBA is NP-
Complete by a reduction from r-EDBA.
Theorem 24. For r ≥ 3, r-DBA is NP-Complete.
Proof. Clearly, r-DBA is in the class NP.
Now we show that r-EDBA ≤p r-DBA. From any instance of r-EDBA with given
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M, N, D and bid functions z
p
i (.) and z
s
i (.), we construct an instance of r-DBA as follows.
The number of channels, number of networks and the bound on revenue are the same
as in the original r-EDBA instance (M, N and D respectively). The bids of network i
are given by:
z̃
p
i ( j1, . . . , jv−1) =



z
p
i ( j1, . . . , jv−1) if v = r
0 if 2 ≤ v < r
z̃si ( j1, . . . , jv−1) =



zsi ( j1, . . . , jv−1) if v = r
0 if 2 ≤ v < r
and
z̃
p
i = 0
Recall that if N < rM, then there is no channel allocation in the r-EDBA instance
with exactly r networks on each channel. Hence, the answer to the decision version is
negative. Thus, let N ≥ rM. We now show that there exists a channel allocation with
revenue at least D in the r-EDBA instance if and only if there exists one such in the
r-DBA instance. If there is a channel allocation with revenue at least D in the r-EDBA
instance, then by construction of the bids in the r-DBA instance, the revenue of that
channel allocation is the same in the r-DBA instance and hence at least D.
Conversely, suppose there is a channel allocation k with revenue at least D in the
r-DBA problem. From this channel allocation, construct a channel allocation k′ for
the r-EDBA instance as follows: if there are r − 1 secondary networks on a channel
in k, let the primary and secondary networks on the channel be the same in k′. From
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the construction of bids in the r-DBA instance, it follows that the sum of payments of
the networks on this channel in k′ is the same as that in k. If there are v−1 secondary
networks on a channel l in k, where v< r, then on channel l in k′, let the same v networks
be primary and secondary and in addition, let r − v more networks be secondaries,
which were not primary or secondary on any channel in k. Such networks exist since
N ≥ rM. By the construction of the bids in the r-DBA instance, the sum of payments
of the networks on channel l in k is 0, whereas that in k′ is at least 0. Thus, the revenue
of allocation k′ is at least as much as the revenue of channel k and hence is at least D.
This shows that r-EDBA ≤p r-DBA. Since r-EDBA is NP-Complete as shown
above, it follows that r-DBA is NP-Complete.
Note that in the r-DBA problem, if r is unbounded, then each bidder i would have
to submit an exponential number of bids z
p
i ( j1, . . . , jv−1) and z
s
i ( j1, . . . , jv−1).
Now, suppose we relax Assumption 4 and retain Assumption 3. Then each net-
work can become a primary or secondary network on up to M channels. As explained
above, the utility of a network from the primary or secondary rights on a given channel
depends upon the channel usage behavior of the network it shares the channel with.
However, the channel usage behavior of this network on the channel may in turn de-
pend upon the number of channels on which it has primary and secondary rights and the
channel usage behavior of the networks it shares those channels with and so on. Thus,
in general, the utility of a network may depend upon which networks are the primary
and secondary networks on each channel. The number of possible ways of choosing
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the primary and secondary networks on the M channels is clearly exponential. Thus,
relaxing Assumption 4 would require each network to express an exponential number
of bids in the auction with dependent bids, which is computationally intractable.
7.5 Auction with Independent Bids
In Section 7.4, we noted that when networks have some knowledge of the channel
usage behavior of other networks, they would like to express bids dependent on which
networks they will share channels with. However, it is quite possible in some scenarios
that networks have no knowledge of the channel usage behavior of the other bidding
networks. In this case, their conjectures about the utility that they will actually get
from a channel allocation would be based only on the number of channels on which
they will get primary and secondary rights and the number of other networks they will
share these channels with in the allocation and would be independent of which other
networks they will share channels with. Thus, they would submit bids, based on these
conjectured utilities, that are independent of which networks share different channels
with them.
Moreover, in Section 7.4.2, we showed that bids of exponential size are needed in
the auction with dependent bids when Assumptions 3 and 4 are relaxed. This motivates
the idea that even when networks have some knowledge of the channel usage behavior
of the other networks, we can obtain a compact bidding language, that is, a means for
networks to approximately convey their bids, by imposing the restriction that the bids
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of a network be independent of which other networks it shares different channels with.
We study the auction resulting from imposing this restriction in this section.
7.5.1 Model
Consider the model in Section 7.2 with the following additions. On each channel, one
network can be the primary network and m1, m2, . . . , m(n−1) or mn networks can be
the secondary networks, where 1 ≤ m1 < m2 < .. . < mn. Note that n is the number of
possible cardinalities of the set of secondary networks on a channel.
When the results of the auction are declared, let ni,0 be the number of channels on
which bidder i is the primary network. Let ni, j, j = 1, . . . ,n be the number of channels
on which bidder i is a secondary network along with m j −1 other secondary networks.
Suppose there are m j secondary networks on a channel. Recall from Section 7.2
that each of these m j secondary networks have equal rights on the channel. The share
of each of these networks in the secondary rights on the channel is called a secondary
part of type j. Also, the channel is said to be divided into m j secondary parts of type
j. Similarly, since exactly one network becomes a primary network on a channel, if
a network is the primary network on l channels, we say that it is allocated l primary
parts. Also, we refer to the throughput received by a network as a secondary network
as its secondary throughput.
In general, network i’s utility may depend not only on the total expected secondary
throughput that it gets, but also on the distribution of this secondary throughput over
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the M channels. For example, it may get the same expected secondary throughput (a)
if it is the secondary network on two channels with one other secondary network on
each and (b) if it is the sole secondary network on one channel. But it may prefer
one of these scenarios over the other. This is because a network has to sense different
channels on which it has secondary rights for ongoing transmissions and also commu-
nicate on them. There may be costs due to delays for switching the antennas of the
network’s nodes between different channels. To take into account this possibility, in
this section, we assume that the utility of network i depends not just on the expected
secondary throughput (and the number of primary parts) it receives, but on the vector
(ni,0,ni,1, . . . ,ni,n). We allow bidder i to submit bids as a function of this vector.
Each bidder i submits the following bid vector to the auctioneer:
{zi(ni,0,ni,1, . . .ni,n) : 0 ≤ ni,0,ni,1, . . .ni,n ≤ M,
ni,1 +ni,2 + . . .+ni,n ≤ M;ni, j integer, j = 0,1, . . .n}
where zi(ni,0,ni,1, . . .ni,n) is network i’s bid for becoming the primary network on ni,0
channels and becoming a secondary network on ni, j channels along with m j −1 other
secondary networks, for j = 1,2, . . .n.
7.5.2 Feasible Allocation
We say that an allocation {ni, j : i = 1, . . . ,N; j = 0, . . . ,n} is feasible if it is possible to
assign to networks, the rights to be primary and secondary on each of the M channels
such that network i, i = 1, . . . ,N is allocated ni,0 primary parts and ni, j secondary parts
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of type j for j = 1, . . . ,n. The following lemma describes necessary and sufficient
conditions for an allocation to be feasible.
Lemma 59. An allocation {ni, j : i = 1, . . . ,N; j = 0, . . . ,n} is feasible if and only if
ni,0,ni,1 . . .ni,n for i = 1, . . . ,N are integers such that for some nonnegative integers
M j, j = 1, . . .n satisfying M1 + . . .+Mn = M:
0 ≤ ni,0 ≤ M, i = 1, . . . ,N (260)
N
∑
i=1
ni,0 = M (261)
0 ≤ ni, j ≤ M j, i = 1, . . . ,N; j = 1, . . . ,n (262)
N
∑
i=1
ni, j = m jM j, j = 1, . . . ,n (263)
Note that the integer M j in the above lemma corresponds to the number of channels
that are divided into m j secondary parts of type j. We assume that the number of bidders
is at least m1 so that a feasible allocation exists.
Proof. The necessity of all conditions is obvious. Now we show sufficiency. Suppose
all the above conditions are satisfied. We construct a feasible allocation. Allocate ni,0
primary parts to network i for i = 1, . . . ,N. Since ∑Ni=1 ni,0 = M, each primary part is
allocated exactly once. Now consider the M j channels divided into m j secondary parts.
Label the m j secondary parts of type j on each of these channels from 1 to m j. Also,
label the M j channels from 1 to M j. Now consider the following order of the m jM j
secondary parts of type j: secondary part 1 of channel 1, part 1 of channel 2, . . . , part
1 of channel M j, part 2 of channel 1, part 2 of channel 2, . . . , part 2 of channel M j,
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. . . , part m j of channel 1, part m j of channel 2, . . . , part m j of channel M j. Now, with
secondary parts in the above order, first allocate n1, j secondary parts to network 1, then
n2, j parts to network 2, . . . , then nN, j parts to network N. Since ∑
N
i=1 ni, j = m jM j, in
this way it is possible to allocate each secondary part of type j exactly once. Also, since
ni, j ≤ M j∀i, it is clear that no network is assigned two or more secondary parts on the
same channel. Hence the allocation is feasible.
From a feasible allocation {ni, j : i = 1, . . . ,N; j = 0, . . . ,n}, it is easy to construct
a consistent specification of the primary and secondary networks on each channel.
Hence, the access allocation problem reduces to finding a feasible allocation {ni, j :
i = 1, . . . ,N; j = 0, . . . ,n} that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue given the submitted
bid vectors zi(.).
Let
k = {ni, j : i = 1, . . .N; j = 0, . . . ,n} (264)
denote a feasible allocation. Let K be the set of all feasible allocations.
7.6 Optimal Solution of Access Allocation Problem
In this section, we present an algorithm for optimally solving the access allocation prob-
lem for the auction described in Section 7.5. The algorithm is polynomial-time when
n, the number of possible cardinalities of the set of secondary networks on a channel,
is fixed (and mn is allowed to grow with the problem size). This special case can be
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useful in practice because even with small n, flexibility in channel allocation can be
achieved by choosing m1, . . . , mn judiciously. For example, with n = 3, we can choose
m1 = 1, m2 = 4 and m3 = 8. In this case, large chunks of secondary throughput can be
allocated to a network by having it the sole secondary network on several channels and
small chunks can be allocated to networks by having 4 or 8 networks share a channel.
7.6.1 Algorithm Description
A dynamic programming algorithm is given in [67] and [13] for the winner determi-
nation problem in a combinatorial auction with multiple units of a fixed number of
different types of objects. We generalize the algorithm in [67], [13] in two directions:
(a) the objects in a combinatorial auction are indivisible, whereas we need to decide into
how many secondary parts to divide each channel and (b) in our auction, the allocation
has to be feasible according to the conditions in Lemma 59.
We first summarize the algorithm. Given the bids zi(.), our goal is to find the alloca-
tion k∗ that maximizes revenue. For each set of nonnegative integers M1, . . . , Mn such
that M1+ . . .+Mn = M, a dynamic programming algorithm is used to find out the max-
imum revenue and the maximizing channel allocation when M j channels are divided
into m j secondary parts, j = 1, . . . ,n. Then we maximize over all sets of M1, . . . ,Mn to
find the optimal set M∗1, . . . ,M
∗
n .
We now give the details of the algorithm. Fix M1, . . . ,Mn such that M1+ . . .+Mn =
M. Let T ( j0, j1, . . . jn, i) denote the maximum possible revenue from all participating
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networks when j0 primary parts and jt secondary parts of type t, t = 1, . . . ,n, are to
be allocated and networks 1, . . . , i are participating in the auction. More precisely, let
K( j0, j1, . . . , jn, i) be the set of allocations ki = {nv,t : v= 1, . . . , i; t = 0, . . . ,n} satisfying
the following conditions, which parallel the conditions in Lemma 59:
0 ≤ nv,0 ≤ M,v = 1, . . . , i (265)
i
∑
v=1
nv,0 = j0 (266)
0 ≤ nv,t ≤ Mt ,v = 1, . . . , i; t = 1, . . . ,n (267)
i
∑
v=1
nv,t = jt, t = 1, . . . ,n (268)
Then:
T ( j0, j1, . . . jn, i) = max{
i
∑
v=1
zv(nv,0,nv,1, . . . ,nv,n) :
ki ∈ K( j0, j1, . . . , jn, i)}
Thus, T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N) is the maximum revenue from networks 1, . . . ,N when
M j channels are divided into m j secondary parts of type j, for j = 1, . . . ,n. We now
give a dynamic programming algorithm to find T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N).
The following expression is used for finding the values of T ( j0, j1, . . . jn,1).
T ( j0, j1, . . . jn,1) =



z1( j0, j1, . . . , jn)
if j0 ≤ M, jt ≤ Mt , t = 1, . . . ,n
−∞ otherwise
(269)
The reason the above equation holds is as follows. Since there is only one network
(network 1), the only possibility is to allocate all parts to network 1. But if j0 > M,
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then n1,0 > M, which violates condition (265). Similarly, if jt > Mt , then n1,t > Mt ,
which violates condition (267). Hence if j0 > M or jt > Mt , then T (.) is set to −∞.
The following recursion is used for finding the values of T ( j0, j1, . . . jn, i) for i ≥ 2.
T ( j0, j1, . . . , jn, i) = max(
T ( j0 − l0, j1− l1, . . . , jn − ln, i−1)+ zi(l0, l1, . . . , ln) :
l0 ∈ {0,1, . . . ,min( j0,M)}, lv ∈ {0,1, . . . ,min( jv,Mv)},
v = 1, . . . ,n) (270)
In the above recursion, if l0 primary parts and lv secondary parts of type v, v = 1, . . . ,n
are allocated to network i, then it is willing to pay zi(l0, . . . , ln) and the maximum
revenue obtainable from networks 1, . . . , i− 1 for the remaining parts is by definition
T ( j0 − l0, j1 − l1, . . . , jn − ln, i−1). Moreover, lv ≤ jv since jv secondary parts of type
v are available and lv ≤ Mv by (267). So lv ≤ min( jv,Mv) for v = 1, . . . ,n and similarly
l0 ≤ min( j0,M). Equation (270) follows by maximizing the revenue from networks
1, . . . , i−1 over all possible values of l0, l1, . . . , ln.
A feasible channel allocation that achieves the maximum revenue T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N)
for the fixed values M1, . . . ,Mn considered, can be found from the array T (.) by repeat-
edly finding the l0, l1, . . . , ln that achieve the maximum in the right side of (270).
For all sets M1, . . . ,Mn such that M1 + . . .+Mn = M, T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N) and
the revenue maximizing allocation are found as explained above. Then the optimal set
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(M∗1, . . . ,M
∗
n) is found as follows:
(M∗1, . . . ,M
∗
n) = argmax
M1+...+Mn=M
T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N) (271)
The revenue maximizing allocation with M1 = M
∗
1 , . . . , Mn = M
∗
n is the one that maxi-
mizes revenue over all channel allocations.
7.6.2 Running Time
The maximum in (270) is taken over O(MM1M2 . . .Mn) values. Moreover, T ( j0, j1, . . . , jn, i)
is calculated for i from 1 to N, j0 from 0 to M, j1 from 0 to m1M1, . . . , jn from 0 to
mnMn, that is (since m j = O(mn) for j = 1, . . . ,n), for O(MM1M2 . . .Mnm
n
nN) values.
Finally, this process is carried out for all M1, . . . ,Mn such that M1 + . . .+Mn = M.
Hence, the time to compute k∗ is:
∑
M1+...Mn=M
O((MM1 . . .Mn)
2mnnN)
≤
M
∑
M1=0
. . .
M
∑
Mn=0
O((MM1 . . .Mn)
2mnnN)
= O(M3n+2mnnN)
Thus, the running time is O(M3n+2mnnN), which is polynomial for fixed n.
7.6.3 Space Complexity
Each network i submits its bid zi(ni,0,ni,1, . . . ,ni,n) for ni,0 ∈ {0,1, . . . ,M} and all sets
ni,1, . . . ,ni,n satisfying ∑
n
j=1 ni, j ≤ M. There are O(M
n+1) such bids. Summing over the
N networks, the storage requirement for bids is O(Mn+1N).
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To find the revenue maximizing allocation for a fixed set M1, . . . ,Mn, we need to
store the array T ( j0, j1, . . . , jn, i), j0 ∈ {0,1, . . . ,M}, jt ∈ {0,1, . . . ,mtMt}, t = 1, . . . ,n,
i = 1, . . . ,N. This requires O(Mn+1mnnN) amount of storage. Once the allocation
has been found, only the allocation and the value of T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N) can be
stored, which require O(nN) and O(1) storage respectively, and the rest of the array
T ( j0, j1, . . . , jn, i) can be discarded.
We need to store the revenue maximizing allocation and the value T (M,m1M1, . . .mnMn,N)
for all sets (M1, . . . ,Mn) such that M1 + . . .+Mn = M. The number of such sets is
O(Mn). So the storage required is O(MnNn).
Thus, the maximum amount of storage required at any given time during the entire
algorithm to compute k∗ is O(Mn+1mnnN).
7.7 A Greedy 2-Approximation Algorithm
The scheme described in Section 7.6 is computationally tractable for fixed n, the num-
ber of possible cardinalities of the set of secondary networks on a channel. However,
if n is allowed to grow, the set of bids of a network is exponential in size as shown
in Section 7.6.3 and hence the scheme is computationally intractable. In this section,
we first provide a compact bidding language for the case with large n. We conjecture
that under this bidding language, the access allocation problem is NP-hard. We give a
basis for this conjecture in Section 7.9. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that
approximates the maximum revenue of the auctioneer within a factor of 2.
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We describe the bidding language in Section 7.7.1. In Section 7.7.2, we introduce
residual bid functions, a concept used in the approximation algorithm. We describe
the algorithm in Section 7.7.3 and prove that it achieves an approximation ratio of 2 in
Section 7.7.4. Finally, in Section 7.7.5, we describe an efficient implementation of the
algorithm.
7.7.1 Bidding Language
Consider the model in Section 7.5 with the following changes. Let the bandwidth of
each of the M channels be W bps. We assume that the primary network on a channel
uses the channel for an expected fraction of time α, where 0 < α < 1. When auctions
are repeated periodically to assign spectrum, α can be estimated based on long-term
measurements of the primary networks’ channel usage. Alternatively, it can be esti-
mated via simulations. Since secondary networks can use the channel whenever the
primary is not using it, an expected bandwidth of W (1−α) is available on a channel
for the secondary networks. So when m j secondary networks share a channel, each one
of them can get an expected secondary throughput of
W (1−α)
m j
on the channel. 33
In this section, we allow a network to express bids as a function of the number of
channels ni,0 on which it is primary and its total expected secondary throughput T
s
i on
33Note that an expected bandwidth of at least
W (1−α)
m j
is available to each of the m j secondary networks.
If some of them do not use this full bandwidth, then more than
W (1−α)
m j
is available to the other networks.
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all M channels. Note that:
T si =
n
∑
j=1
ni, jW (1−α)
m j
(272)
In the sequel, for brevity, we simply say secondary throughput instead of expected sec-
ondary throughput. Moreover, we assume that the utility, and hence the bid zi(ni,0,T
s
i ),
of each network i when it is primary on ni,0 channels and has T
s
i units of secondary
throughput, is separable, i.e., of the form:
zi(ni,0,T
s
i ) = wi(ni,0)+ yi(T
s
i ) (273)
where wi(ni,0) is its bid for being primary on ni,0 channels and yi(T
s
i ) is its bid for
T si units of throughput as a secondary network. This assumption is a good approx-
imation since networks transmit different kinds of traffic (delay-sensitive and elastic
respectively) as a primary and secondary network.
Under this assumption, the access allocation problem separates out into two inde-
pendent problems– allocating the primary parts and allocating the secondary parts. The
problem of allocating the primary parts can be optimally solved in O(M2N) time using
the dynamic programming algorithm in Section 7.6 with n = 0. In this section, we fo-
cus on giving a 2-approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating the secondary
parts. In the rest of the section, “revenue” refers to the auctioneer’s revenue from selling
the secondary rights on the M channels.
Assume that yi(.) is a concave increasing function for each network i. We use piece-
wise linear concave functions to compactly represent the bid functions of the networks.
They can be used to closely approximate arbitrary concave functions [6] and have been
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previously used in the context of spectrum auctions in [22]. Each network i specifies
its bid for at most P different levels of secondary throughput, for a positive integer P.
More precisely, let Pi ≤ P be a positive integer and let:
0 = qi,1 < qi,2 < .. . < qi,Pi (274)
For v = 1, . . . ,Pi, network i specifies yi(qi,v), which is its bid for qi,v units of secondary
throughput. Network i’s bid for q units of secondary throughput, where qi,v < q< qi,v+1
is found by linear interpolation:
yi(q) = yi(qi,v)+
(
yi(qi,v+1)− yi(qi,v)
qi,v+1 −qi,v
)
(q−qi,v) (275)
Note that qi,1, . . . ,qi,Pi are the breakpoints of the piecewise linear function yi(.).
We assume that for each network i, qi,1 = 0, that yi(qi,1) = yi(0) = 0 and that
qi,Pi ≥ MW (1−α). (276)
Since MW (1−α) is the total secondary throughput available on the M channels, the
second assumption means that network i’s bid for any amount of secondary throughput
on the M channels can be found by linear interpolation.
7.7.2 Residual Bid Functions
Our algorithm uses the following concept.
Definition 4. Let q̃ ≥ 0. The q̃-residual bid function of network i is the function ỹi(.)
given by:
ỹi(q) = yi(q̃+q)− yi(q̃) (277)
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We will sometimes say, “the residual bid function after accounting for q̃” instead of
the q̃-residual bid function. Informally, once network i has been allocated q̃ units of sec-
ondary throughput, ỹi(.) acts as its bid function for allocations of additional secondary
throughput. The following lemma gives some simple properties about the q̃-residual
bid function.
Lemma 60. Let ỹi(q) be the q̃-residual bid function of network i for some q̃ ≥ 0. Then
1. ỹi(q)≤ yi(q) ∀q ≥ 0.
2. ỹi(q) is a piecewise-linear concave increasing function of q.
Proof.
yi(q+ q̃)≤ yi(q)+ yi(q̃), ∀q ≥ 0
by concavity of yi(.). Hence,
ỹi(q) = yi(q+ q̃)− yi(q̃)≤ yi(q) ∀q ≥ 0
which proves part 1.
Now, yi(q) is piecewise-linear, concave and increasing by assumption. Thus, yi(q+
q̃) is a piecewise-linear, concave and increasing function of q as well. Part 2 follows by
(277).
The significance of the q̃-residual bid function is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 61. Suppose the bid function of network i is yi(.) and it is successively al-
located secondary throughputs of q1,q2, . . . ,q f . Let y
v
i (.) denote the (q1 + . . .+ qv)-
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residual bid function of network i, for v = 1, . . . , f . Then
yi(q1 + . . .+q f ) = yi(q1)+ y
1
i (q2)+ . . .+ y
f−1
i (q f ) (278)
Proof. By definition:
y1i (q2) = yi(q1+q2)− yi(q1)
which implies that:
yi(q1+q2) = yi(q1)+ y
1
i (q2) (279)
Similarly,
yi(q1 +q2 +q3) = yi(q1 +q2)+ y
2
i (q3) (280)
= yi(q1)+ y
1
i (q2)+ y
2
i (q3) (281)
where the second step follows from (279). Similarly proceeding for f steps, we get the
desired result (278).
Thus, the significance of the residual bid function is that if a network i is successively
allocated chunks q1, . . . , q f of secondary throughput (e.g. by successive steps of an
algorithm), then we can keep track of its residual bid function after every allocation so
that the extra money that network i is willing to pay for the v’th allocation qv is simply
yv−1i (qv). Moreover, this tracking can be done using the update rule in part 1 of the
following lemma to calculate yv+1i (.) from y
v
i (.).
Lemma 62. Let ỹi(.) and y
+
i (.) be the q̃-residual bid function and (q̃+ q̂)-residual bid
function of network i respectively. Then
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1. y+i (q) = ỹi(q+ q̂)− ỹi(q̂) ∀q ≥ 0
2. y+i (q)≤ ỹi(q) ∀q ≥ 0.
Proof.
ỹi(q+ q̂)− ỹi(q̂)
= (yi(q+ q̂+ q̃)− yi(q̃))− (yi(q̂+ q̃)− yi(q̃))
= yi(q+ q̂+ q̃)− yi(q̂+ q̃)
= y+i (q)
Hence, y+i (.) is the q̂-residual bid function corresponding to the bid function ỹi(.). So
by Lemma 60, y+i (q)≤ ỹi(q) ∀q ≥ 0.
7.7.3 Algorithm Description
We now describe the greedy 2-approximation algorithm. The algorithm determines
SGl , the set of secondary networks on channel l for l = 1, . . . ,M. Denote by q
G
i,l, the
amount of secondary throughput allocated by the greedy algorithm to network i in the
l’th channel. Since each network in SGl equally shares the secondary throughput on
channel l, we have:
qGi,l =



W (1−α)
|SG
l
|
if i ∈ SGl
0 else
(282)
Let yli(.) be the (q
G
i,1 + . . .+q
G
i,l)-residual bid function of network i, that is, its residual
bid function after accounting for the secondary throughput allocated to it in channels 1
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to l. Note that for each network i, y0i (.) is the bid function yi(.).
The greedy algorithm successively determines SGl , for l = 1, . . . ,M, one channel at
a time. Suppose the algorithm has determined SG1 ,S
G
2 , . . . ,S
G
l−1 and for each network
i, has found the residual bid function yl−1i (.). It assigns channel l using the following
steps:
STEP1: For j = 1, . . . ,n, find the maximum increase in revenue Rlj obtainable
from channel l by dividing the channel into m j secondary parts using the following
rule. Sort the set of numbers yl−1i
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
, i = 1, . . . ,N into decreasing order. Let
yl−1(v)
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
denote the v’th largest element. Then Rlj is given by:
Rlj =
m j
∑
v=1
yl−1(v)
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
STEP2: Find the maximum among Rl1, . . . ,R
l
n. Suppose R
l
j is the maximum. Then
divide the l’th channel into m j secondary parts. On the l’th channel, the m j networks
with the m j largest values y
l−1
(1)
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
, . . . ,yl−1(m j)
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
, which were determined
in STEP1, become secondary networks. This determines SGl .
STEP3: For each i ∈ SGl , find the function y
l
i(.) from its bid function yi(.) and
qGi,1, . . . ,q
G
i,l. Note that q
G
i,l is given by (282).
Comments on Algorithm:
1. Once channels 1, . . . , l − 1 have been allocated, steps 1 and 2 allocate channel l
so as to obtain the maximum possible increase in revenue over the revenue from
channels 1, . . . , l − 1. This property will be crucial in proving the approximation
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ratio of 2.
2. In Step 3, for conceptual clarity, we have not presented the most efficient imple-
mentation. Specifically, the function yli(.) need not be computed from scratch. It
can be found iteratively from yl−1i (.) using the update rule in part 1 of Lemma 62.
See Section 7.7.5 for details.
7.7.4 Approximation Ratio
Theorem 25. Let R∗ be the maximum possible revenue under any allocation of the
rights to be secondary networks on the M channels and let RG be that achieved by the
above greedy algorithm. Then RG ≥ R
∗
2
.
Proof. Let Rl be the increase in revenue obtained by the greedy algorithm from allocat-
ing the l’th channel. By part 2 of Lemma 62:
yli(q)≤ y
l−1
i (q) ∀q ≥ 0 (283)
From the discussion after Lemma 61, it follows that after channels 1, . . . , l were allo-
cated, the extra money network i was willing to pay for its share in channel (l + 1) is
yli(q
G
i,l+1). Moreover, if the greedy algorithm were to allocate the l’th channel to the
same set of networks, SGl+1, to whom it actually allocated the (l+1)’st channel, then:
1. each network in SGl+1 would have received on the l’th channel, a throughput of
W (1−α)
|SG
l+1|
, which equals qGi,l+1 by (282),
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2. after channels 1, . . . , l − 1 were allocated, the extra money network i would be
willing to pay for its share in channel l would have been yl−1i (q
G
i,l+1) and hence by
(283),
3. the increase in revenue from the l’th channel would have been at least Rl+1.
But the actual increase in revenue from the l’th channel, Rl , is by definition of the
greedy rule, the maximum possible from allocating the l’th channel. Hence Rl ≥ Rl+1.
Thus, we get:
R1 ≥ R2 ≥ . . .≥ RM.
Since RG = R1 + . . .+RM , we get:
RM ≤
RG
M
(284)
Now, let q∗i be the total secondary throughput allocated by the optimal algorithm
to network i and qGi be that allocated by the greedy algorithm. Also, let S
∗
l be the
set of secondary networks on the l’th channel, l = 1, . . . ,M, in the optimal allocation.
Next, we will upper bound R∗−RG, the excess revenue of the optimal allocation over
the greedy allocation. To this end, for each network i, we account for its payment
for max(q∗i −q
G
i ,0), the excess secondary throughput if any, of the optimal allocation
over the greedy algorithm’s allocation, by accounting for its payments for the chunks
qei,l, l = 1, . . . ,M. Here, q
e
i,l is the contribution of channel l to the excess max(q
∗
i −q
G
i ,0),
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once the contributions of channels 1, . . . , l−1 have been accounted for and is given by:
qei,l = min
(
W (1−α)
|S∗l |
,
max(q∗i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,l−1,0)
)
, i ∈ S∗l (285)
qei,l = 0, i /∈ S
∗
l (286)
We motivate the expressions above. The second term in the min in (285) is equal to
the as yet unaccounted for excess, if any, obtained by subtracting the contributions
qei,1, . . . ,q
e
i,l−1 of channels 1, . . . , l−1 from the total excess throughput max(q
∗
i −q
G
i ,0).
Also, since channel l is shared by |S∗l | networks, q
e
i,l ≤
W (1−α)
|S∗
l
| . Hence, q
e
i,l is the mini-
mum of the two terms in (285).
From (285) and (286), it can be shown using a simple, yet tedious, case by case
analysis that:
q∗i −q
G
i ≤
M
∑
l=1
qei,l, i = 1, . . . ,N (287)
We relegate the proof of (287) to Section 7.10.
Let yei,l(.) be the (q
G
i +q
e
i,1 + . . .+q
e
i,l)-residual bid function of network i.
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Now,
R∗ =
N
∑
i=1
yi(q
∗
i )
≤
N
∑
i=1
yi(q
G
i +
M
∑
l=1
qei,l)
(by (287) and since yi(.) is increasing)
=
N
∑
i=1
(
yi(q
G
i )+
M
∑
l=1
yei,l−1(q
e
i,l)
)
(by Lemma 61)
= RG +
M
∑
l=1
N
∑
i=1
yei,l−1(q
e
i,l)
= RG +
M
∑
l=1
∑
i∈S∗
l
yei,l−1(q
e
i,l) (288)
where the last step follows since qei,l = 0 if i /∈ S
∗
l by (286) and since y
e
i,l−1(0) = 0.
Now, by the definitions of yM−1i (.) and y
e
i,l−1(.), part 2 of Lemma 62 and (288), we
get:
R∗−RG ≤
M
∑
l=1

∑
i∈S∗
l
yM−1i (q
e
i,l)

 (289)
Now, qei,l ≤
W (1−α)
|S∗
l
| by (285) and (286), and since y
M−1
i (.) is increasing by part 2 of
Lemma 60, we get the following inequality from (289):
R∗−RG ≤
M
∑
l=1

∑
i∈S∗
l
yM−1i
(
W (1−α)
|S∗l |
)
 (290)
Now, we have:
∑
i∈S∗
l
yM−1i
(
W (1−α)
|S∗l |
)
≤ RM (291)
because when the greedy algorithm was about to allocate channel M, the increase in rev-
enue it would have got from the channel if it allocated the channel to the |S∗l | networks
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in the set S∗l is equal to the expression on the left hand side of (291) (refer to Lemma 61
and the discussion immediately following it). This expression is at most RM, since the
greedy algorithm allocates the M’th channel so as to maximize the increase in revenue
from it.
By (290) and (291), we get:
R∗−RG ≤
M
∑
l=1
RM
≤ RG (from (284))
The result follows.
7.7.5 Efficient Implementation
We now describe an efficient implementation of the greedy algorithm.
We first discuss how to store the function yli(.) so that y
l
i(q) can be found for any q
in O(logP) time. Recall from part 2 of Lemma 60 that yli(.) is piecewise linear. Similar
to the representation of the bid function yi(.), y
l
i(.) is stored by storing its value at P
l
i
values qli,1, . . . , q
l
i,Pli
, which are the breakpoints of the piecewise linear function yli(.).
Also, yli(q), where q
l
i,v < q < q
l
i,v+1 is found by linear interpolation similar to (275):
yli(q) = y
l
i(q
l
i,v)+
(
yli(q
l
i,v+1)− y
l
i(q
l
i,v)
qli,v+1 −q
l
i,v
)
(q−qli,v) (292)
Now, the numbers qli,1, . . . ,q
l
i,Pli
and the numbers yli(q
l
i,1), . . . ,y
l
i(q
l
i,Pli
) can be stored in
two sorted arrays, so that for any v, qli,v and y
l
i(q
l
i,v) can be accessed in constant time.
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Also, since Pli ≤ Pi ≤ P (see the last step in the steps below), given any q, we can find v
such that qli,v ≤ q < q
l
i,v+1 by binary search [11] in O(logP) time. Once this v is found,
we can find yli(q) in constant time using (292).
Suppose the algorithm has allocated the first l−1 channels and hence has computed
yl−1i (.) and q
l−1
i,v ,v = 1, . . . ,P
l−1
i . Also, suppose the l’th channel has been divided into
m j secondary parts. While allocating channel l, in Step 3 , y
l
i(.) can be found as follows
from yl−1i (.) using the update rule in part 1 of Lemma 62. For network i, first find out
v such that:
ql−1i,v ≤
W (1−α)
m j
< ql−1i,v+1.
Then find yl−1i
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
using equation (292). Next, perform the following steps:
qli,1 = 0
yli(q
l
i,1) = 0
for t = 2,3, . . . ,Pl−1i − v+1 do
qli,t = q
l−1
i,t+v−1 −
W (1−α)
m j
yli(q
l
i,t) = y
l−1
i (q
l−1
i,t+v−1)− y
l−1
i
(
W (1−α)
m j
)
end for
Pli = P
l−1
i − v+1
The second statement in the for loop implements the update rule in part 1 of Lemma 62.
Also, it can be checked that the first statement in the for loop appropriately sets the
breakpoints of the function yli(.).
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It can be shown that the running time of the greedy algorithm is O(nMN logNP+
MPmn) when the above implementation is used.
7.8 Simulations
In Section 7.7.4, we proved that the greedy approximation algorithm achieves an ap-
proximation ratio of 2. In this section, we show via simulations, that in fact, for a
variety of scenarios, the greedy algorithm achieves the optimal revenue.
In all our simulations, we used the values n = 2, m1 = 1, m2 = 4 and W (1−α) =
4 units. First, we simulated the case in which the bid function of every network is
different and is a piecewise linear approximation of a quadratic function. Let Cmin,
Cmax and MAX be parameters such that Cmax > Cmin > 0 and MAX > 0. Consider the
following quadratic function:
ŷi(q) = ci
(
1−
(q−MAX)2
(MAX)2
)
, i = 1, . . . ,N (293)
The bid function yi(q) of network i is chosen to be a piecewise-linear approximation of
the above function, where the parameters ci, i = 1, . . . ,N are uniformly spaced in the
interval [Cmin,Cmax]:
ci =Cmin +(i−1)
(Cmax −Cmin)
N −1
, i = 1, . . . ,N (294)
With these bid functions, we found the revenue using the greedy approximation
algorithm and the optimal revenue using the dynamic programming algorithm in Sec-
tion 7.6. We used small values for n and M since the running time of the dynamic
266
programming algorithm grows rapidly with these parameters (see Section 7.6.2). For
different values of the parameters N, Cmin, Cmax and MAX , we evaluated the revenues
of the greedy algorithm and the optimal revenue for M varying from 5 to 60 and found
that the greedy algorithm achieves the optimal revenue.
Next, we considered the case in which there are two classes of networks and the
bid function of each network in the same class is the same. The bid functions yi(q) of
networks i = 1, . . . ,N1 and of networks i = N1 +1, . . . ,N are piecewise linear approxi-
mations of the following exponential functions respectively:
ŷi(q) = B1(1− exp(−a1q)), i = 1, . . . ,N1 (295)
ŷi(q) = B2(1− exp(−a2q)), i = N1 +1, . . . ,N (296)
where a1, a2, B1, B2 and N1 are parameters. For different values of these parameters, we
evaluated the revenues of the greedy algorithm and the optimal revenue for M varying
from 5 to 60 and found that the greedy algorithm achieves the optimal revenue.
Thus, although the worst-case approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm is 2, in a
variety of scenarios, it achieves the optimal revenue.
Nevertheless, we could construct some pathological examples in which the greedy
algorithm achieves a revenue equal to 5
6
times the optimal revenue and is therefore
strictly sub-optimal. We now describe one such example. Let M = 2, N = 3, n = 2,
m1 = 2, m2 = 3 and W (1−α) = 6. The bid function of network i, i ∈ {1,2,3} is given
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by:
yi(q) =



qβi if q ≤ 4
4βi if q > 4
(297)
where β1 = β2 = 1, β3 = 1−ε and ε is a small positive constant. It can be checked that
the greedy algorithm assigns channel 1 to networks 1 and 2 and channel 2 to networks 1,
2 and 3 and achieves a revenue of RG = (10−2ε). The optimal algorithm assigns each
one of channels 1 and 2 to networks 1, 2 and 3 and achieves a revenue of R∗= (12−4ε).
Note that R
G
R∗
equals 5
6
in the limit as ε tends to 0.
In summary, the greedy algorithm is sub-optimal only for pathological input in-
stances, and is optimal for a large variety of “well-behaved” inputs; thus, it performs
well in practice.
7.9 Future Work
We now describe some directions for future research. We conjecture that the access al-
location problem described in Section 7.7.1 is NP-hard. Our conjecture is motivated by
the facts that (a) the bid function of each network can be an arbitrary real-valued func-
tion satisfying the conditions in Section 7.7.1, (b) the number of secondary networks
on each channel can be selected from a possibly large set {m1, . . . ,mn} and (c) the set
of secondary networks on each channel can be an arbitrary subset of the set of all N
networks. The proof of the conjecture remains an open problem for future research.
Also, we considered the case when the M channels are identical. The extension to
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non-identical channels remains an open problem.
When the auctioneer’s objective is to maximize its revenue, note that the algorithms
that we designed for the access allocation problem can be used to maximize the auc-
tioneer’s revenue given the bids zi(.) of the bidders. To compute its bid, a bidder i may
use different strategies, which it thinks will maximize its net utility in (255). For ex-
ample, when auctions are conducted periodically, a bidder may compute its bid based
on its knowledge of the outcomes of previous auctions. An open problem is the design
of allocation strategies for the auctioneer and bidding strategies for the bidders when
each player chooses its strategies based on the outcomes of previous auctions in order
to influence the other players to act to its own advantage.
7.10 Appendix
Proof of (287)
By (285) and (286), for each channel l, one of the following cases must hold true
for each network i:
Case 1: If i /∈ S∗l , then q
e
i,l = 0.
Case 2: Else, if
W (1−α)
|S∗
l
| ≤ q
∗
i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,l−1 then q
e
i,l =
W (1−α)
|S∗
l
| .
Case 3: Else, if q∗i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,l−1 < 0, then q
e
i,l = 0.
Case 4: Else, qei,l = q
∗
i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,l−1.
Fix a network i. If Case 3 holds for some channel, then let v be the first such channel.
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Then, q∗i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,v−1 < 0, q
e
i,v = 0 and by (285) and (286), q
e
i,v+1 = . . . =
qei,M = 0. Hence:
q∗i −q
G
i <
M
∑
l=1
qei,l
and (287) is satisfied.
Now, if Case 4 holds for some channel, then let v be the first such channel. Then
q∗i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,v−1 −q
e
i,v = 0 and by (285) and (286), q
e
i,v+1 = . . . = q
e
i,M = 0.
Hence:
q∗i −q
G
i =
M
∑
l=1
qei,l
and (287) is satisfied.
Otherwise, neither of Case 3 and Case 4 holds for any channel. Then, for each
channel, one of Case 1 and Case 2 holds and we get that for l = 1, . . . ,M:
qei,l =



W (1−α)
|S∗l |
if i ∈ S∗l
0 else
(298)
Let l = M′ be the last channel for which i ∈ S∗l . Then by the above equation, q
e
i,M′ =
W (1−α)
|S∗
M′
| and by (285) with l = M
′:
q∗i −q
G
i −q
e
i,1 − . . .−q
e
i,M′−1 ≥
W (1−α)
|S∗
M′
|
= qei,M′ (299)
By definition of M′, qei,M′+1 = . . .= q
e
i,M = 0. So if equality holds in (299), then (287)
is satisfied with equality. If there is a strict inequality in (299), then:
q∗i > q
e
i,1 + . . .+q
e
i,M
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which is a contradiction because
q∗i = q
e
i,1 + . . .+q
e
i,M
since qei,l given by (298) is precisely the amount of secondary throughput allocated
by the optimal algorithm to network i on channel l. Hence, there cannot be a strict
inequality in (299).
Thus, (287) is satisfied in all cases.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
We investigated the economics of spectrum allocation in CRNs in this dissertation.
We considered both the one-step allocation scheme, in which the regulator allocates
spectrum simultaneously to the primaries and the secondaries in a single allocation and
the two-step allocation scheme in which the regulator first allocates spectrum to primary
users, who then separately allocate unused portions on their channels to secondary
users.
Chapters 2 to 6 focussed on the two-step allocation scenario. In particular, Chap-
ters 2 to 5 analyzed the case in which there are a small number of primaries and secon-
daries using the framework of game theory. In Chapter 3, we found the Nash equilib-
rium (NE) and proved its uniqueness for price competition among multiple primaries
when all the players are located in a single location. The structure of the NE provides
several interesting insights into the behavior of the primaries; in particular, it suggests
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that we can expect to see randomization in the setting of the prices by the primaries.
As we mentioned earlier, this can be interpreted as the primaries holding sales to attract
secondaries. In Chapter 4, we generalized our model to allow for random valuations of
secondaries, found the symmetric NE and showed its uniqueness. We showed that the
symmetric NE strategy can be non-contiguous, unlike in the case of constant valuations
of secondaries. In Chapter 5, we analyzed price competition among primaries in the
presence of spatial reuse. We showed that in a fairly general class of graphs, called
mean valid graphs, which covers several conflict graphs that commonly arise in prac-
tice, there exists a unique NE in the class of NE in which all the primaries use the same
distribution for selecting the independent set to offer bandwidth at. Also, this NE has a
simple form and we provided a system of equations which can be solved to explicitly
compute the NE.
We have mainly studied the game in a single slot. As future work, it will be interest-
ing to analyze the case where primaries interact over multiple slots and employ learn-
ing strategies to adapt their behavior in a slot based on their experience from past slots.
Another open question is whether there exist new equilibria if we allow for correlated
equilibria. Analysis of the game in which groups of primaries collude and coordinate
their prices is another open problem for future research.
In Chapter 6, we considered a spectrum market with a large number of primaries
and secondaries and analyzed the problem of optimal dynamic selection of a portfo-
lio of different types of spectrum contracts using the framework of stochastic dynamic
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programming. We proved several interesting structural properties of the optimal solu-
tion that provide insight and can be used to speed up the computation of the optimal
solution.
In Chapter 7, we designed an auction framework for the one-step allocation scenario–
we devised several bidding languages that the primaries and secondaries can use to
compactly express their bids and polynomial-time algorithms that the regulator can use
to solve the access allocation problem.
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